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This study uses Kingdon’s multiple streams framework (MSF) to examine the local agenda 
setting process in Bristol during the election for a directly elected mayor in 2016. It uses 
housing policy as the basis for discussion and develops the MSF to provide an 
understanding of how mayoral candidates decide their priorities pre- and post-election. 
 
The fieldwork for the research was based on an interpretive policy ethnography, utilising the 
opportunity to experience the election process from the perspective of those involved in it. A 
combination of methods for collecting data were used to study the process over a period of 
nine months, involving mayoral candidates and policy entrepreneurs. These included 
observation (practice), interviews (talk) and analysis of documentation (considered writing).  
 
The research considered how a predictable window opened in the politics stream as the 
election began, and how the streams came together as party agendas were produced and 
diverged again once the election was over, as a new, smaller window opened before the 
new mayoral decision agenda was set. The research identifies how mayoral candidates 
operate across the streams, seeking ideas and solutions, from within and outside of the 
party system. It illustrates the strategies and tactics used by policy entrepreneurs to bring 
their issues to the attention of the candidates.  
 
This research draws conclusions on who and what influences the agenda before, during and 
after an election and demonstrates the role local political parties and policy entrepreneurs 
play in party and decision agendas. It illustrates how coalitions and networks bring 
opportunities for greater influence to the individuals and groups involved in them. The 
research also demonstrates the benefit of bringing solutions alongside problems, as local 
actors display a willingness to work with the council to achieve more desirable outcomes in 
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This research is about agenda setting during the Bristol mayoral election in 2016. 
The impetus for this study came from an interest in why some issues grab policy 
makers’ attention whilst others do not and how priorities are set during an election 
process. It stemmed from a desire to develop a better understanding of the role local 
elections play in framing policy agendas, the role and impact of different influencers, 
as well as how politicians make decisions about priorities when time is limited. It also 
came from an interest in agenda setting theory, particularly Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework (MSF), and how that could be used to understand how agendas 
are set at a local level in the UK during an election (Kingdon, 1984).  
 
Kingdon’s MSF has traditionally been used to explore agenda setting at a national 
level, initially in the US, and more recently across a range of other countries. Most of 
the research has been qualitative, using interviewing and documentary evidence as 
the main forms of data collection, with few using observation or participant 
observation (Jones et al, 2015). Very little research has been carried out at a local 
level in the UK and none of that has specifically looked at agenda setting as it 
happened during an election period or within the new model of local governance in 
the UK where there is a directly elected mayor. The basic assumptions of the MSF 
suggest that the number of issues under consideration at any one time are limited, 
as is the capacity of policy makers to deal with these issues due to significant time 
constraints. These assumptions seemed particularly relevant to a study of agenda 
setting during an election, where time is limited, many different issues will be raised 
by different actors and competition for attention will be high. The focus of the MSF on 
agenda setting was a good fit with my own focus and its emphasis on the role of 
policy entrepreneurs seemed particularly pertinent in terms of the potential for 
influence during an election campaign. Other theories of the policy process were 
considered but after an initial analysis (see table in Appendix 1) the MSF was 




This research was based on a real time study of that activity as it took place, pre- 
and immediately post-election. It explored the relevance of the idea of windows of 
opportunity and the role of policy entrepreneurs throughout the agenda setting 
process, highlighting where the MSF provided a useful framework for understanding. 
It is not, however, a study that explicitly sought to test a theory or hypothesis. Rather, 
it sought to use the MSF to help understand what was happening and to construct a 
story of events as they were seen by the people at the centre of the action. The 
approach adopted used the idea of interpreting actors’ own constructions of what 
they were doing through an analysis of their beliefs and everyday practices, as well 
as what they did, and what they said they did (Rhodes, 2013). It focused on a local 
case study of Bristol using an ethnographic approach to examine how, if and why 
particular aspects of housing policy were prioritised during the mayoral election. It 
did this through a detailed exploration of the approach, reactions and perceptions of 
local political decision makers and the individuals, groups and networks trying to 
influence them.  
 
This research was broadly guided by an epistemology and ontology that was 
interpretivist and social constructionist by design and explanatory in its approach. It 
sought to understand the way in which different actors perceived and made sense of 
the world.  The aim was to understand how individual actors or groups influenced a 
specific policy agenda during an election and how the mayoral candidates 
responded to that influence. The fieldwork for the research was based on an 
interpretive policy ethnography, utilising the opportunity to experience the election 
process from the perspective of those involved in it. A combination of methods for 
collecting data were used to study the process over a period of nine months, 
involving mayoral candidates and influencers. These included observation (practice), 
interviews (talk) and analysis of documentation (considered writing). The approach 
adopted used the idea of interpreting actors’ own constructions of what they were 
doing through an analysis of their beliefs and everyday practices, as well as what 
they did, and what they said they did (Rhodes, 2013). 
 
The research and the use of Bristol as a case study rests on three basic premises. 
Firstly, using housing policy as the focus for attention was justified as it was widely 
acknowledged that there was a housing crisis in the UK generally and at a local level 
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in Bristol more specifically. It was also a time of constant, ad hoc policy change at 
national, sub national and local level. Nationally the focus was often on the supply of 
housing, with different political parties competing to set the highest target for new 
build. The wider approach to housing policy varied from supporting people to buy 
their own home and reducing the unnecessary restrictions of the planning system, to 
encouraging landowners and property developers to release more land for housing 
and supporting buy-to-let landlords (Murie, 2012; Reeves, 2014). The ability to 
approach the problem comprehensively seemed to get lost in a mix of politics, ‘big 
ideas’ and short-term thinking (King, 2010). In Bristol the crisis has played out in 
terms of both the overall supply and affordability of housing. Outside of London and 
the South East, Bristol and the West of England is one of the most expensive places 
to live in the UK. In recent years house building in Bristol has fallen well short of 
requirements (Hughes, 2015).  
 
The second basic premise of the research was that Bristol provides an interesting 
case study for research. It was the only core city to vote yes to having a directly 
elected mayor in the city referendums held across England in 2012. Bristol it seemed 
had a particular set of local circumstances that led to this vote, including perceptions 
of unstable local leadership with constant changes in political control and leaders, 
and a lack of visibility, with the council frequently criticised for being inward looking 
(Marsh, 2012; Fenwick, 2013). The Localism Act (HMG, 2011), provided the 
opportunity to vote for a new form of leadership, with a directly elected mayor 
providing a clear focus for decision making. There had also been considerable 
recent debate about devolution and the role of city regions, with Bristol featuring as 
one of the areas that sought increased powers and resources from central 
government in exchange for adopting a combined authority and metro-mayor1 
(Wintour, 2015). In 2016 there was the first mayoral re-election campaign since the 
model was introduced. It was also the first time in 20 years that all 70 councillors, 
across the city, came up for election at the same time. It was therefore quite a 
significant local election, coming just a year after the general election, and potentially 
a period of significant change for the city. 
 
 
1 The first metro mayor for the West of England Combined Authority was elected in May 2017 
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Thirdly, an understanding of how issues get onto, and move up and down, the policy 
agenda during a period of political change at a local level is an area of research that 
has not received particularly extensive attention over the years. The focus of much 
agenda setting research is either at a national level or is historically focused, looking 
back at how a decision was taken or a policy change generated over a longer time 
period (Carter & Jacobs, 2014). This research looked at local agenda setting as it 
happened, at a moment in time, and sought to understand why it was happening, 
who or what was influencing the process and how those under influence responded 
and reacted. It focused on an election period where there was a concentration of 
political activity, over a short period of time, when influence, engagement and 
responsiveness were likely to be greater than at most other times. 
 
The two main questions this research sought to address were as follows:   
 
1. How do issues get onto the policy agenda during an election campaign?  
This question addressed how political manifestos are developed and how 
priorities are decided. It looked at how candidates prioritised their engagement 
with different actors, who they listened to and why. 
 
2. Who is trying to influence the agenda and how?   
This questioned addressed who the main actors were during the election process 
and the tactics and strategies they used to attract attention to particular issues. 
 
 
This research demonstrates how, in Kingdon’s terms, a predictable window opened 
in the politics stream as the election began creating opportunities for change and for 
influencers to push their own agenda and issues. The streams were then drawn 
together as party agendas were produced immediately prior to the election, followed 
immediately by a hiatus until the election took place. Once the election was over, the 
streams appeared to diverge once again, as a new smaller window opened, 
providing additional opportunities for influence on changes to the mayoral agenda 
before it was finalised soon after the election. The research identifies how mayoral 
candidates operated across the streams, seeking ideas and solutions, from within 
and outside of the party system.  It considers the role of the party in political decision 
making, demonstrating clear party influence at key points in the process, running 
alongside wider engagement with non-party members, experts and professionals. 
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The research also highlights the strategies and tactics used by policy entrepreneurs 
to bring their issues to the attention of the candidates. It demonstrates which 
strategies were used during the election process and which ones appeared to 
achieve success. It shows how clever use of storytelling and framing a problem 
generated media and public attention for an issue, as well as how important 
evidence was at a local level to highlight and reinforce the extent of a problem. It 
illustrates how coalitions and networks created opportunities for greater influence to 
the individuals and groups involved in them. The research also demonstrates the 
benefit of bringing solutions alongside problems, as local actors displayed a 
willingness to work with the council to achieve more desirable outcomes in the 
delivery of affordable housing in Bristol. 
 
The policy entrepreneurs identified are shown to operate as individuals, coalitions 
and networks to promote their ideas and solutions, bringing the streams together at 
varying points as housing priorities are developed by the candidates. They remain 
vigilant throughout, using every opportunity available to them to bring their issues to 
the forefront of attention. 
 
The research identifies key stages in the process where the opportunities for 
influence were greatest and where agendas were set. It identifies who and what 
influenced the agenda before, during and after the election and demonstrates the 
role local political parties and policy entrepreneurs play in party and decision 
agendas. Above all this research provides an understanding of agenda setting during 
the Bristol mayoral election from the perspective of the candidates and the policy 
entrepreneurs active during the campaign and their role and influence throughout.  
 
 
1.1 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 explores agendas and agenda setting, beginning with a discussion of the 
different types of agenda and the development of agenda setting before a detailed 
introduction to Kingdon’s multiple streams framework. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the limitations of the MSF and how I adapted it for my research. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the approach I adopted, highlighting the epistemological and 
ontological underpinnings before describing interpretive policy ethnography and the 
methods I used in my ethnographic fieldwork. It recognises the role I play in the 
research, as a participant as well as an observer. It finishes by describing the 
process used for analysis and presentation of data and the main purpose of the 
research. In Chapter 4 I introduce Bristol, the city where my research took place and 
the setting for the chapters that follow. This includes a discussion of governance and 
leadership, elections, and housing policy in Bristol. Chapters 5-7 present the findings 
and initial analysis of my research, using Kingdon’s MSF as a basis for the chapters; 
An Introduction to the Candidates and Influencers; The Agenda Window; and The 
Decision Window. There follows in Chapter 8 a more detailed analysis of the findings 
relating to the two main research questions and drawing on the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 9 draws together my conclusions, providing a summary of 
findings, my assessment of my contribution to knowledge and an outline of the 
limitations of the study.  
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2.0 Agendas and Agenda Setting  
 
This chapter provides an introduction to agenda setting and Kingdon’s MSF. The 
MSF provides a simple, useable and well-established framework that enables an 
exploration of how agendas are set. The potential of the policy window and policy 
entrepreneur concepts are particularly relevant to my research, where an election 
presents a predictable window of opportunity and different interest groups and 
individuals mobilise, during this window, to attempt to influence the agenda of the 
different political parties and candidates. These terms and concepts are explored in 
detail in this chapter. 
 
Before I begin a discussion of the MSF, the next section provides a discussion of 
what we mean by ‘the agenda’ and the development of agenda setting theory over 
time together with the main questions it seeks to address. There then follows a more 
detailed discussion of Kingdon’s MSF, its basic assumptions, structural elements 
and how it has been used and adapted, as well as its main strengths and 
weaknesses. The chapter draws to a close with a revised framework setting out how 
I have used the MSF in my research. 
 
 
2.1 What is Agenda Setting? 
Before beginning a discussion of agenda setting it is important to first establish what 
is meant by the term ‘the agenda’. Agendas exist at all levels of government and are 
generally a collection of issues available for debate or consideration (Birkland, 
2007:63). The following quotes provide some brief definitions: 
 
“The agenda, as I conceive it, is the list of subjects or problems to which 
government officials, and people outside of government closely associated 
with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time.” 
(Kingdon, 1984:3). 
 
“An agenda is a collection of problems, understandings of causes, symbols, 
solutions, and other elements of public problems that come to the attention of 
members of the public and their governmental officials.” (Birkland, 2007:63). 
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Birkland, (2007: 63-65) explains the different levels of agenda that exist: the agenda 
universe, the largest level, includes all possible issues and ideas that could be 
discussed within a society; whereas the systemic agenda includes issues perceived 
as meriting public attention and are within the legitimate concern of the governing 
authority, but are still some way from enactment. The institutional agenda consists of 
those items that are “explicitly up for active consideration by decision makers” and is 
a subset of the systemic agenda (Birkland, 2007:64). Beyond this is the decision 
agenda, which includes issues that are “about to be acted upon” (Birkland, 2007:65). 
As different groups seek to influence the agenda, they advance issues from the 
agenda universe, through the systemic agenda to the institutional and decision 
agendas (see Figure 1).  
 
















Source: Birkland (2007:64) 
 
In contrast, Dearing & Rogers (1996:5) suggest that “the agenda setting process is 
composed of the media agenda, the public agenda, and the policy agenda, and the 
interrelationship among these three elements.”  The public (systemic) agenda 
consists of issues of public interest that are in need of attention. The public agenda 
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is generally measured by public opinion surveys whilst the media agenda is defined 
using content analysis of the news media. The policy agenda focuses on how an 
issue gets onto the agenda and, according to Dearing and Rogers (1996:18), is 
generally measured by legislature, resource allocation and the time given to debate. 
This is similar to the institutional agenda, identified by both Birkland (2007) and Cobb 
and Elder (1983:14-15), which is defined as “issues under active discussion in 
political institutions with a view to constructing policies”. The decision agenda is 
where items are about to be formalised and acted upon by the governing body 
(Birkland, 2007:64). 
 
My research is concerned with public policy agenda setting and how issues move 
from the systemic agenda, to the institutional agenda and then onto the decision 
agenda:  
 
“The policy agenda is the range of salient issues that the government and 
other key decision makers concentrate on at any one point in time.” Kingdon 
(2011:3). 
 
The policy agenda consists of an ordering and prioritisation of issues brought about 
by the constraints of both time and capacity (Zahariadis, 2007). There is also a 
filtering process where the items policy makers believe they can affect will be 
included on the institutional and decision agenda. This can also include symbolic 
issues where policy makers believe they need to be seen to be doing something to 
placate supporters but where they are unlikely to have much effect (Zahariadis, 
2016:6). In addition, the process by which agendas are set may differ as a result of 
institutional and cultural variations.  
 
Evolution of Agenda Setting 
Agenda setting is often described as the beginning of the policy process where the 
questions addressed focus on how some issues get on the agenda whilst others 
languish, why decision makers pay attention to one thing rather than another and 
who sets the policy agenda (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). It could also be the end of 
the process if issues do not make it onto the agenda or are there too fleetingly to 
receive full attention (Kingdon, 1984). 
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Agenda setting theory has been defined differently by different traditions over the 
years. Much of the focus in the 1960s and 1970s was on media and public agenda 
setting, with extensive studies carried out looking at the role of the media and the 
public in influencing agendas. There are a large number of studies within journalism 
about the role and impact of the mass media on agendas, including research by 
McCombs et al (2014), which identified different facets of agenda setting. These 
facets that range from basic agenda setting to ‘agendamelding’ help to explain the 
salience of issues and the way the top issues of the moment flow from the news 
media to the public agenda McCombs et al (2014:782). More recent work has 
widened this use of media to include social media and its impact on agenda setting 
during the 2012 Presidential election in the United States (Vargo et al, 2014; 
Neuman et al, 2014). This is an area of potential relevance to my research as the 
role of the local media and use of social media may well be significant in raising 
issues and generating attention to particular issues. The concept of ‘agendamelding’ 
may also be particularly important, where it is argued “we meld agendas from 
various sources to create pictures of the world that fit our experiences and 
preferences” (McCombs et al, 2014:794).  
 
Studies of agenda setting and policy dynamics date back to the work of Simon 
(1957), Downs (1972) and Schattschneider (1960). Simon’s notion of bounded 
rationality highlighted the limits to decision-making, which included an individual’s 
inability to pay attention to all aspects of a problem; the lack of perfect information; 
uncertainty over how decisions will be perceived; and lack of complete knowledge 
over preferences (Pump, 2011:1). The idea of bounded rationality was further 
considered by Downs (1972:5) who asserted that “public attention rarely stays 
focused on one issue for long”. The ‘issue-attention cycle’ where issues leap into 
prominence for a short time, then fade from public attention if unresolved, was used 
by Downs in a study of the quality of the environment in the US. He was interested in 
understanding why issues gained attention and how long they remained of high 
interest.  
 
Downs (1972) maintains that assuming certain characteristics are present then 
issues will go through five stages, where attention increases until the issue is centre 
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stage, and then gradually declines as other more fashionable or pressing issues 
move to the centre. The characteristics of social problems that go through the ‘issue-
attention cycle’ include situations where the majority are not suffering from the 
problem as much as some minority, so most people do not suffer directly enough 
from the problem to keep their attention for any length of time. In this instance a 
focusing event, such as a flood, could raise attention while it is happening but as 
soon as it ends public interest wanes.  
 
The stages model, prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, identifies agenda setting 
as the first ‘stage’ of the policy process (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Weible, 2014:8). In 
this model the process of policy making begins with defining a public problem that 
requires government attention, possible solutions are then discussed to form the 
policy agenda (Lasswell, 1956). Whilst there is no one single agreed stages model, it 
is frequently characterised as a process through which decisions are made in a 
series of sequential stages, which begin with the identification of issues, the 
definition of a problem and the provision of a range of activities that solve the 
problem. Policy makers will then enact solutions and implement policy, followed by 
some form of monitoring and evaluation.  
 
There are some similarities between the issue-attention cycle, the stages model and 
Kingdon’s MSF, which was designed to explain agenda setting at the national level 
in the US and focuses on what makes an issue take hold and increase in 
prominence (Kingdon, 1984). It explores the agenda setting stage of the policy 
process and consists of five main structural elements: policy, problem and politics 
streams; policy windows; and policy entrepreneurs. Whilst the MSF was designed to 
be used under conditions of ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2016) and derives its inspiration 
from Cohen et al’s (1972) garbage can model, the focus of the framework is on how 
the three streams come together or are brought together by policy entrepreneurs, 
during a window of opportunity, to create the conditions for policy change. If issue 
proponents or policy entrepreneurs fail to take advantage of the open window to 
create the change they are seeking then the opportunity is lost, and the issue fades 
from attention (see more detailed discussion later in this chapter). 
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Agendas, Agenda Setting and Elections  
Further work has looked at the role that crises can play in agenda setting, particularly 
in relation to policy subsystems and issue networks (Birkland, 1997; Jochim & May, 
2010; Jones & Jenkins-Smith, 2009). The work by Birkland (1997) is worth further 
consideration here. He looked at disasters as focusing events and considered how 
they influence agendas. In his study of natural and environmental disasters he drew 
particularly on Kingdon’s MSF and Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Drawing on Birkland’s explanation of why it is 
important to study focusing events as part of agenda setting provides some useful 
arguments to support the idea of studying elections as focusing events (Birkland, 
1997:4-5).  More specifically, three of his arguments seem to be particularly 
applicable for my research. Firstly, Birkland argues that focusing events are an 
opportunity for individuals and the general public to look at specific problems and ask 
why they have not been considered and what can be done about them.  Secondly, 
Birkland identified a gap in the study of agenda setting and policy making around the 
impact and influence of focusing events, and the same is true now of the impact of 
local elections (Jennings et al, 2011). Kingdon (1984) makes mention of elections as 
potential triggering events and others have looked at policy change during a new 
administration, but very few have considered the focusing role elections could play in 
terms of the opening of a ‘predictable window’ and how items move onto the policy 
and decision agendas at this time. Few studies have focused on predictable 
windows with more authors seemingly highlighting the role of policy windows 
generally rather than identifying the type of window and how processes might differ 
between predicable and unpredictable windows (Ackrill et al, 2013). This is a point I 
will return to later in the discussion on the MSF below. Finally, as Birkland suggests, 
it is possible to study what happens during a focusing event as there is a clear 
timeframe and it is likely to be easier to pinpoint cause and effect at a particular 
moment than it is at any other time.  
 
My research considers the role of elections and the opportunity they provide for 
change by their very nature, as activity around the development of manifestos and 
party policies, changes in public opinion, media coverage, and lobbying by pressure 
groups is all condensed into a relatively short and decisive period of time. This raises 
some interesting questions, as suggested by Froio et al (2017), about the extent to 
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which the policy programmes of parties presented at election times are a function of 
the priorities of national or local government (the policy agenda), the more immediate 
concerns of voters and the mass media (the public agenda), or the preferences of 
parties themselves (the party agenda). This discussion relates to the levels of the 
agenda identified above by Birkland (2007), where the public and policy agendas are 
similar, but party agendas have been added. These party agendas can relate to the 
policy agenda but are specific to political parties and are particularly relevant to this 
research as they are often, but not exclusively, developed during election 
campaigns.  
 
According to Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010), decisions on party agendas 
are based on a balancing of issues, including party concerns and ideology, and 
public and media attention. They call this the ‘party-system agenda’ where parties 
favour their own issues but are under pressure to respond to other agendas and 
events, which comes down to a choice about how they divide their scarce attention 
between competing alternatives (Downs, 1972). According to Jones and 
Baumgartner (2005) the policy priorities of government respond to shifts in public 
opinion and issue priorities of the public. This is a dynamic process where the public 
agenda and the policy agenda come together in response to one another over a 
period of time, continually adapting in response to public concerns (Froio et al, 
2017:696). These different levels and types of agenda, together with the terms I use 
in my research, are identified in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Levels and Types of the Agenda 
Levels of the Agenda Types of Agenda My Research 
Agenda Universe: 
All ideas that could be raised in a society 
  
Systemic Agenda: 
Any idea that is a shared concern of a 
significant proportion of the public and/or 
considered by policy makers/politicians as 







A subset of the systemic agenda, where ideas 









Items about to be acted upon by a 
governmental body  
 
 Mayoral Decision 
Agenda 
Sources: Birkland (2007:63-65), Cobb & Elder (1983:85-86), Froio et al (2017), Green-Pedersen & 
Mortensen (2010), Kingdon (1984:211-212). 
 
Party competition, according to Carter and Jacobs (2014), is something that has 
received little attention in the MSF. But, in parliamentary systems dominated by a 
majority party or ruling coalition, parties can play a key role in agenda setting and 
policy change. Party competition models suggest that party preferences are a 
significant factor in shaping election platforms (Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009), as 
parties position themselves around their perception of voter preferences, 
emphasizing issues that are to their advantage (Budge et al, 1983). They are also 
responsive to policy shifts of rival parties and respond to the platforms of their 
competitors (Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009). Carter and Jacobs (2014:139) in their 
work on environmental policy highlight the importance of a shift from ‘passive 
consensus’ to ‘competitive consensus’ in opening up the politics stream to the idea 
of new policy initiatives and policy change, with parties competing to see who can 
outdo one another in terms of being the greenest. It is possible to identify an 
analogous process here in recent debate on UK housing, with all parties competing 
to show who can set the highest target for new house building, with limited 
consideration initially of how to actually achieve that target. 
 
Froio et al (2017), argue that party agendas are the product of selective prioritisation 
of issues, influenced by issues generated during the preceding electoral cycle as 
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well as issues at the top of the public and media agendas in the run-up to the 
election. A similar argument was made by Easton (1953) who suggested that past 
public and policy agendas (policy legacies) structure and shape future policy 
agendas, whilst different institutional agendas respond to one another over time. The 
basic premise of this argument seems to be that political parties respond to shifts in 
public concern and update their own agendas to reflect this as new problems and 
events arise and as their attention turns to the next election. In addition, parties 
running for office develop their party platforms (or party agenda) in light of previous 
policy priorities and commitments (Rose & Davies, 1994) and those in office may 
seek to manipulate the agenda by emphasising issues where they perceive their 
opponents to be weak (Rogoff & Sibert, 1988). Party agendas may also react to past 
commitments of government by seeking to reverse reforms, highlight failures and 
provide alternative policy solutions. 
 
Once elected, priorities may shift as new administrations come to terms with distinct 
but overlapping incentives and pressures that structure their choice of policy 
priorities that make it onto the decision agenda. It is argued that scarce institutional 
and cognitive resources mean a limited number of issues can be prioritised for 
immediate policy action, leaving others to wait for attention or be disregarded (Jones 
& Baumgartner, 2005). Others have identified a continuum of policy issues, from 
essential or core issues to discretionary concerns (Froio, 2013 & 2017; Jennings et 
al, 2011). The balance is therefore “between delivering on electoral mandates, 
responding to short-term changes in public opinion and the emergence of new 
problems on the agenda” (Jennings et al, 2011:9). 
 
Froio et al (2013) developed a number of hypotheses to test the relationship 
between party agendas and policy agendas in the UK. They studied the manifestos 
of the two main political parties (Conservative and Labour) in the UK between 1983 
and 2008, Acts of Parliament, public priorities (using Ipsos-MORI polls), the ‘Speech 
from the Throne2’ and the media agenda. What they found was that parties tend to 
reflect not only their own election platforms but also the platform of their opponent, 
they respond to voters’ issues, reflect long term policy commitments (policy legacies) 
 
2 This is the term used for the Queens Speech  
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and are stable over time. This is a particularly relevant point when considering how 
candidates and parties develop their priorities and manifestos in the lead up to an 
election and then what happens after the election. There are potentially a number of 
decision points where priorities may be revised as new information is available and 
different pressures come into play.  
 
From the above discussion it is clear that there are a range of potential influences on 
how party agendas are set during election periods; what brings an issue to attention 
to begin with and how problems are identified; where solutions might come from; and 
how individuals and groups can influence the agenda. This initial set of influences is 
concentrated at election time and very much focused on the political actors at the 
centre of the election (the candidates and/or party group).  
 
 
2.2 Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework  
The focus of this section is on Kingdon’s theory of policy agenda setting and a 
discussion of the main structural elements of the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) 
to explore how and why some issues make it onto the policy agenda whilst others 
are ignored. Attention is paid to how Kingdon’s model has been used and the types 
of studies and methods employed by different authors. The main criticisms of the 
MSF are drawn out, highlighting issues and concerns about the transferability of the 
model to different settings and different levels of governance. The section draws to a 
close with a brief exploration of how the MSF is used in my research and the 
contextual issues that need to be taken into account when drawing on the model at a 
local level in the UK. 
 
Kingdon’s MSF, developed in 1984 and applied to a study of health and transport 
policy making in the US during the 1970s, looks at what problems attract attention 
and how policy agendas are set and by whom. His research was based on 247 in-
depth interviews over a four-year period (Zahariadis, 2007: viii). Kingdon (1984:2) 
describes the journey of understanding “why important people pay attention to one 
subject rather than another” as untidy, as subjects drift onto the agenda and off 
again and in retrospect it may even be difficult to discern why. But he goes on to 
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suggest that the journey is worthwhile, as the phenomena are critically important to 
our understanding of policy outcomes and government processes. He focuses on the 
two main processes where public policy making begins, the setting of the agenda 
and the specification of alternatives (Kingdon, 1984:3). The basic premise is that 
policy-making is not a rational response to clearly defined problems.  
 
Kingdon rejects the notion of a linear process in which a problem is identified, then a 
range of possible solutions are considered before a selection is made (Cairney and 
Zahariadis, 2016:87), instead he suggests the idea of three separate streams, 
problems, policy and politics. The basis of Kingdon’s MSF is that policy windows 
open when the three streams are brought together by policy entrepreneurs, 
enhancing the chances that policy makers will adopt a specific policy. The three 
independent streams come together to create the right circumstances for policy 
change to happen. A problem is identified and the chances for a problem to rise up 
the decision agenda in the politics stream are dramatically increased if a solution is 
attached. Kingdon’s idea of the “policy primeval soup” describes the agenda setting 
stage as a place where policy ideas and proposals float around and are tested for 
feasibility and viability (Kingdon, 1984:21). Then, if the important actors in the 
political stream are supportive and judge that the public mood is also amenable, an 
issue can move up the agenda (Kingdon, 1984:21). This ‘window of opportunity’ 
provides “an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to 
push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon, 1984:173). Kingdon suggests the 
following process: 
 
“The separate streams of problems, policies and politics come together at 
certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them 
are joined to favourable political forces.” (Kingdon, 1984:20). 
 
Structural Elements of the MSF 
This section will use the five main structural elements of Kingdon’s MSF to provide a 
discussion of the themes and issues relating to policy agenda setting. The main 
structural elements, as identified by Zahariadis (2014) are as follows and are also set 
out in Figure 2: 
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§ Problem stream 
§ Policy stream  
§ Political stream 
§ Policy window 
§ Policy entrepreneurs 
 
Figure 2: Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework 
 




In the problem stream the discussion is about how an issue gets defined as a 
problem for which action is required. This suggests that problems do not just exist 
but have to be defined by someone before we need to do anything about them 
(Knaggård, 2015:452).  According to Jones et al (2015:3) in the MSF “public policies 
occur when political elites want solutions to issues they perceive as problematic”. 
Kingdon argues that whether or not government officials in particular define a 
condition as a problem that warrants their attention will depend on how they hear of 
the issue and the way it is defined. The constraints that limit their capacity to respond 
are temporal, resource based and cognitive. With limited time and capacity some 
problems will make it onto the agenda whilst others may not. 
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The mechanisms by which issues are identified as problems include indicators 
illustrating change, focusing events and disasters or feedback about existing 
programs (Kingdon, 1984). According to Ritter et al (2018:1542) indicators play an 
important role in the MSF in both the problem and policy streams. These indicators 
provide data that then needs to be interpreted by participants in order to translate it 
into a problem. They are an important aspect of the problem stream, where issues 
begin to demand the attention of policy makers because the indicators demonstrate 
the extent of a problem or that it is getting worse, so the need for action becomes 
more pressing. These indicators can be in the form of quantitative data and evidence 
in research reports and academic publications, highlighting the extent of a problem 
or why and how it has increased. They can be activities or issues routinely monitored 
by local government, such as, numbers of homeless on the council waiting list, rough 
sleepers, and new affordable housing units built in a year. They can also be ‘lay 
knowledge’ from anecdotes about the experiences of members of the public or from 
broader qualitative data collected in a less formal way than statistics (Ritter et al, 
2018:1542). These indicators are used by policy makers to assess the extent of a 
problem and to monitor changes in the problem (Kingdon, 1984:96).  
 
The use of evidence to highlight problems is an important aspect of the MSF and 
agenda setting, but it is also one where questions are raised about the role of 
evidence in policy making. Evidence can mean research based technical and 
scientific evidence or it can be knowledge gained through experience, 
professionalism and political action that highlights “what works, for whom, in what 
circumstances” (Davis & Nutley, 2002). Others have argued that evidence can be 
defined as whatever will convince an audience rather than necessarily being a series 
of facts and data (Stone, 1997; Green, 2000), or as Cairney (2014:1) puts it 
“Evidence-based policy making’ (EBPM) is a vague, aspirational term, rather than a 
good description of the policy process. It can be interpreted in very different ways.” In 
my research I use evidence and knowledge together as the main indicators Kingdon 
refers to in the MSF.  
 
Focusing events can also bring problems to the attention of policy and decision 
makers when indicators alone are not enough, they push the issue onto the agenda. 
These include crises or disasters, such as an increase in the visibility of 
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homelessness or the death on the streets of someone sleeping rough. These types 
of events generate media and public attention and bring issues to the attention of 
decision makers in a more public manner. Focusing events are not always related to 
crises, they can also be linked to the personal experiences of policy makers which 
reinforce or heighten a problem and bring it to attention (Kingdon, 1984:102). 
 
Feedback also has the potential to raise a problem onto the agenda through 
monitoring, for example when programs are failing, additional problems arise as a 
result of existing activity or where there are unanticipated consequences of existing 
programs (Kingdon, 1984:106). Complaints from the public are another form of 
feedback that can push an issue onto the agenda of policy makers. 
 
In Kingdon’s MSF policy entrepreneurs are highlighted as playing a key role in 
bringing problems to public attention (Kingdon, 1984:115).  However, according to 
Knaggård (2015:452), Kingdon’s analysis misses the point that problem definition 
itself plays an important role in agenda setting and acceptability. Knaggård 
introduces the role of the problem broker, who defines conditions as problems and 
frames those conditions as a public problem “with the purpose of making policy 
makers accept it and, in the end, do something about it” (Knaggård, 2015: 452). The 
role of the problem broker seems to have been interpreted in many discussions of 
the MSF as the same as or similar to the role of the policy entrepreneur, with little 
definition or difference identified between them. Indeed, Ritter et al (2018:1542), 
discuss policy entrepreneurs as interpreting indicators in order to frame a problem 
for public attention much the same as Knaggård (2015) does. According to Herweg 
et al (2018:22), the difference between problem brokers and policy entrepreneurs is 
that problem brokers argue something must be done about a specific condition, 
whereas policy entrepreneurs suggest solutions to the problem. Kingdon identifies 
problem definition as an important part of the agenda setting process: 
 
“Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we 
should do something about them.” (Kingdon, 1984:115). 
 
This suggests conditions do not exist as problems until they are defined as such, this 
making the role of policy entrepreneurs critical to the process. 
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My research considers the different elements of the problem stream as problems are 
defined, where more established problems may come with accepted solutions but 
newer and more complex problems may not have any simple solutions that can be 
promoted. The capacity of elites to deal with problems is also pertinent, as new 
problems may struggle to enter the agenda if time is taken up with all-consuming or 
numerous other problems. Problems are seen more as social constructs than 
objective facts so agency becomes relevant in the problem stream, as problems 




The policy stream is where policy ideas and proposals are available, floating around 
in a ‘policy primeval soup’, waiting for a particular problem to appear or to gain 
acceptance (Kingdon, 1984:122-123). In the policy stream ideas and proposals go 
through a selection process, where possible policy initiatives are narrowed down to a 
short list of ideas that will be taken more seriously. This process can take a number 
of years, often using a process of ‘softening up’ where members of the policy 
community, including political parties, ‘discuss, modify, and recombine’ ideas to 
provide a smaller number of viable policy alternatives (Herweg et al, 2018:23). 
 
Policy communities are found in the policy stream and are composed of specialists 
who come together around particular policy problems. They can operate within and 
outside of government and have regular interaction with one another (Kingdon, 
1984:123). Policy entrepreneurs are a key part of these communities and are 
identified by their willingness to invest their own time and resources in advocating 
solutions to perceived and identified problems (Kingdon, 1984:129). 
 
It is in the policy stream that potential solutions are debated and where community 
consensus is built (Cooper-Searle et al, 2018). In a parliamentary democracy, 
particularly in a European context, Herweg et al (2015) suggest that political parties 
become more relevant in the policy stream than Kingdon originally envisaged, as the 
parties have a greater role to play. Parties and politicians can have an influence in 
the development of policy ideas by developing proposals themselves or by taking up 
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the ideas of others from outside the party. They can lead the development of 
consensus and bring ideas and solutions to the forefront of discussion. 
 
The proposed solutions, promoted by policy entrepreneurs, are more likely to 
succeed if they are both feasible and available as problems are identified, whilst 
other problems are more likely to fall off the agenda if they do not have readily 
available solutions (Pralle, 2009:793). Thus, the success of ideas and solutions to 
address problems and their ability to survive depend on a number of key 
characteristics, including their technical feasibility, value acceptability and resource 
adequacy. Proposals that fail to meet these criteria are not likely to survive or to 
receive serious attention (Kingdon, 1984:131). Ideas that initially fail to meet these 
criteria can be reworked and resubmitted, with a greater chance of success if 
remodelled successfully. The policy stream is seen as ready for “coupling when at 
least one viable policy alternative exists that meets the criteria for survival” (Herweg 
et al, 2018:24).  
 
Zahariadis & Allen (1995) deconstructed Kingdon’s description of the policy stream 
to provide clarity around the concept of the policy community rather than the policy 
itself. They suggest that the type of policy community or network and its level of 
integration are important to the chances of success. Important factors to consider in 
relation to the policy community are its size, the nature of its participants, access to 
decision makers and its capacity to deliver. Therefore, in the policy stream 
consideration needs to be given to both the nature of the policy proposals and the 




The politics stream is dominated by the ‘institutional and cultural context of the 
agenda’ (Jones et al, 2015:4) and consists mostly of political actors, their 
preferences and party ideology, where they are able to influence both initial 
decisions on policy and final decisions on the party agenda (Kammerman, 
2018:219). The politics stream operates independently of the problem and policy 
streams and has its own dynamics and rules (Kingdon, 1984:170).  
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Kingdon (1984:152-160) suggests that swings of national mood and social 
movements are particularly important, as well as the balance of organised political 
forces in terms of who or what influences change. National mood, whilst hard to 
evidence, refers to the idea that significant numbers of people in a country tend to 
think along common lines in relation to a particular policy problem (Herweg et al, 
2018:24). Measuring and providing an empirical base for this is difficult, but is 
nevertheless something that Kingdon suggests influences government officials and 
politicians, as they sense changes in national mood, and respond accordingly. The 
role of interest group campaigns is considered as distinctly different from the role of 
interest groups in policy communities as part of the policy stream. In the politics 
stream their role is to support or oppose particular policy ideas, making those ideas 
more or less likely to make it onto the agenda. Where these ‘organized political 
forces’ are all pointing to similar solutions then policy makers are likely to take more 
notice than if “the balance of support is tilting against a proposal” (Kingdon, 
1984:157). In most cases the balance of organised forces actually mitigates against 
change happening, particularly when the majority oppose a proposal, those 
advocating it are likely to back off in the face of such opposition (Kingdon, 1984:158-
159).  
 
Alongside national mood and organised political forces Kingdon identifies the 
importance of events within government itself, through administrative changes and 
turnover of key personnel and the “drawing of jurisdictional boundaries and by 
battles over turf” (Kingdon, 1984:160). Elections themselves provide an opportunity 
for significant change, both politically and administratively, as a change of personnel 
or of the administration itself create the potential for new actors take on new roles. 
This creates an opportunity for different influencers and policy entrepreneurs to 
reframe their ideas and solutions and to present them to these new actors in a way 
that may resonate more with their own ideology and therefore achieve success. It is 
also a time when new policy agendas will be developed and new priorities set, as the 
new administration brings with it manifesto and election promises (the party agenda), 
as well as new ideas, which have a greater opportunity to take hold particularly 





“...a window opens because of change in the political stream (e.g., a change 
of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats in 
Congress, or a shift in the national mood); or it opens because a new problem 
captures the attention of government officials and those close to them.” 
Kingdon (1984:176)  
 
 Once a window opens, in either the politics stream or the problem stream, it 
provides an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to bring the three streams together, 
as a policy problem is recognised, a solution is available and the political will is there 
to make change happen. As Ackrill et al (2013:880) suggests: 
 
“Coupling is the critical element in the MSF and is a function of both the 
nature of the policy window and the skills and resources of the policy 
entrepreneur.” 
 
Windows can be predictable or unpredictable, opening because of a planned event 
like the annual budget programme or planned legislative change, or brought about 
as a result of focusing events, crises or accidents. Predictable windows are more 
likely to lead to successful coupling of the streams whereas unpredictable windows, 
created by particular crises, are more complicated and less likely to result in change 
unless the issues raised by the crises are high on the agenda anyway (Herweg et al, 
2018:28). Howlett (1998:500) suggests there are four types of windows identified in 
Kingdon’s MSF: routine political windows; discretionary political windows; spillover 
problem windows; and random problem windows. My research focused on what 
Howlett (1998:500) defines as “routine political windows, in which institutionalized 
procedural events dictate predictable window openings”. In this instance the mayoral 
election formed the basis of a predictable window where the window opened prior to 
the election and continues as suggested by Howlett into the immediate post-election 
period (Howlett, 1998:515). 
 
Windows open in the problem or political streams and are described by Kingdon 
(1984:204) as problem windows or political windows. Depending on the impetus for 
the window, the coupling differs. For example, if the window opens in the problem 
stream then a solution to the problem needs to be found or an existing solution 
needs to be matched to a problem and support in the political stream is required 
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(Kingdon, 1984:187). In the political stream the window could come about as a result 
of an election, where the newly elected government has a particular set of policies in 
a manifesto, which they are keen to implement. In this case the solution is available 
and needs to be matched to a problem, which is helped by the process of problem 
framing discussed above and by the work of policy entrepreneurs promoting 
particular solutions. A new administration can ask “what should we do first?” 
(Kingdon, 1984:176) and different groups and individuals can push their own 
proposals and positions, but for an issue to stay on the agenda solutions also need 
to be available that are viable and feasible. Otherwise items may fall off the agenda 
as interest wanes and moves on to other issues, and the opportunity passes if the 
solution is not readily available.  
 
Policy windows may close again quickly if solutions are found to be costly or difficult 
to implement, or if political, public and media attention shifts to other priorities before 
solutions can be found. Herweg et al (2015) distinguish between agenda windows 
and decision windows, where agenda windows provide an opportunity to get an 
issue on the agenda whilst decision windows provide opportunities for policies to be 
adopted. This could be a useful distinction to make in my research when considering 
how agenda setting occurs before, during and after an election, where different 




Kingdon (1984:188) defines policy entrepreneurs as “advocates who are willing to 
invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in 
return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary 
benefits”. Levine (1985:257) suggests that policy entrepreneurs serve three main 
functions, they promote ideas, soften up the system to ensure their ideas are 
received favourably and help to bring the streams together during a window of 
opportunity. These entrepreneurs might be “elected officials, career civil servants, 
lobbyists, interest groups, academics or journalists” and can be individuals or 
corporate actors, often not defined by any specific formal position (Kingdon, 
1984:214). The different actors vary according to the level of governance, but 
generally include politicians, civil servants, interest groups and networks. These 
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entrepreneurs are key actors or organisations, according to Smith (2018:14), who 
use their skills to gain traction for their idea. The most successful entrepreneurs are 
those with the best access to policy makers (Herweg et al, 2018:29), with the skills to 
attach problems to solutions, and plenty of time and persistence to see things 
through. Even though Kingdon mostly identified entrepreneurs operating outside of 
government they can also operate from within government, with a potentially key role 
for ministers and politicians themselves.  
 
In the MSF a policy entrepreneur is someone who exploits policy windows by “linking 
a compelling problem to a plausible solution that meets the test of political feasibility” 
(Khayesi & Amekudzi, 2011:1548).  
 
“If a policy entrepreneur is attaching a proposal to a change in the political 
stream, for example, a problem is also found for which the proposal is a 
solution, thus linking problem, policy, and politics. Or if a solution is attached 
to a prominent problem, the entrepreneur also attempts to enlist political 
allies, again joining the three streams.” (Kingdon, 1984:191). 
 
In his discussion of the relevance of both structure and agency when understanding 
change, Kingdon suggests that windows open as a result of factors beyond the 
individual but that the individual entrepreneur then takes advantage of the 
opportunity as it arises (Kingdon, 1984:192). The key to the success of any 
entrepreneur is that they have to be ready to act with ideas, solutions and expertise 
in order to respond immediately a window is open. Wherever the window originates, 
the entrepreneur must be ready with a solution to attach to the issues raised.  
 
According to Ackirll et al (2013:880), the focus of much of the existing literature has 
been on policy entrepreneurs rather than the nature and type of window. If the focus 
is on predictable windows in the politics stream, then the role of policy entrepreneurs 
may be limited by the short-term political pressures prevalent at this time: 
 
“... it is the nature of the policy window and the reform agenda it creates for 
policy-makers which plays the primary causal role in shaping which policy 
ideas gain attention.” (Ackrill et al, 2013:881) 
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In addition, policy-makers, rather than being identified as passive agents can 
“employ intentional selection mechanisms” so policy solutions/ideas can make it onto 
the agenda because policy-makers select them without input from policy 
entrepreneurs. Which raises the question of whether or not policy-makers can be 
policy entrepreneurs. On this point Kingdon (1984:188) appears unclear, he does 
suggest that policy entrepreneurs can be politicians, civil servants or campaigners 
and can sit inside or outside of the decision-making body and as he suggests: 
 
“The placement of entrepreneurs is nearly irrelevant, anyway, to 
understanding their activities or their success.” Kingdon (1984:188) 
 
Ackrill et al (2013) also raise the question of how to measure the success of policy 
entrepreneurship, as success is equated with actual reform with little said in the MSF 
about strategies that might be employed by entrepreneurs to maintain and preserve 
the status quo.  
 
Policy entrepreneurs have developed a range of strategies and tactics to highlight 
the importance of particular issues (John et al, 2013; Liu et al, 2010). These tactics 
include providing solutions to known problems, the identification of new research 
evidence to illustrate the importance of a particular problem, feedback from opinion 
polls and media attention, and joining with others to promote an issue, as well as the 
framing of problems in a way that grabs attention. Work by Cairney (2018: 201) 
suggests that policy entrepreneurs use three main strategies to maximize their 
impact: they tell persuasive stories to frame policy problems, they have a solution 
ready to chase a problem, and they know when to act to exploit opportunities. 
 
Further work by Aviram et al (2019) has sought to bring together studies of the 
characteristics and strategies of policy entrepreneurs from across the literature. 
Table 2 sets out the 20 different strategies identified by Aviram et al (2019), these 
are listed in order of frequency of use and include additional explanations from 
Cairney (2018) and John et al (2013). This is the first main attempt to 
comprehensively set out the traits and behaviours of policy entrepreneurs through a 
systematic review of 229 articles (Aviram et al, 2019:2). Whilst not solely focused on 
the policy entrepreneurs as described in the MSF, they provide a useful framework 
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for classifying policy entrepreneurs’ strategies at different stages of the policy 
process.  
 
Table 2: Strategies and Tactics used by Policy Entrepreneurs 
Strategy Definition 
Solution seeking Understanding the cause of a problem and providing a 
range of solutions, being part of the solution 
Problem framing Understanding how best to position an issue, politically 
and culturally 
Networking in government Joining with others, networking with politicians and 
bureaucrats 
Forging interorganisational and 
cross-sectoral partnerships 
Creating networks with actors from different sectors and 
organisations, creating coalitions and policy 
communities 
Networking out of government Networking with private, public and third sector players 
Process planning Having a systematic long-term plan 
Political activation Becoming active in policy decision making and politics 
Anchor work Securing the policy by regulations, rulemaking and 
actual implementation, preventing decoupling 
Gathering evidence to show the 
workability of a policy 
Engaging with others to clearly demonstrate the 
workability of a policy and the extent of a problem 
Risk taking Paying a potential price for policy entrepreneurship 
Team leadership Actively leading the policy network 
Stimulating potential beneficiaries Praising the benefits of the policy to different audiences 
Participating in the evaluation of 
policies 
Actively participating in evaluation processes  
Using media coverage Using the media to promote policy, tapping into public 
mood, maximising size of audience and attracting 
attention 
Strategic use of symbols Use of stories, images and other symbols to stir passion, 
capture public attention and build support 
Venue shopping Move decision making authority to a new policy arena 
Involving civic engagement Organising the public to be active in a policy issue 
Strategic information 
dissemination 
Strategic use of information among actors in the policy 
process 
Salami tactics Dividing the policy change into stages, presenting 
smaller less risky steps 
Focusing on the core and 
compromising on the edge 
Negotiating and cooperating with those who have 
different ideas while maintaining that part of the policy 
that is most important 
Sources: Aviram et al (2019), Cairney (2018) and John et al (2013). 
 
In addition, Aviram et al (2019) explored the existing literature to define the main 
traits and attributes of policy entrepreneurs as part of the determinants of success. 
They identified these separately to the strategies and suggest there are three main 
traits of successful policy entrepreneurs: trust building; persuasion; and social acuity. 
Corbett (2003) suggests policy entrepreneurs need to be seen both within their 
institutional context and as individuals with personal beliefs and identities in order to 
fully understand their influence. As Ackrill et al (2013:879) suggest: “No entrepreneur 
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alone will ever be enough to cause policy reform; we always require an account of 
the context.” That is, the same idea and brokering used in one context may not 
generate change, but in another will produce reform, thus whilst it is important to 
understand the attributes of entrepreneurs, on its own this is not enough. It needs to 
be brought together with an analysis of the situation in which opportunities occur 
(Ackrill et al, 2013:881). 
 
My research sought to identify the tactics and strategies used by different actors, 
locally in the context of a mayoral election, and how these were perceived by the 
people they were trying to influence. The framework above as identified by Aviram et 
al (2019) is used in the findings and analysis chapters to draw out the extent to 
which these strategies and tactics are identifiable in my research. 
 
 
2.4 Exploring the MSF 
Kingdon’s MSF has received criticism over the years but despite this has been 
applied across different levels of governance, different subject areas and in different 
countries. In more recent years attention has turned to how best to adapt the model 
to address concerns about context and applicability. Kingdon’s original model 
focuses on the actors that bring about change rather than the institutions themselves 
and is based purely on the federal level of government in the United States. It is 
focused on agenda setting rather than any other aspect of policy making and is a 
single framework that has emerged from the Garbage Can Model, with no attempt to 
link to any other theories or frameworks. 
 
In general, agenda-setting research “examines the fate of different public policy 
issues as they receive more or less public and governmental consideration, and 
agenda-setting scholars attempt to explain these varying patterns of attention” 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2006:781). Many of these studies of agenda setting have a 
number of common elements. For example, they tend to focus on the interaction of 
institutions and players that bring about change and the relative importance of 
different actors and they consider local context and the interaction of political, 
governance, economic, and social factors. They are often studies of long-term 
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problems that cannot be solved with one policy at one point in time and they tend to 
study areas where policy interventions have typically been unsuccessful or limited in 
impact. In addition, they often seek to combine more than one theory into a research 
framework and/or select different aspects of one framework to inform their research 
rather than the entire model.  
 
Recent work by Jones et al (2015) explores the scope of studies applying the MSF 
based on 311 peer-reviewed articles published between 2000 and 2013. Jones et al 
(2015) identified the most popular policy areas, the geographic areas studied, 
methods used and the governance levels studied. A summary of key results is 
provided in Table 3. Much of this research was initially dominated by studies at a 
national level in Europe and the USA using qualitative methods (Jones et al, 2015). 
Recognition of this trend does appear to have led to a range of studies in more 
recent years looking at different levels of governance in different countries. It is also 
clear that the preferred form of study is the case study using qualitative methods, 
mostly focused on interviewing.  
 














One of the important issues Jones et al (2015:13) identify is that the MSF is used in 
many different ways, with a significant proportion of studies failing to include all of 




Most popular categories: 
§ Health (28%) 
§ Environment (19%) 
§ Governance (14%) 
§ Welfare (7%) 
Focus on domestic policy 
Geographic Area § 65 different countries included 
§ 78% in Europe or North America 
Governance Level § International/transnational (13%) 
§ Federal/National (52%) 
§ Regional (8%) 
§ State (12%) 
§ Local (15%) 
The majority are studies of a single level of governance (72%) 
but some have also been applied to multiple levels of 
government 
Methods Used § Qualitative (88%) 
§ Quantitative (11%) 
The majority used case studies and/or interviews (43% and 
42% respectively) 
Source: Jones et al (2015:7-11) 
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acknowledges this point and incorporates all five elements of the MSF as part of its 
framework for analysis. 
 
Figure 3: Use of the MSF Structural Elements 
 
Whilst there are clearly issues with the application of the MSF in research, according 
to Jones et al (2015:18) it “has proven to be a very productive and analytically useful 
way to study public policy” and provides “unparalleled empirical richness”. Despite 
these advantages, the work by Jones et al also found that the studies lacked 
systematic theory development and provided a “surprisingly incoherent research 
programme”. Some of these points are elaborated further in the discussion below. 
 
In research by Cairney and Jones (2015) consideration is given to both the 
theoretical and empirical contribution of the MSF to identify its overall contribution to 
public policy. They argue that whilst the MSF has been used extensively it can only 
make a “meaningful theoretical contribution” if it is used in a nontrivial way, that is by 
paying attention to all elements of the framework (Cairney & Jones, 2015:2). 
Exworthy and Powell (2004; 2008) take this a step further in their research on health 
inequality in the UK when they provide major revisions to the MSF to make it more 
applicable at a local level and across levels of government. In their study of health 
agendas in the UK they combine Kingdon’s model with levels of government to see 
how firmly a policy agenda has been established nationally and locally (Exworthy & 















Policy Entrepreneurs. The policy entrepreneur is identified in just over half (58 per-
cent) of all MSA applications (e.g., Aberbach & Christensen, 2013), the least of any
of the five core MSA concepts. And much like other major MSA concepts, policy
entrepreneur subcomponents are similarly identified sparingly. For those applica-
tions employing the policy entrepreneur, access is identified in 7 percent (e.g., Mar-
ier & Mayer, 2007), resources in 12 percent (e.g., Mintrom, 2013; Oborn, Barrett, &
Exworthy, 2011), and strategies in 15 percent (e.g., Huitema et al., 2011; Zahariadis,
2008). An ex mplar study of the policy entrepreneur can be f und in Huitema
et al. (2011) who analyze policy entrepreneur strategies regarding water policy.
While policy entrepreneurs are often identified within MSA studies coded for our
review, the data indicate that specification of MSA subcomponents associated with
this category is usually not needed to describe and/or explain policy entrepreneur
behavior.9
Policy Windo s. The policy indow is the most popular of all the MSA concepts,
being identified in 72 percent of all MSA applications in this meta-review (e.g.,
Thompson, 2008). However, like the policy entrepreneur and the three streams, the
policy window’s subcomponents are sparingly used. Coupling logic is identified in 12
percent of MSA pplications (e.g., Bakir, 2003), stitutional context in 10 percent (e.g.,
Buhr, 2012; Marier & Mayer, 2007), and decision style is identified once (Tjernshaugen,
2011).
New Subcomponents. About 10 percent (30) of the analyzed applications included sub-
components identified as new or innovative to the MSA by the application’s
author(s). New subcomponents in the politics stream include macropolitical develop-
ments (Kalifeh, Cohen-Vogelm, & Grass, 2011), dramatic events (Bakir, 2003), and
policy-related local conditions (Guldbrandsson & Fossum, 2009). New subcompo-
nents of the policy stream include affordability (Blankenau, 2001), while new
subcomponent identification in the problem stream includes concepts such as a
state-specific problem stream (McLendon, 2003). Newly identified policy entrepre-
neur subcomponents include: the bureaucratic (Gains & Stoker, 2011) and political
Figure 7. Operationalizing Aggregate Concept Applications.
n 5 311.
Jones et al.: A Multiple Streams Meta-Review 13
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A further point made by Keskitalo et al (2012), in their study of climate change 
adaptation in four different countries, is that there is no single agenda, agendas are 
not just set at a national level, they can be set locally, regionally and nationally and 
the interplay between these levels, involving different actors, is important, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter with reference to the work of Birkland (2007) and 
different levels of the agenda.  
 
Research by Kammermann (2018) into the factors that lead to the adoption of strong 
policy instruments promoting hydroelectricity in Switzerland highlighted the lack of 
attention in the MSF to institutional factors. She sought to address this by 
complementing the framework with two institutional factors that were expected to 
have an effect on the adoption of strong policy measures, that is, the extent of 
decentralisation in the water industry and current levels of production of 
hydroelectricity were factored into the research framework. This aspect of how the 
MSF can be used at different levels of governance and across levels, together with 
an understanding of the institutional context within which policies are developed, was 
important for my research as whilst I looked at local government, the institutional and 
political context within which local government operates was also likely to be 
significant. 
 
Work by Aluttis et al (2014) looked at how and why global health issues made it onto 
the European Commission agenda but then apparently lost momentum and faded 
from the agenda. They explored the barriers that hinder the development of the 
global health agenda including the fragmentation of the policy community and the 
lack of common definitions (Aluttis et al, 2014:1). Another study by Bache (2013) 
measuring quality of life in the European Union identified issues relating to internal 
networks through which ideas are developed and the complexity of overlapping 
levels of governance. He suggests the importance of drawing a distinction between 
the governmental and decision agendas in order to distinguish between political 
attention and substantive decisions (2013:22).  
 
One of the key points to emerge from these studies is the importance of local context 
and the interaction between different levels of governance. Of course, in Kingdon’s 
study this was less of an issue, as he was dealing with policy making and agenda 
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setting at the federal level in the United States. This is one area where different 
studies have questioned the transferability of Kingdon’s model to other governmental 
settings and to different levels of governance. What the above discussion seems to 
suggest is that Kingdon’s model is useful in determining how firmly a policy agenda 
has been established, at local, regional or national level. But that this needs to be 
supplemented with a better understanding of how things work at a local level, the 
role of local agencies and policy entrepreneurs and the interaction between the 
different levels. As suggested by Exworthy and Powell (2008), Kingdon’s MSF is 
useful in helping to understand why something gets on the agenda to begin with, but 
has little to say about central-local dynamics and what happens where policy 
conflicts might exist. This is something that the framework for my research picks up 
on as it draws on the work by Exworthy and Powell to help explore how the 
dynamics of the MSF might work differently at a local level. 
 
Several of the studies also seek to combine various theories into a broader research 
framework. For example, Carter and Jacobs (2014) use a framework that combines 
Kingdon’s MSF with punctuated equilibrium, where the coupling of streams is linked 
to changes in institutional venues to create policy windows. Tiernan and Burke 
(2002:89) in their study of Australian housing policy, adapt Kingdon’s MSF to 
account for the differences in institutional context and pay particular attention to 
wider contextual and historical development issues. They also reorder the streams 
with politics examined first as the most important, as in their view it is difficult to 
make sense of problems and policies unless issues in the political stream are 
identified.  
 
From a methodological point of view, many of the studies carried out using Kingdon’s 
model tend to focus on looking back at documentary evidence over a period of time, 
to see how issues get onto the agenda and whether or not they stay there and 
achieve policy change. The argument for this approach is that it requires study over 
a long time frame in order to understand the fall and rise of issues and the nature of 
the change (Bache, 2013). This approach is demonstrated in the work of Carter and 
Jacobs (2014) who looked at UK climate change policy under the Labour 
Government from 2006-2010. In their view considering change over a four-year 
period was necessary to fully understand the transformation of policy that took place. 
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The work by Catalinac (2004) on aboriginal rights in New Zealand is another good 
example of a study using documentary evidence over a longer period of time to 
understand why a problem came to the forefront and led to significant policy change. 
In this instance the research highlights the importance of protest movements as a 
form of focusing activity, rather than any set of indicators, research or more usual 
focusing events.  
 
The argument for this type of study, looking back at change, is that agendas are 
relatively stable and change only occurs occasionally. Whilst Kingdon suggests that 
change in the policy stream is mostly seen as incremental, the politics and problem 
streams may be more prone to sudden changes. This resonates with the points 
made by Baumgartner and Jones (2009) who suggest that policy agendas are 
relatively stable over long periods of time until shocks or crises occur. In this sense a 
study looking at a short period of time may find that little changes on the political 
agenda, thus the importance of focusing on backward looking time series data. 
However, if one were to look at the impact or influence of focusing events on policy 
agendas, even over a short period of time, then the potential for change is perhaps 
greater. Indeed, as suggested by Birkland (1997) this is an area of study that has 
largely been ignored by agenda setting theory and is merely explained as one 
example of the triggers that increase attention on a particular issue. Birkland’s work 
suggests a shock or crisis event can create instability and has the potential to 
generate policy change, bringing some issues to the top of the agenda in a sudden 
rush of activity. The extent to which these issues then take hold and create any real 
change will depend on a range of other factors. The point to highlight here is that a 
shorter-term study, where attention is focused on a particular triggering event, can 
provide an opportunity to understand how agenda setting works and what influences 
policy priorities at a particular moment in time. This is something I drew on in my 
research, where I studied an election process as it happened. 
 
The MSF assumes the three streams of policy, politics and problems operate 
independently of one another and that policy entrepreneurs are responsible for 
bringing them together during open windows. This may well have made sense at the 
level of the federal government, where different people operate in different streams 
but is perhaps less relevant at the local level where the same entrepreneurs may 
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operate across the three streams. The original MSF was focused on choice and 
policy formation by national governments but according to Zahariadis (2014) there is 
no reason why it could not be used at different levels of government. He also 
suggests the idea of moving away from grand applications of the full framework to 
analyse specific elements and their effects. This approach is supported by Liu et al 
(2010:69) in their study of local elites in three US states that examines the “key 
forces and factors, as well as their relative importance, in local agenda setting, 
problem identification, and alternative policy selection”. Rather than using the whole 
model in their study they focused on four aspects: important policy participants, 
attention attractors, alternative attributes and political factors (2010:72-73). This type 
of approach, taking elements of the MSF rather than all five main elements, is 
common, but as discussed above, Jones et al (2015) suggest this can be less than 
helpful when trying to understand the contribution the MSF can make to 
understanding agenda setting.  
 
The beauty of the MSF is its flexibility, which allows it to be modified “to explain 
agenda setting in new political settings” (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016:88). Cairney 
and Zahariadis (2016:93) identify three main elements of the MSF that are not 
specific to any one political system, “ambiguity and competition for attention; an 
imperfect selection process; and limited time”. These elements enable the 
transferability of the MSF as the “concepts are abstract enough to be described as 
universal”. 
 
“The aim when considering the cumulative insights gathered from MSA3 is to 
produce concepts that are flexible enough to aid comparison without 
stretching them so hard that they lose their practical meaning” (Cairney & 
Zahariadis, 2016:94). 
 
In summary it can be seen that over time the MSF has been used to explore agenda 
setting at different levels of government across different countries (Liu et al, 2010; 
Exworthy & Powell, 2004 & 2008); has been extended as a framework to cover 
decision making processes generally (Zahariadis, 2014; Herweg et al, 2018; Howlett 
et al, 2015 ) and has been combined with other theories to better understand 
 
3 MSA – multiple streams approach – another term frequently used to describe Kingdons multiple streams 
framework 
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institutional and contextual issues relating to agenda setting (Keskitalo, 2012; 
Tiernan & Burke, 2002; Kammermann, 2018). 
 
Limitations and considerations 
The above discussion has begun to highlight some of the issues drawn out by a 
range of studies in terms of how the MSF can be applied to different settings and 
what some of the main weaknesses are of the framework.  In the years up to 2014, 
as the 30th anniversary of Kingdon’s book “Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies” approached, there was an increased academic appetite for debate and 
reflection on the MSF. At a workshop held in 2013 (see Zohlnhöfer & Rüb, 2016), 
Kingdon’s MSF was the focus for debate, emerging as it did from a perception that 
systematic debate about the MSF was missing. Despite the fact that many 
researchers use the framework, according to Zohlnhöfer & Rüb (2016) there is little 
detailed discussion about its strengths and weaknesses, theoretical refinement and 
empirical application. This has partially been addressed by work undertaken by 
Cairney and Jones (2015) but otherwise still remains an issue. From the findings of 
this workshop and the work of other authors, such as Cairney & Zahariadis, (2016); 
Cairney & Jones, (2015); Herweg et al, (2015); and Exworthy & Powell, (2004, 
2008), there are a number of common criticisms that arise when discussing 
Kingdon’s theory and how it has been or can be used in different settings. Three of 
the main criticisms are discussed below:  
 
§ Structure and agency,  
§ Levels and types of governance, and  
§ Streams and stages. 
 
Firstly, the MSF has been widely criticised for the absence of institutions in its 
framework (Zohlnhöfer & Rüb, 2016; Jones et al, 2015; Zahariadis, 2018). According 
to Saetren (2016:21-23) this neglect of the institutional context is a major omission in 
the MSF compared to the garbage can model. Kingdon was very clear in that he 
focused on human agency in agenda setting, using the concept of the policy 
entrepreneur, whereas the garbage can model included the organisational context 
through the choice opportunities concept (Saetren, 2016:25). Spohr (2016:251) 
makes the point that institutions “shape constellations of actors and their goals” and 
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shape behaviour in a way that helps to determine which solutions reach the agenda. 
According to Spohr, the institutional setting is particularly important in the policy 
stream, where the institutional context helps to shape perceptions and preferences 
as well as the feasibility of policies. In the problem and politics streams, institutional 
settings also need to be factored in as “institutions influence variables that determine 
the dynamic in the politics stream” (Spohr, 2016:253). 
 
Making changes to the MSF to reflect the need for greater consideration of 
institutional issues enables an assessment of the autonomy of the level of 
governance, understanding of which types of entrepreneur facilitate policy making 
and the role of party ideology in agenda setting (Smith, 2018:144). In her research 
on health policy reform in England and Australia, Smith identifies the important role 
played by institutional entrepreneurs who focus their efforts on changing institutional 
frameworks as well as promoting particular policies and solutions (2018:144). The 
institutional and organisational setting provides the structure for the relationship 
between different factors that can lead to different outcomes (Saetren, 2016: 27). 
 
Zahariadis (2014) and Jones et al (2015) suggest that to improve the MSF’s ability to 
provide clarity on institutional influences additional concepts need to be incorporated 
into the sub-elements of the framework. Zahariadis (2014) suggests the addition of a 
greater emphasis on party ideology and balance of interests in the politics stream to 
better reflect institutional arrangements, particularly in a parliamentary system of 
governance. In addition, Zahariadis (2014:45) adds institutional context as a factor in 
the policy window where he suggests, “institutions make things possible, but people 
make things happen”. 
 
The second main criticism raises questions about the MSF’s applicability to different 
levels of governance and the interplay between them particularly as more case 
studies are developed that use the MSF across different systems. This brings into 
question the role and effectiveness of the policy entrepreneur and how this may 
differ at different levels of governance, making the MSF’s application to other political 
systems difficult. Cairney and Jones (2015:2) suggest that moving the focus of 
research from national to subnational/local level requires some theoretical revision to 
the MSF in relation to the concept of the policy entrepreneur. The policy 
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entrepreneur may be seen to be more effective at a local level than on a national 
stage and understanding therefore needs to be developed to better define the 
concept of the policy entrepreneur at a local level, to include individuals, policy 
communities and organisations. This is an issue I develop in my research, where I 
consider how the policy entrepreneurs at a local level in Bristol operate across the 
streams.  
 
Exworthy and Powell (2008) suggest that Kingdon’s MSF is useful in helping to 
understand why something gets on the agenda to begin with, but has little to say 
about central-local dynamics and interaction and what happens where policy 
conflicts might exist. They suggest the need to look at the ‘little windows’ at local 
level as well as the ‘big windows’ at central level in order to understand how agenda 
setting works locally as well as nationally (2004:265). 
 
There have also been suggestions that the MSF needs to be amended to put 
political parties at centre stage when used in parliamentary systems. For example, 
Zohlnhöfer and Rüb (2016:172) suggest that the streams may need adapting to 
better illustrate how the MSF would work in a parliamentary system. In the policy 
stream, political parties may play more of a role than suggested by Kingdon, which in 
turn challenges the independence of the streams, as the policy and politics streams 
may overlap. Herweg et al (2018:36) draw attention to this point and suggest that 
political entrepreneurs may be more active across the different streams, in different 
roles at different times, with political policy experts active in the policy stream and 
party leadership involved in the politics stream. This point is even more relevant 
when the context of the study is local rather than national. 
 
In themselves these criticisms are not sufficient reason to abandon the use of the 
MSF, rather they point towards the need to be aware of the issues and potentially 
adapt the MSF to different systems and levels of governance recognising the role of 
different types of window and the operation of political entrepreneurs at a local level.  
 
Thirdly, there has also been considerable discussion about the way in which the 
streams operate in the MSF, particularly under different conditions, and how they 
can be adapted to work with other models of the policy process. Herweg et al 
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(2018:39) question the independence of the streams, as on one level the streams 
seem to operate independent of each other and obey their own rules, whilst they can 
also be seen to be interdependent as problems and solutions are developed 
alongside one another. Herweg et al (2015) adapt the framework to include two 
windows rather than one, an agenda window and a decision window, and two 
coupling processes. The decision window opens once agenda coupling succeeds 
and successful decision coupling leads to a policy output such as the adoption of a 
bill. This adaption seems to best reflect the type of process likely to be in operation 
during an election and will be reflected in the framework for my research. 
 
 
2.4 Research Framework 
The above discussion on agenda setting and specifically the MSF serves to illustrate 
the importance and usefulness of the framework and how it can be used to explore 
the three main questions that Kingdon poses (1984:2): “why do ‘important people’ 
pay attention to one subject rather than another; how do their agendas change from 
one time to another; and how do they narrow their choices from a large set of 
alternatives to a very few?”. 
 
The discussion has identified how the MSF has been used by different authors 
across different systems and furthermore how it has been amended and updated to 
enable its use in a wider context. Specifically, the lack of an institutional element in 
the framework needs to be addressed, alongside additional detail on policy 
communities, network integration and the role of party ideology. On balance, whilst 
there are clearly concerns and questions raised regarding how the MSF can be 
used, with some amendments and improvements the framework has the potential to 
provide a useful tool for exploring the agenda setting stage of the policy process.  
 
The issues identified in Table 4 take on board amendments suggested by Zahariadis 
(1995 & 2014), Howlett et al (2015), Smith (2018) and Herweg et al (2018). The main 
characteristics and additions outlined in the table provided a framework to guide my 
fieldwork and interviews. 
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Table 4: MSF Characteristics and Additions 
MSF Structural 
Elements 
Main Characteristics Additions 












Level of network integration  
Expand policy communities concept – 
size, nature, access 
Antecedent polices 
Role of political parties in policy 
development and alternative selection 





Increased emphasis on party ideology 
Role of electoral mandate 
Levels and types of governance 
Local context 
Balance of interests 
 
Policy Window Coupling 
Predictable windows 
Unpredictable windows 
Problem and political windows 
Length of time window opens 
Agenda windows and decision 
windows 
Party concerns and processes 
Party competition 
Existing policies 










§ Providing solutions 
§ Networking 
§ Ready to act 
Institutional entrepreneurs 
Organisations as well as individuals 
Policy communities 
Role of entrepreneurs at different levels 
of governance and interaction between 
levels 
Role of entrepreneurs across the 
streams at a local level 
Visible or hidden participants 
Source: author’s own analysis 
In particular, given the extent of the criticism about the lack of an institutional strand 
to the MSF, I incorporated a number of sub-elements into the five structural 
components of the MSF.  
 
Firstly, the nature of policy communities will be broadened to include discussion on 
the level of network integration, as well as an assessment of the size, nature and 
level of access different policy communities have. Secondly, the role of party politics 
will feature throughout the streams but particularly the policy and politics streams, 
where more detailed consideration will be given to how parties operate at a local 
level. Alongside this the role of existing policies within the governance system will 
also be explored. Thirdly, the existence of different types of windows will be 
considered, to explore when and how they operate and what creates them. Finally, 
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the role of entrepreneurs will be explored to see how different strategies and tactics 
are used across the streams at a local level. 
 
Further to these amendments it is worth considering the points made in the 
discussion above about elections and administration changes as predictable 
windows, which may operate differently to unpredictable windows. In addition, it 
might also be useful to differentiate between agenda and decision windows, where 
the agenda window is the first stage of the process, opened as a result of the 
election being called as political parties look for ideas and solutions. After the initial 
setting of priorities, through political processes there could then be a decision 
window, where other factors come into play as a result of a change of administration 
after the election, providing an additional opportunity to set and influence priorities. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the streams might operate when there is a predictable 
window created by an election and a further window generated by a change of 
administration: 
 
Figure 4: Predictable Windows and Elections 
Source: author’s own diagram 
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In this illustration the politics stream is dominant at both stages of the process, as the 
windows open in the politics stream. There are two open windows that provide 
opportunities for change and for policy entrepreneurs to influence priorities. The 
diagram incorporates the five structural elements of the MSF but has been 
developed to respond to some of the criticisms and to reflect the context of my own 
research. This adapted framework was used throughout my research as a 




3.0 An Introduction to Methods and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This section outlines the approach I have adopted in my research. It begins with a 
discussion of the research problem and research questions, and then draws on the 
methodological literature to highlight the epistemological and ontological approach 
underpinning the research philosophy. It then provides a broad introduction to 
interpretive ethnography before a more detailed discussion of the ethnographic 
fieldwork undertaken and the ethical implications of the research.  
 
Having previously identified the research problem and questions, in chapter 1, it is 
now important to set the context for the research and how it was undertaken. My 
framework is drawn from Bryman (2012), Babbie (2007) and Gilbert (2008) and 
includes the following aspects: 
 
§ Theoretical considerations informing how the research should be 
conducted; 
§ Research Approach using interpretive policy ethnography; 
§ Research Methods involved in ethnographic fieldwork; 
§ Reflexivity and the role of the researcher; 
§ Analysis and presentation of data; 
§ Purpose of the research and its relation to, and implications for, practice. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical considerations 
The way in which the social world is conceptualised informs the questions that are 
asked and the way the world is investigated (Cooper, 2008:8). This research moves 
away from positivist notions that the methods of natural sciences can be applied to 
the study of social reality. This form of positivist approach is more concerned with the 
idea that the world can be measured and facts can be gathered separately to how 
people interpret them, using the same principles and procedures as studies of the 
natural sciences (Gilbert, 2008). Instead my focus is on understanding and 
explaining human behaviour and the subjective meaning of social action (Von 
Wright, 1971). From a phenomenological perspective my research is concerned with 
understanding how individuals make sense of the world in which they live. It 
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develops an explanation, using narrative to understand the beliefs and desires of 
elite actors. Such an approach based on hermeneutics takes the starting point that 
the social sciences subject matter is different to that of the natural sciences (May, 
2001). 
 
My aim in this research was to understand and explain how individual actors or 
groups influenced the housing policy agenda during an election and how the mayoral 
candidates responded to that influence. It was about understanding the context of 
how decisions are taken, and ‘being there’ to understand what sense those at the 
centre of the study made of what was happening to them (Van Hulst, 2008:145). I 
sought to understand and explain how mayoral candidates defined problems and 
issues, how they decided what the solutions were and how they prioritised their 
decisions. My intention was not to generalise about the findings in empirical terms 
but to use my research to provide explanations and understanding. The aim was to 
raise questions about what was happening and how decisions were made, to explore 
who and what was influencing the identification of priorities and to develop the 
contextual basis for agenda setting at a local level.  
 
Whilst based on a range of initial assumptions drawn from practical and theoretical 
knowledge, my research is primarily inductive, or abductive as described by 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012:26-27) which suggests a “puzzling out process” 
where the researcher moves back and forth in an interactive-recursive manner 
between puzzle and explanation, involving a weaving between data and theory. The 
theoretical foundations are there to help inform observations and data collection, but 
data will also be used to refine theory as part of the outcome of the research. The 
aim is to provide explanations for the puzzle and whether it works in context, not to 
generalise findings (Rhodes, 2016:178). Using an interpretivist perspective relies on 
researchers grasping “the subjective meaning of social action” and is based on 





3.3 Research Approach - Interpretive Policy Ethnography 
The point of taking an ethnographic approach is to try to see things as the people 
you are researching do, an approach described as ‘sense-making’ by Van Hulst 
(2008) who suggests that interpretive ethnography brings something different to the 
study of local governance as it provides scope to experience the lives of the people 
under study and see things from their perspective. This approach means getting 
beneath the surface and seeking to understand the meanings people attach to their 
own experience. It means finding out the ways people experience reality, seeing how 
they respond to events and being there to experience the events yourself (Van Hulst, 
2008:147). Ethnography relies on being part of conversations, observations and 
interactions in the everyday life of the people being studied. As a researcher I had to 
try to respond to events and opportunities as they happened and careful planning of 
field activity was not always possible, it was more about being there, reacting and 
experiencing events and activities as they occurred. The fieldwork was frequently 
unstructured, with initial intentions put to one side as different, unplanned meetings 
or conversations took place. 
 
“Ethnographers tend to view every happening as a potential moment of 
evidence gathering...” Wedeen (2010: 256). 
 
My research looks at both how policy entrepreneurs try to influence candidates and 
how candidates interpret and respond to influence, in an attempt to gain a more 
complete picture of what was happening during the election process. I looked at how 
those outside of local governance viewed the political system and tried to influence 
the election candidates, as well as how the elite actors, the candidates, responded to 
and interpreted that interaction and engagement. Few studies of agenda setting 
have gone beyond the more traditional qualitative methods, with only a very small 
percentage, for example, using participant observation and focus groups rather than 
interviewing and surveys (Jones et al, 2015:10), but according to Boswell et al 
(2018:1) “the innovative and varied practices of contemporary ethnography are 
ideally suited to shedding light into the ‘black box’ of elite politics”. 
 
To undertake a full ethnographic study would have been difficult given the key actors 
involved and the timing of my research during an election. Instead I adopted a similar 
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approach to that adopted by Rhodes (2013 & 2016) and suggested by Boswell et al 
(2018) which involved a broad approach to ethnography, using different methods 
that enabled a partial immersion in the world of the elite actors. The emphasis of my 
research was to look at the importance of meanings in the study of the main actors 
(Bevir & Rhodes, 2003), where shared interpretations are important, interaction and 
influence are part of the research and writing up is more flexible, with choices to be 
made about how findings are presented (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Rhodes, 2016). 
 
Ethnography typically involves a range of methods and an approach that adapts the 
research focus to what proves available and interesting (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007; Fetterman, 2010). In this sense, as the researcher, I had to think myself into 
the perspective of the participants and become a temporary part of the natural 
setting (Gilbert, 2008:270). Accessing and being part of the candidates’ world was 
made easier because of my previous roles and connections with politicians and 
influencers in Bristol. I was a local councillor in Bristol for eight years (1994-2002) 
and chaired planning and environmental committees during that time as well as 
representing the council on various local, regional and national bodies and 
partnerships. I also worked for a number of organisations in the city over the 
following ten years, in a senior position where partnership working with the city 
council was a key part of my role. My focus throughout this period was on housing, 
planning and development, so I had good connections across those sectors in the 
city and with many of the local politicians. My challenge was less about going native 
and thinking myself into the role, and more about withdrawing myself from my 
existing embeddedness, so as to ensure balance and impartiality.  
 
In addition, much has been written about studying elites and how, particularly in 
ethnographic research, the approach has predominantly been to engage with the 
relatively powerless, rather than those more powerful than ourselves (Ward & Jones, 
1999:303). My research is different, in that I was studying elite actors and attempting 
to at least partially immerse myself in their world, temporarily during a period of 
major change. 
 
In his study of top civil servants in Westminster, Rhodes drew on three main sources 
of information: practice, talk and considered writing (Rhodes, 2013:484). This 
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involved over 400 hours ‘shadowing’ elite actors in government departments 
(practice); repeat interviews with nearly 40 civil servants and politicians, totalling just 
under 70 hours of interviews (talk); and documentary evidence including media 
reports, speeches, diaries and government reports (considered writing). My research 
used a similar but more diverse approach, combining observation, interaction, 
conversations, interviewing and use of documentary evidence to both explain and 
construct an understanding of how and why certain housing issues were prioritised 
during the Bristol mayoral election. While it has to be acknowledged that my 
approach did not allow for the deep immersion favoured by traditional 
ethnographers, it was adapted to be more practical, to fit in with the nature of the 
election campaign and the time available during what was a fixed period. It was an 
approach that was also similar to that adopted by Corbett in his study of politicians in 
the Pacific Islands, which used observation across 11 countries, “looking over the 
shoulder of politicians on the campaign trail, in their constituency, at parliament, and 
during regional meetings” (Boswell and Corbett, 2015:225). This was exactly what I 
strove to do, to “look over the shoulder” of the mayoral candidates at key points in 
their election campaign, to see some of their world and to be there (Boswell and 
Corbett, 2015). It was a complex approach that required different skills at different 
times. At the beginning of the process I was confident I could deal with that, but at 
times during the fieldwork I came to question certain aspects and whether or not I 
had enough experience to make the most of the access I achieved. I will return to 
this point later in a discussion on strengths and weaknesses of my approach. 
 
One of the first things ethnographers have to decide is whether to tell the participants 
what they are doing. For my research, I chose an overt approach as being the most 
applicable, but according to Gilbert (2008:272) even this is likely to involve an 
element of covertness, as the researcher is unlikely to be entirely overt in every 
aspect. The advantage of overt research is that I was able to move around the 
setting more freely, ask research related questions and write notes whenever I 
needed to. The downside, of course, is that by my very presence I may have had an 
impact on the actions and activity of those I was observing. I was able to negotiate 
access, using existing contacts, to observe campaign meetings and discussions, 
meetings with influencers and lobby organisations, in particular where these related 
to housing issues. Negotiated access was achieved to varying degrees with the 
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existing mayor and two of the main party candidates. My aim was to both observe 
and participate in the everyday political life of the mayoral candidates and their 
campaign teams, to get to know the people I was studying and their influences and 
constraints, in an attempt to gain understanding of how policy agendas are set at a 
local level and to get behind the scenes to better understand and explain the 
intricacies of micro-politics in Bristol.  
 
However, it needs to be remembered that this was a study of ‘governing elites’ at a 
time of high activity, sensitivity and high stress, therefore maintaining access was a 
constant challenge. At the beginning of my research I recognised the difficulties of 
negotiating access to politicians at a time when pressure is high and time is short. 
Elections are also a time when politicians are most sensitive to intrusion and 
confidentiality. Gaining access to campaign teams and candidates was difficult, but 
was made easier by my existing relationship with many of those involved. I was 
careful from the start to be very clear about what I expected from their involvement 
and what I was able to offer to them by way of information and commentary as a 
result of this research. Negotiating access and maintaining it was a continual 
process over many months, made more difficult at key points in the election process, 
when unexpected things happened and when everything was happening at once 
with many calls on each candidate’s time.  
 
My approach was what Rhodes (2016:181) has called “hit-and-run ethnography” 
where ‘studying-up’, ‘follow through’ and ‘yo-yo research’ are the new norms of 
engagement. The hit-and-run element refers to “short bursts of intensive 
observation” and activity as I moved in and out of the field (Boswell et al, 2018:5). 
In terms of ‘studying-up’ the reference is to research focused on elites: in my 
research that means the political candidates and the policy elites or influencers 
lobbying for change. The ‘follow through’ is about following events through a process 
- through networks, relations and discourses to understand and explain the activity 
across time and space, in this case throughout the election process. The concept of 
‘yo-yo research’ is about moving in and out of the field, at different times, in different 
spaces, going back and forth at key moments (Wulff, 2002). I did this by being 
involved with the candidates and influencers at the beginning of the election process, 
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at points during the campaign and then again, a few months after the election was 
over. 
 
This type of interpretive ethnography raises a number of important, practical 
questions. Is the research objective, reliable and valid? Were the meetings and 
debates observed typical and observed behaviours natural? These are critical 
questions for qualitative research and have been the subject of much debate. 
Rhodes (2016:182) suggests that there is little point trying to argue the case for 
observation and ethnography against the same criteria as a more positivist approach 
to research because they are simply different approaches to be judged against 
different criteria. In this respect, the particular range of methods used for my 
research has been selected as a means of providing a more in-depth understanding 
of the subject matter, but also has the benefit of helping to support the validity of the 
research, where consistencies and inconsistencies between datasets can be 
identified and explored. 
 
 
3.4 Ethnographic Fieldwork - Research Methods 
By using an ethnographic approach to research, I sought to combine participant 
observation, observation, informal conversations, semi-structured interviewing and 
the use of documentary evidence to understand how and why certain housing issues 
were prioritised during a local election process. By using a range of different 
methods, I sought to mitigate against the weaknesses of any single approach, a 
concern associated with traditional ethnography (Boswell et al, 2018). My aim was to 
understand and depict the experiences of the candidates during the campaign “from 
within their world, rather than outside it” (Corbett, 2015:54). As suggested by Corbett 
(2015:54) my findings in chapters 5-7 use extensive quotations using the voice of the 
candidates and influencers to explain the issues and their approach. This voice is 
however inevitably constructed by me and therefore highlights patterns I have 
identified from the data. 
 
Participants were selected using purposive sampling related to specific roles and 
through my own knowledge of the main actors and decision makers in Bristol. These 
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were selected on the basis of their critical importance to providing an understanding 
of the principal aims of the research (Ritchie et al, 2014:114-115). Negotiating 
access to elite actors has its challenges so the approach to sampling was flexible 
depending on the responses received. A snowball sampling strategy was therefore 
also used to identify further participants suggested by initial interviewees and to 
identify key influencers in areas/issues that emerged during the research process. 
Different influencers became apparent as the election process moved on, so the pool 
of potential participants increased throughout the process. The sampling criteria 
were based on participation in the mayoral election, involvement in decision-making, 
organisations identified by participants as influential and influential stakeholders.  
 
The use of interviews and observation meant I could collect a wide range of data that 
provided an in-depth understanding of the subject. Combining interviews with 
observation also provided the opportunity to probe into issues raised during 
observations and to follow up on areas where clarification was needed to better 
understand what was happening. Whilst these methods can be time consuming, 
difficult to analyse and inevitably mean smaller sample sizes, both methods provided 
me with the opportunity to delve into the world of those being studied and to interpret 
and understand it from their perspective. Relying upon interviewing alone would 
have provided a useful insight, but the addition of observation at private meetings 
and discussions as well as more open meetings meant I could assess activities as 
they took place rather than rely on a second-hand description of events from others. 
I did find that the process of analysing and interpreting field notes and interview 
transcripts took a lot of time and was quite complex in places as matching points 
made in interviews with my own observations of the issues meant a lot of cross-
comparison of information. Much of this analysis was in the first instance undertaken 
using NVivo and followed up with a manual search on issues and activities to check 
for accuracy. 
 
With any research of this nature there is the inevitable concern about observer or 
interviewer bias. In some of the meetings and discussions I attended I was asked to 
merely be an observer rather than engage with the discussion. In these instances, I 
introduced myself and my research and made it clear I was purely there to observe 
and record for research purposes. At no point did anyone raise any objections to my 
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attendance. In other cases, I was invited as a researcher but also encouraged to 
participate in the discussion. In these instances, I introduced my research and the 
person who was leading the meeting made it clear I was there to participate as well. 
This was a complex role for me to play as the main reason I was encouraged to take 
part in the discussion was because I was known to the organiser/s and many of 
those in the room. Even where I was introduced as an observer there were times 
when I was asked directly what my view on an issue was or if I had anything to add 
to the discussion. Where I think this impacts on my research and the issues raised, I 
have tried to identify the role I played when I am discussing the issues in the analysis 
sections later. I have tried to be as transparent as possible about this so that the 
reader can be clear about where any potential bias may have occurred.  
 
The use of documentary evidence alongside the observation and interviewing is a 
further opportunity to reinforce information gained and overcome some of the 
weaknesses of each approach. The exploration of manifestos provided a written 
record of points made during meetings and interviews. Other documents produced 
by the mayor and council after the election provided a good indication of how 
seriously issues had been taken as action was documented. 
 
According to Morse (2002:14), it is important for any research to ensure rigour as 
“Without rigor, research is worthless, becomes fiction, and loses its utility. Hence a 
great deal of attention is applied to reliability and validity in all research methods”. 
Consideration therefore needs to be given to the integrity of the conclusions drawn 
from this research. In my research I sought to verify my findings through the nature 
of my research, as an iterative process. This enabled me to check, confirm and 
make sure the data was valid as I went through the different processes at different 
times. For example, I was able to check things in interviews that had been raised at 
meetings and in documents, and see from different documents a confirmation of 
issues raised in discussions.  
 
Whilst there might be opportunities to generalise about theory it would be difficult to 
assume that the findings from a study of specific circumstances, during a particular 
time period, in one city, with particular individuals, would be applicable in other 
contexts and situations in other areas. Therefore, the intention was not to generalise 
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about the findings in empirical terms but to use the research to provide input to the 
theoretical development of the MSF model of agenda setting and an understanding 
of the role of policy entrepreneurs during an election. Interpretive ethnography 
provides the opportunity for ‘plausible conjectures’ according to Boswell et al 
(2018:7), in the same way as naturalist research enables generalisations. From my 
research I have been able to make some general statements that can move our 
theoretical understanding forward: as suggested by Boswell et al (2018:7) they are 
“plausible because they rest on good reasons and the reasons are good because 
they are inferred from relevant information”.   
 
Validation is an important concept in qualitative research, with a focus on how well 
meanings have been captured and interpreted. The use of triangulation helps to 
address issues of validity, where complementary methods are used to answer the 
same research question, providing corroboration and bringing different partial views 
together to describe the same events, as well as revealing consistencies and 
inconsistencies (Patton, 1999). It uses the idea of bringing different sources of 
information together to improve clarity and precision of a piece of research, as well 
as to deepen understanding of a subject or phenomena (Boswell et al, 2018). The 
particular range of methods used in this research have been selected as a means of 
providing a more in-depth understanding of the subject matter, but also have the 
benefit of helping to support the validity of the research, where consistencies and 
inconsistencies between datasets can be explored and identified. 
 
The intention of this research was to ensure procedures and practices throughout 
the research were well documented, transparent and open, and to provide a 
thorough description of the research context, to enable other researchers to 
understand how the conclusions have been arrived at and judge the rigour and 
consistency with which the data has been interpreted.  
 




Partial immersion in the field was an important part of this research as understanding 
issues from the perspective of those involved was critical to gaining an overall 
picture of agenda setting and policy prioritisation during the mayoral election held in 
May 2016. This took place to different levels of intensity over a period of eleven 
months from November 2015 to September 2016, to cover the pre-election process, 
the election itself and then the immediate response following the mayoral election. A 
timeline of overall fieldwork activity is outlined in Figure 5.  
 















Source: Author’s own diagram 
 
The aim of the fieldwork was twofold: to observe discussions, debate and activity at 
public meetings; and to negotiate access to election candidates and their campaign 
teams to enable observation at formal and informal meetings relating to the 
development of priorities and discussion on housing policy issues. The intention was 
to observe the candidates in their day-to-day lives during the campaign and to talk to 
them about activities and events as they arose. My field notes from these observations 
and informal meetings and discussions form an important part of the data collected for 
this research. They enabled me to form ideas about what was going on as well as 
record descriptions. They formed part of my reconstruction of the field on paper, as 
described by Van Hulst (2008:147). As suggested by Brewer (2000), field notes were 
generally written up as soon after each field visit as possible to enable the ‘rich 
immediacy’ of notes to be captured. However, this was not always possible as I was 















































was difficult to write extensive notes, as I was chatting informally to people, or taking 
part in a meeting where someone writing copious notes might have put people off 
expressing their views. This meant I took brief notes, then once outside of the meeting I 
wrote more notes from memory of discussions and observations.  
 
The purpose of observation through attendance at hustings and other public 
meetings was to see how candidates operated in public, to see what issues came up 
at public meetings and how they were dealt with. At hustings meetings I attempted to 
record the type of issues discussed, the coverage given to housing issues by 
different candidates and the type of questions asked from the audience. On 
reflection I could have got more information from these meetings by noting how 
arguments developed from one hustings to another. What I failed to record 
comprehensively was how the debate on the housing issues changed as time went 
on, to see if different candidates demonstrated new understanding and more 
complex development of their ideas. Whilst I did gather some information on this it 
was limited which limited my ability to draw any conclusions on these issues. 
Partially this was due to the limited nature of the debate at most hustings meetings, 
particularly if all thirteen mayoral candidates were present, as there was little time for 
responses to the many questions, and partially because I was less clear about the 
objectives of using the hustings meetings in my research.  
 
Observations during shadowing were aimed at seeing how the candidates operated 
in private meetings and discussions, in party meetings and campaign meetings. The 
aim was to better understand who was influential in these discussions and how the 
candidates responded to different influences. These meetings were particularly 
useful in gathering information on where issues come from and how they are 
formulated over time as I was able to attend meetings throughout the campaign 
process. 
 
In addition, the roundtables I attended were a good opportunity to connect with the 
main housing influencers, to attend some of their discussions as well as undertake 
more formal interviews. This engagement enabled me to see the debate from a 
different perspective, to see how those intent on influencing the candidates operated 
and planned their interventions. 
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A field diary was kept throughout the fieldwork, starting in November 2015. This 
initially covered access to discussions and negotiations, who had been contacted 
and when. Once attendance at public and private meetings, interviews and 
shadowing began then the field diary recorded information from events and activities 
attended, informal discussions, as well as telephone calls and chats. These included 
descriptive notes and reflective notes, as well as demographic information such as 
place, time, date, and participants as illustrated in Table 5.  
 









Source: author’s own analysis 
 
Whilst these notes were sometimes extensive, on occasion they were quite minimal 
as my involvement in a meeting meant it was more difficult to concentrate on taking 
notes, thus relying on my memory of the event and impressions of the meeting 
afterwards. Reflecting afterwards on this process of keeping a field diary I found 
myself wishing I had taken more detailed notice of impressions and thoughts on what 
was happening rather than notes of what was said. My experience of being a 
researcher has largely depended on me taking notes of what people say, rather than 
how they behave, so I found that more difficult to remember to do during meetings. 
Afterwards I frequently added to fieldnotes with impressions of behaviour, tone of the 
meeting and thoughts on participants, but in future research I would seek to include 
this in my notes whilst at a meeting and to use it better in my writing. 
 
By agreeing to take part in the research the different candidates agreed to a range of 
activities and engagement (see Appendix 1 and 2 for examples of Participant 
Information Sheet and Consent Form). Mayoral candidates C1, C2 and C3 agreed to 
Descriptive notes Reflective notes 
• Time, place, date of meeting/activity 
• Participants names or number in 
attendance 
• Portraits of the participants (small 
meetings) 
• Reconstruction of dialogue 
• Accounts of particular events/activities 
• Coverage in terms of housing issues 
compared to other issues 
• Notes of key questions and issues 
covered 
 
• Personal thoughts on participants, their 
responses, body language, tone etc. 
• Impressions of responses and activity 
• Thoughts on hidden agendas, who’s 
influential, who’s listening to whom? 
• How did the meeting/activity work, who 
dominated, who was in charge? 
• What was the tone of the meeting, 
positive, negative? 
• Were the right people at the meeting, 
did anyone who was expected not 
attend, any notable absences? 
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some form of ‘shadowing’ which was initially proposed as the researcher ‘shadowing’ 
them for up to 2-3 days equivalent, to be agreed at key points in the campaign. In 
practice this was mostly broken down into half days revolving around important 
meetings and roundtables. The idea of shadowing for a few days at a time seemed 
less relevant once I had discussed things further with the candidates and agreed the 
types of meetings and activities it would be useful to engage in. Four of the five 
candidates I approached agreed to be interviewed, with interviews at the beginning and 
end of the election period. They also agreed to provide campaign information and 
written material to me at key points in the campaign.  
 
Once the election process began in earnest it soon became clear that even having 
negotiated access to three of the main candidates beforehand, actually ensuring that 
contact happened was more difficult. As suggested by Van Hulst (2008:146), 
“gaining access when needed, does not mean that access will be given to everything 
that is happening and that it is guaranteed over a long period of time.” As time 
pressures became more apparent and candidates’ priorities were entirely focused on 
the election, my ability to capture their time reduced significantly and it was 
necessary to constantly re-negotiate access. However, I was able to snatch 
moments in time between private meetings and roundtables, whilst walking between 
venues and over a quick cup of tea, to gain valuable insights into the world of the 
candidates and the pressures on them. I was present at meetings over several 
months during the campaign, observing and participating, as well as chatting 
informally with candidates and those around them. In total, I was present at 15 
private meetings (about 30 hours in total), including 3 roundtables of 2-3 hours each 
and attended 7 campaign meetings and launches of between 1-4 hours each. I was 
also involved in many informal discussions, phone calls, and quick chats before and 
after meetings, which are more difficult to quantify, as they tended to be ad hoc and 
often spur of the moment, but were nevertheless a key part of my research. The 
information these activities provided me with was particularly valuable as I was able 
to see and hear discussions for myself, rather than relying on the candidates own 
reflections on them, and I frequently managed to get instant reactions from the 
candidates about the meetings and discussion before they had the time to reflect 
and rationalise their views. 
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In addition, I attended or listened online to 5 public debates and hustings. These 
meetings typically lasted for 2-3 hours and the aim was to record the types of issues 
discussed, the coverage given to housing issues by different candidates and the 
types of questions asked from the audience and by whom. This was actually more 
complex than originally anticipated as housing featured in some but not all of the 
hustings, as some were themed around other key issues. In the more general 
meetings housing was touched on as part of other discussions as well as in its own 
right. Whilst these meetings did provide an overview of the types of issues and 
interest, they were perhaps less useful than the time spent observing private 
meetings.  
 
The objective from all of these observations was to develop an understanding of the 
extent to which housing issues featured as part of the election debate; who was 
attempting to influence the agenda; and how the candidates responded to the 
housing issues raised.  This part of the research was about observing and 
discussing what was happening, as it happened, and seeing into the world of the 
candidates and the people trying to influence them. 
 
Talk (Interviews) 
I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews, at different stages in the election 
process. These interviews were open-ended and conversational, with themes and 
issues as a guide as well as some general questions (See Appendix 3 for the initial 
framework of themes/questions). They were conducted with mayoral candidates, 
housing practitioners and influencers, council officers and other key stakeholders; 
pre- and post-election (see Table 6 and a more detailed table in Appendix 4). My 
approach included repeat interviews with candidates and campaigners, at different 







Table 6: Interviews and Coding 
Candidates (C1-C4) 4 Candidates 8 interviews 
Influencers (INF1-18) 18 Influencers 22 interviews 
Members (M1,6)  






2 Officers 3 interviews 
Media (NEWS1-3) 3 Media 3 interviews 
Source: author’s own analysis 
 
I interviewed each of the main mayoral candidates at least once (with the exception 
of the Conservative Party candidate, who declined to be interviewed) formally before 
the election, with the winning candidate and the previous mayor also interviewed 
after the election. In addition, a series of interviews were conducted during the 
election process with key external influencers and council officers. All interviews 
were recorded, where agreed by participants, and transcribed fully upon completion. 
Although I did find that some of the candidates and stakeholders were less happy to 
be recorded and the location of some of the interviews meant recordings were 
difficult to transcribe because background noise was dominant. In total 33 semi-
structured interviews plus 8 informal interviews were undertaken ranging from 20 
minutes to 2 hours each. A small number were conducted over the phone with media 
contacts, all other interviews were face-to-face. 
 
The interviews provided a wealth of information and were a valuable source of 
content. The repeat interviews with eight of the participants were particularly useful 
in terms of formally collecting different views at different times during the election 
process. Reflecting on this approach it would potentially have been more useful to do 
more repeat interviews with more of the key players, rather than extending the net of 
interviews as wide as I did. I found that four or five of the interviews with influencers 
were less relevant to my research and provided little in terms of content, when 
perhaps talking to the candidates or the more central influencers one more time 
might have been more fruitful. 
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Considered Writing (Documentary evidence) 
The use of documentary evidence was particularly useful for my research in the 
build-up to the election as written information provided detailed content that could be 
picked up on in interviews and also helped me to understand some of the 
discussions I attended, as papers and evidence were often referred to. The 
documents used are outlined in the Table 7. 
 




3 Background information reports 
on housing statistics 
3 Main campaign documents from 
MfH, Acorn and NFA groups 
Various draft versions of campaign 
documents from MfH and NFA 
6 background reports on housing 
issues from influencers and think 
tanks 
Written documents from housing 
providers and campaigners 
Written documents from campaign 
groups 
Written documents from individuals 





5 main candidates  
3 other candidates 
2 manifesto launch speeches 
1 post-election inauguration speech 
Written documents or website 
pages 
Newspaper reports with full text 
Council 
Documents 
2 Housing Strategy documents 
2 Housing delivery documents 
4 Housing evidence reports 
2 Scrutiny reports 
2 Homes Board meeting 
documents 
2 Planning documents 
1 report from Homes Commission 
All written documents either 
provided on paper or available on 
websites 
 
Source: author’s own analysis 
 
This included analysis of the election manifestos of all the main mayoral candidates, 
any other action plans and documents produced as well as key speeches made by 
them to understand their approach to housing policy and their prioritisation of issues. 
Documents and reports provided by influencers were also collected, as they were a 
source of information for the candidates. Existing council policy on housing was 
examined as a baseline against which to assess change. I also collected the key 
council documents, reports and mayoral speeches published in the first three to four 
months after the election to establish the extent to which housing issues were picked 
up as a priority on the council and mayor’s agenda once the election was over. 
 
Using written documents allowed me to delve in detail into some of the background 
information candidates were provided with, as well as consider how they were using 
this in their own speeches and discussions. Interrogation of manifesto commitments 
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provided a written confirmation of priorities and allowed for comparison against what 
had been said by each candidate during the campaign, as well as the firm 
commitments made after the election by the successful candidate. The only 
downside of using written documents is that there is always the possibility of being 
‘drowned’ in information, as so much was produced by the influencers, council 
officers and even some of the candidates themselves. Being able to sift through and 
identify the most relevant information was made easier by having a framework of 
themes and questions that were used in interviews to guide my reading. In 
discussions with the candidates it was clear that they were experiencing information 
overload, as more and more documents were provided to them directly by 
influencers and through their own research into particular issues. 
 
 
3.5 Reflexivity and the Researcher  
Interpretive research needs to be reflexive as the researcher needs to take account 
of how their own assumptions and views have impacted upon the research process 
and outcomes (Charmaz, 2006). It is important to use your own “personal 
interpretive framework” consciously during research and be aware of the values and 
assumptions you bring to the research as an individual (Pachirat, 2009:144). My plan 
from the start was to use the MSF as a guiding framework, rather than an explicit 
theory, with the aim of developing more substantive theories and working 
hypotheses throughout the research process. This culminated in the final diagram 
and framework presented in Chapter 8, where predictable windows of opportunity 
and the role of policy entrepreneurs are highlighted as key elements of the agenda 
setting process. 
 
Madden (2010:20) suggests it is important to consider the role of the researcher in 
ethnographic research and to be aware of the connections of the researcher from the 
outset. Like the research undertaken by Madden (2010), my research took place in 
my home town, where I was working in a familiar environment where I had formed 
various subjective attachments. The subjective and reflexive elements of my 
research need not be considered a problem to overcome, they were more central to 
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the research and a positive element in terms of understanding and access. Indeed, 
as Alveson & Skoldberg (2009:144-145) suggest: 
 
 “the role of the ethnographer in the ethnography can be a productive and 
necessary source of reflection and analysis, rather than a shortcoming to be 
silenced or downplayed”. 
 
The influence my social and historical identity had on the creation of my writing and 
understanding of different settings and interactions was a key part of this research. 
Without my prior experience my understanding of what was happening and my 
interpretation of events would have been more limited. 
 
My previous experience as a local politician, a policy advisor and influencer provided 
me with a deeper understanding of what to look for and what to extract from the data 
generated by my research. It provided me with me an ability to interpret what was 
happening from a perspective close to that of the participants in my research, a 
perspective that others who had not been part of that political and policy world would 
have found more difficult to interpret and understand. This connection was both 
positive and negative, as my interpretations could also carry the risk of political bias, 
associated with my past party-political involvement. I was conscious of this issue 
throughout my research and fieldwork and worked hard to use participants’ own 
words in my text to illustrate the interpretations I was making, so others could 
understand their basis. 
 
I can also see the positive from my position in terms of my deeper understanding of 
the structures and institutions of politics in Bristol, the unwritten rules and dynamics 
of party systems, business involvement and influencers. Researchers from outside 
the political world would not know or understand the relationship and dynamics to the 
same extent. It is difficult to quantify or fully assess the impact of this prior 
knowledge and experience on my research output but suffice to say it was an 
important part of this interpretive ethnography not simply in relation to gaining access 
to key individuals but also in relation to my understanding and interpretation of 
events and activities that took place during the fieldwork period. 
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Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009:273) suggest four levels of reflexivity, which I have 
reflected throughout my fieldwork and writing: 
1. Interaction with empirical material – accounts in interviews, observations, 
documents; 
2. Interpretation – underlying meanings; 
3. Critical interpretation – ideology, power, social reproduction; 
4. Reflection on text production and language use – own text, claims of 
authority, selectivity of voices represented in the text. 
 
Throughout the research I kept a research diary in which I noted reflections on my 
role, my thoughts, concerns and assumptions, as well as side notes about 
interactions, informal discussions and overall observations. These are brought out in 
the text of my findings where appropriate. I did, however, find that these notes were 
harder to keep consistently and were a more ad hoc part of the research. Sometimes 
there was just no time to write notes immediately, and other times there was less to 
record. Notes tended to made at the end of a day or week, depending on the level of 
activity at any one point in time. In addition, when interpreting data and attaching 
meanings I mostly tried to use the words and text of those I was observing alongside 
my own words. Inevitably, this text and discussion in chapters 5-8 is ultimately my 
own interpretation of the data and is based on my choice of which data to use, 
influenced and informed by my own experiences, knowledge and values. 
 
There were many challenges associated with this research involving elite actors in 
an arena and city where I am well-known in political and policy circles. Many of those 
I was observing and interviewing are known to me as a result of my past political 
involvement and through personal friendships such that “both the involvement and 
detachment of the researcher lies at the heart of the observation” (Rhodes, 2011:10).  
In my research it could be argued that, in Shehata’s (2014:210) terms, I became “a 
conduit of research and a primary vehicle of knowledge production”, in that as well 
as an observer and an ‘outsider’, I was a participant in the very process I was 
seeking to understand, more of an ‘insider’. I was there, from the outside looking in 
and from the inside looking out. I watched and listened to events, activities, 
announcements and statements as they happened, as a bystander looking at a 
process from the outside, looking into the world of the politicians. I also attended, 
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participated and observed at private meetings and discussions, spoke formally and 
informally to many of the politicians with inside access looking out from their world, 
seeking to see it and understand it as they do. 
 
I was close to those I was observing and interacting with, part of their world and part 
of the discussion, whilst at the same time being considered by some participants as 
an outsider. My position varied according to who I was observing and engaging with, 
depending on our previous history and our past involvements. I walked a fine line 
between involvement and observation, and influence and impartiality. That is the 
nature of this type of research, where I was observing and engaging in a political 
world where I was known and where I had previously been a participant, and to 
some extent still am. There was always a balance to be struck between interaction, 
participation and observation. Reflexivity was essential. 
 
My field research relied on my role as both participant and non-participant observer, 
which brought with it its own complications, as all observers/researchers bring with 
them into the field prior theories, which are used to construct interpretations. Indeed, 
I entered the field with a framework for my research (the MSF), drawn from theory, to 
structure my interaction and with my own knowledge and experience of politics and 
political processes in Bristol. In this research situation I already had a relationship 
with many of those observed and interviewed, which made academic detachment 
even more difficult. The key for any ethnographic researcher, according to Gilbert 
(2008), is to be both an insider and an outsider taking part in the social world you are 
researching but being careful not to become part of it. This was a particular 
challenge for me because to some extent I was already part of it before I began the 
research so the challenge was more about stepping out of the social world of those I 
was researching and seeing it from the outside. Rhodes (2011:12) describes this as 
a balance between keeping your distance and keeping their confidence; empathising 
whilst not going native; being part of it whilst remaining impartial. I would go a step 
further and suggest that impartiality is impossible in this situation and to some extent 
unnecessary. As suggested by Yannow (2009:290-291): 
 
“The use of “I” situates the author into the writing and the research but does 
not tell us anything about the person’s experience or how their presence 
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shaped the research and data. Reflexivity requires the researcher to provide a 
considered exploration of the possible impacts on research findings and 
knowledge”. 
 
One area of concern was the extent of my involvement whilst observing and 
shadowing mayoral candidates. During this process it was all too easy to be drawn 
into providing advice and help to candidates, taking part in the debate, providing 
input and ideas. Indeed, in many instances it was difficult not to, as my views were 
sought and my input encouraged. In these instances, I took the decision to 
participate and provide my thoughts when asked, but not to be proactive, rather I 
waited to be invited into the discussion. The extent to which my views were sought 
varied from candidate to candidate, based on how well we knew one another and 
how much I engaged with them prior to the election. Once more this comes back to 
the question of balance, which was difficult to predict prior to conducting fieldwork, 
but which did become clearer once I was in the field. Perhaps the most important 
thing is the need to remain responsive to what is possible and what is interesting, 
providing a flexibility and energy to the research. 
 
Throughout the research it was important for me to be aware of the potential for 
researcher bias as well as to consider the skill, time and experience required to 
conduct ethnographic research. It was also important to acknowledge some of the 
advantages of being known and knowing something about the setting I was 
researching. In this case I had a good understanding of the politics of Bristol, how 
the political world operated, who the influencers might be and how the structures of 
political life interacted. I understood the language of politics and elite actors and I 
was recognised as having in the past been ‘one of them’, part of their world, 
sympathetic to the constraints and influences they faced. Whilst the difficulties of this 
connection had to be taken into account, the benefits were also significant in terms 
of access and acceptance, understanding and the ability to interpret events. 
 
 
3.6 Analysis and Presentation of Data 
In my research, different themes and issues were recorded as they appeared, and 
data analysis began immediately after the first interview was completed and initial 
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observations recorded (Maxwell, 2011). As part of this process, all interview data 
was transcribed fully and loaded into NVivo for storage, organising and analysis. 
Field notes were also periodically added to NVivo for analysis alongside the 
interview data. A process of open coding was used as a first stage in developing 
categories for thematic coding.  This was based on deductive and inductive coding, 
using my initial interview framework as a starting point then adding inductive codes 
as issues arose from transcripts. Matrices were then compiled that brought together 
different themes and contextual relationships, with concepts within the theoretical 
framework, using key quotes, research notes and observations to highlight emerging 
patterns (Flick 2009). 
 
The initial themes based around housing policy, influence and structures were 
expanded into sub themes, including different types of influence, different elements 
of housing policy and local, sub regional and national levels of influence. In addition, 
sub themes were added that reflected the five structural elements of Kingdon’s MSF 
to enable information to be extracted in a more systematic way. 
 
As the research continued, I found myself regularly returning to the data set as a 
whole rather than just the extracted elements of analysis, as re-reading and re-
assessing the data enabled a broader understanding of the bigger picture and 
encouraged me to rethink my initial analysis and findings to refine the issues as 
more data were collected and a more complete picture assembled. 
 
In terms of reporting and capturing the data into my findings and analysis, one of the 
most difficult elements was to try and decide how to present the material to 
demonstrate the different elements of my research. In this case I decided to use the 
‘practice, talk and considered writing’ elements defined by Rhodes and described 
above. That meant in each case where I use quotes, para-phrasing or information 
from my research I have added additional codes to identify them as P (practice), T 
(talk) or CW (considered writing) to ensure the reader gains a better picture of how 
the information was collected and assimilated and how I am using it. I found 
including the extent of my data into the research quite challenging. I was torn 
between storytelling and data presentation in a more traditional manner, in the end I 
 66 
used both to some extent, but perhaps focused more on traditional presentation of 
data in quotes and para-phrasing rather than using my fieldnotes more directly. 
 
 
3.7 Purpose and distinctiveness of the research  
My research aims to make a contribution in a number of different areas. Firstly, 
methodologically this research adopts an approach to studying agenda setting that 
has seldom been used by others. By trying to enter the world of the mayoral 
candidates I looked at agenda setting from their perspective, as it happened, during 
an election process. In addition, my research sought to contribute to the agenda 
setting literature and link through to policy process theories. As suggested by 
Cairney and Jones (2015:16), to take things forward in the development of policy 
process literature, agenda setting research using the MSF needs to do three things; 
demonstrate proficiency with the MSF; speak to the MSF; and speak to broader 
policy research. I have used these suggestions to guide the development of my 
research to enable comparison with other empirical studies and to push the 
boundaries of the research further forwards, in the new directions suggested by 
Cairney and Jones. 
 
Part of the point of doing this research was also to consider its implications for 
practice. What does it have to offer a practitioner, influencer, politician or council 
official in their day-to-day lives? This was perhaps a more difficult aspect to consider 
as my research was quite deliberately initially focused on exploring theoretical 
models and methodological issues that help us to explain and understand what is 
going on. Despite this, it was clear that providing a better understanding of how 
politicians take policy decisions and prioritise issues during and immediately after 
local elections would be of interest and use to practitioners and politicians 
themselves. I sought to provide some clarity on this process in Bristol, to explore the 
micro-politics of power, to identify who was influential and why, and how politicians 
respond to influence. The outcomes of this research will therefore hopefully be useful 
to the politicians themselves, as well as policy elites, influencers, and council 
officials. 
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4.0  Introduction to Bristol 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to Bristol, the city at the heart of my research. 
It begins with a brief discussion about its development as a city and outlines some of 
the significant dates and trends as the city has prospered and grown over the 
decades. Discussion then turns to the nature of governance and leadership in the 
city, providing the background to more recent events and the mayoral election at the 
heart of this research. This is followed by an outline of the housing issues and 
problems the city faces and how the council has sought to deal with these. It 
considers the main features of housing policy prior to the 2016 election and 
highlights the issues that were prevalent leading up to the election. The main aim of 
the chapter is to provide the reader with a clear understanding of politics, leadership 
and housing in Bristol and how past decisions and the historical development of the 
city influence the current situation. 
 
4.1  Introduction and background 
The Bristol council area has a population of 442,500 whilst the sub-region has a 
population of approximately one million (BCC, 2015). Bristol is now the sixth largest 
city in England and one of ten core cities outside of London4.  
 
The city of Bristol was designated as a city and county in 1373 by King Edward III 
and gradually took on more powers and responsibilities before many of these powers 
were then ceded to the newly established County of Avon in 1974 (Brown & Harris: 
1964). The creation of Avon, according to Stewart (2003) ‘resulted in 20 years of 
civic sulking’ waiting for Bristol to regain its status as both a city and county. This 
happened in 1996 when Avon County Council was abolished and the West of 
England became the preferred description for the new sub-region covering four new 
unitary council areas: Bristol, South Gloucestershire, North Somerset, and Bath and 




4 Core cities - a network of ten UK cities providing a united voice for cities to promote their role in society and to 
unlock the potential that cities have to offer. The ten core cities are: Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, 
Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Sheffield (https://www.corecities.com). 
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Figure 6: Bristol and the West of England 
 
City Development 
One hundred years ago the Housing and Town Planning Act (later known as the 
Addison Act, 1919) set up the financial systems for councils to build new homes on a 
grand scale. In response to this, following the first world war Bristol, like many other 
cities, saw the advent of slum clearance and the impact of the garden city 
movement, with city centre residents moved to local authority housing on the 
suburban fringes of the city, to areas such as Sea Mills, Knowle West and 
Shirehampton. The ethos of the new estates was based on quality, health, domestic 
well-being and affordability (Howard, 1965). 
 
After the second world war, further large municipal estates were built on greenfield 
sites on the edge of the city, expanding its urban boundary, such as at Southmead, 
Hartcliffe, Lockleaze, and Lawrence Weston. Over time all these estates suffered 
similar problems. Despite the quality of the housing and the improvements to local 
infrastructure, there were few local facilities or amenities and limited public transport 
routes provided alongside the housing. Whilst the plans identified these services, few 
were developed at the same time as the houses and many of the planned new retail 





The pressure to build new housing in Bristol has been fairly constant, with extensive 
post war building, the largest number outside London, continuing into the 1960s and 
1970s (Dunleavy, 1981). For example, the 1951 Development Plan identified the 
need for 60,000 new dwellings by 1970. During this period the tensions between 
Bristol and its surrounding authorities were clear to see, with boundary extensions 
negotiated into Somerset, and failed negotiations with Gloucestershire, but still 
insufficient housing built at the edge of the city to accommodate its overspill. This 
shortage of land continues to this day, with Bristol suffering tight urban boundaries to 
the south and east, and surrounding authorities resistant to growth, except on the 
north fringe of the city. 
 
At the same time as this growth within the city boundary, significant planned 
expansion took place around Bristol in places like Thornbury, Nailsea and 
Keynsham. In the 1960s further urbanisation took place on the north fringe of the city 
around the market towns of Chipping Sodbury, Yate and Almondsbury. There 
followed in the 1980s significant poorly planned private sector development across 
the north fringe, with 10,000 houses built at Bradley Stoke and additional expansion 
in Yate. Like those developed in the 1950s and 1960s, these 1980s estates suffered 
similar problems with few local facilities provided and a largely car-based population 
(Farthing et al, 1996).  
 
The late 1990s saw the role of the north fringe consolidated as an alternative centre 
with the development of Cribbs Causeway as an out of town retail and leisure centre 
with a catchment of over four million people (Tallon, 2007). This development on the 
edge of Bristol highlights a national trend towards polycentric cities, with edge of city 
retail and leisure, and extensive free parking, competing with traditional city centres. 





















Source: David Lock Associates5 
 
As a response to this, the new unitary authority of Bristol developed a City Centre 
Strategy in 1998 which sought to encourage a focus on city centre living and the 
regeneration of the city centre, continuing a trend that began in the late 1980s as 
young people and investors began to move back into the city. Most of this new 
housing was private sector developer led and provided little in the way of affordable 
housing. Much of it was private rented and owner occupation, with buy-to-let a 
significant proportion (Boddy, 2003). 
 
New policy from central government in Planning Policy Guidance Note 3 on housing 
(DETR, 2000), helped encourage developers to shift their attention away from 
greenfield sites around the city and move towards the reuse of previously developed 
land. Local authorities were encouraged to identify land in city centres that could be 
used for housing. In Bristol much of this was around the waterfront at Harbourside, 
The Point and Capricorn Quay with later development identified across the city 
centre at Temple Quay. 
 
These trends towards city centre and north fringe development, alongside the loss of 
traditional industries (such as tobacco), led to the decline of the south of the city and 
 
5 One of a series of plans developed as part of the author’s work on Bristol 2050, High in Hope (2011) in 
collaboration with David Lock Associates. 
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the eastern edge of the city centre around St Pauls, Redcliffe and Easton. This 
further reinforced the overall polarisation between areas of affluence and deprivation 
in the city (Boddy, 2003). Areas north of the river in Bristol were generally more 
affluent than those to the south. They were better connected and benefited from new 
economic growth, whereas much of south Bristol was poorly connected and lost 
employment, such as the Wills tobacco factory, which closed in 1987 with the loss of 
6,000 jobs (Bull & Jones, 2006). 
 
Growth pressures in and around Bristol have been strong for many years and local 
political resistance to growth is particularly high outside of the city in the surrounding 
authorities. Concern regarding growth is exacerbated by the fragmented nature of 
governance in the city region. The unitary authority of Bristol was established with 
tight boundaries that cut across some of the urban area to the north and east of the 
city and which left little opportunity within the city boundary for further significant 
growth (Lambert and Smith, 2003). These administrative boundaries made a 
coherent approach to growth more complex as different councils with different 
political control were required to agree on strategic plans for housing and transport. 
Indeed, this has proved a challenge since the County of Avon was abolished in 
1996. 
 
In more recent years attempts have been made to draw the four councils together in 
formal and informal partnerships as part of a sub-region. The West of England 
Strategic Partnership (WESP) was formed in 1998 as an informal partnership with 
the local chamber of commerce working in collaboration with the chief executives of 
each of the four local authorities that previously formed Avon. It was brought 
together by the Bristol Initiative6 and was later transformed into a more formal 
partnership, the West of England Partnership (WEP), in 2005, adding social and 
environment partners to the membership. This was then superseded by the Local 
Enterprise Partnership (LEP), imposed as part of government policy in 2010, 
bringing business representatives together with councils in a partnership focused on 
economic development and growth across natural economic areas. Alongside this, in 
 
6 The Bristol Initiative was founded in 1988 by a group of 12 business leaders with the aim of bringing business 
and civic leaders together to address economic and social problems in the city. Thirty years on and the Initiative 
is still going strong with over 100 members from business, local government, public bodies and the community 
sector across the Bristol city region. 
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February 2017, the West of England Combined Authority (WECA) was formed, again 
as a response to government policy and in order to secure a Devolution Deal for the 
city region (HMG, 2016)7. Rather confusingly, WECA only includes three of the four 
local council areas as North Somerset declined to join and are therefore not 
represented through this formal structure. Their resistance was due to the imposition 
of a metro-mayor for the sub region, which was formalised in an election in May 
2017. During the period 2015-2016 the Mayor of Bristol also engaged in discussions 
with Cardiff and Newport, launching a report called Britain’s Western Powerhouse 
(Great Western Cities), a collaboration across boundaries between the three cities in 
an attempt to focus attention on the area and to provide a southern competitor to the 
Northern Powerhouse (Metro Dynamics, 2016). This complexity of boundaries, 
partnerships and governance is discussed further in the section below. 
 
 
4.2 Governance, Leadership and Elections 
This section seeks to introduce Bristol and its governance, with an initial look at the 
different sectors involved over the years and how they have come together in 
partnership to form part of the urban governance of the city. It then turns to a 
discussion of leadership and elections, highlighting the move from relative political 
stability to constant change and uncertainty. There is also some discussion of the 
different changes in structure brought about as a response to government legislation, 
changing the way in which the council worked and functioned. The level of change is 
identified as a significant factor in how the city functions and the development of 
local partnerships across civil society. 
 
Governance in Bristol 
Governance in Bristol demonstrates a fluid situation with constant change in the 
nature, role and functioning of different institutions and a succession of policy 
instruments and initiatives as the traditional responsibilities and powers of local 
authorities have been diminished by successive governments (Stewart, 2003:76). 
Stewart looks at the half century of urban policy change up to 2000 and discusses 
 
7 Whilst the Devolution Deal and the Combined Authority were formally agreed and set up after the Mayoral 
election in 2016, discussions and meetings were held on both prior to the election covered in this research. 
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this in relation to the emergence of a new urban governance in Bristol. His 
assessment considers the extent to which partnership working has shaped the 
patterns of collaboration in the city and how Bristol responded to the loss of power 
when the County of Avon was formed in 1974 and then the regaining of power once 
it was abolished in 1996. The city council had historically been introspective, more 
concerned with service delivery and the needs of local residents, than it was with 
perceptions of Bristol from outside the city or from different sectors within the city.  
 
In the 1980s the business community in Bristol began to take a more active interest 
in city governance, following a tradition begun by the Merchant Venturers8, which 
has continued to this day, illustrated by the fact that the first directly elected mayor of 
Bristol, George Feguson, was a member9. In 1988 The Bristol Initiative was formed 
as one of a number of ‘initiatives beyond charity’ set up by the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI, 1988) with the aim of bringing public and private sectors 
together to tackle social and economic problems in the city. The Initiative, which 
merged with the Bristol Chamber of Commerce in 1993, established a number of 
public-private partnerships covering regeneration, culture, retail, education and 
environmental issues and sought to involve itself more directly in the overall 
governance of the city (Adburgham, 1998). 
 
After the local government reorganisation of 1996 pressure from central government 
for joint working and the voluntary acceptance of public-private partnership working 
with the business community, led to a different style of governance, more reliant on 
cross-sector working with a proliferation of partnerships and organisations involved 
in urban governance and particularly regeneration, as demonstrated by the 
institutional map produced by Stewart, copied below as Figure 8 (2003:80). Whilst 
this map was almost out of date as soon as it was developed, it nevertheless 
provides an illustration of the number and type of organisations involved in city 
governance and urban policy. Undoubtedly the situation is significantly different now, 
with changes to regional governance, the introduction of sub-regional entities and 
 
8 Founded in 1552, with about 250 members. Members were the leaders of the business community and 
frequently involved in city politics. The Merchants still exists as a key business organisation in the city to this day. 
9 Although George Ferguson did resign from the Merchants once elected. 
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the loss of some partnerships. There are however likely to be just as many, if not 
more organisations working across the city today. 
 
Figure 8: Institutional Map of Bristol 1990s 
Source: Stewart (2003:80) 
 
Bristol also has an extensive and active voluntary and community sector (Jones et 
al, 2016) with over 1,400 registered voluntary sector organisations (Cabinet Office, 
2010) involved in community development, economic well-being, education and 
training, health, environment, capacity building and cultural activity. It is well known 
for having an active third sector economy engaged in a wide range of activities 
including housing development, job creation schemes, care services, loan schemes 
and offering local services on contract to the public sector (Cooper, 1999). The 
groups are a mix of communities of interest and area-based community 
organisations that have evolved over the decades from the new social movements of 
the 1970s and the regeneration initiatives of the 1980s onwards to an emergence of 
newer equalities groups developed under the remit of community development 
(Purdue et al, 2004). The extent of this local civil society is significant and 
incorporates a number of partnerships and networks where groups are brought 
together with common interests. The most significant umbrella organisation is 
VOSCUR (Voluntary Organisations Standing Council on Urban Regeneration), which 
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was set up in 1996 to bring this myriad of groups together to represent the third 
sector (Bull and Jones, 2006). 
 
There has been extensive partnership working in Bristol with the private sector often 
taking the lead, but with constant changes required and introduced by government, 
adding new layers to engagement, and according to Stewart (2003) there is little 
coherence to the process. The establishment of Local Strategic Partnerships in the 
Urban Policy White Paper was seen by government as a means of rationalising 
some of these local partnerships into a partnership of partnerships, which were set 
up to produce area wide Sustainable Community Strategies (DETR, 2001). In Bristol 
this was formed as the Bristol Partnership, which was a requirement for the city if it 
wished to access Neighbourhood Renewal funding in 2002/03. Initially this was set 
up with 70 members and a 24-member executive, with many of the existing groups 
and partnerships continuing, maintaining a myriad of connections and networks 
(Stewart, 2003). The Bristol Partnership then went through numerous changes 
during its lifetime, with constant restructures and changes to representation 
consuming its energy (Davies & Pill, 2012:2207). From personal experience of 
involvement with the Bristol Partnership over a number of years as both a member 
and as a policy advisor to the Chief Executive of The Initiative when he was the 
Chairman, my own assessment would be that it suffered the same problems many 
partnerships suffer, that of lack of power and resources. Too many of the members, 
who were senior level representatives, were busy with their own organisations, so 
whilst they attended meetings it was difficult to elicit any direct action from them in 
between meetings and it seemed that many were there just to keep a watching brief. 
 
The above discussion highlights just how fragmented leadership in the city has been, 
with no single person or organisation providing clear strategic direction. The 
business community, and in particular The Initiative, raised this as an issue over 
many years and argued that the lack of leadership and the lack of any clear, long 
term strategic vision in the city and city region would lead to the city being left 
behind. Indeed, in 2010, The Initiative under the direction of John Savage10, 
embarked on a visioning exercise, using business funds to employ staff and other 
 
10 I was working for John Savage at the time and coordinated much of the work on the vision bringing different 
sectors together with experts to develop ideas. 
 76 
experts, to bring people together across sectors to develop the Bristol 2050 vision 
(The Initiative, 2011). The need for this, according to the business community, was 
due to the short term, bureaucratic nature of the council and its political system, 
where concerns about annual elections and more pressing budget matters meant 
there was little time or ability for councillors to think beyond day-to-day pressures 
and issues. 
 
Leadership and Elections 
Over the last two decades, the governance of Bristol has changed fundamentally, 
from a traditional committee system with leader, to a leader and cabinet system with 
a separate scrutiny role separating executive-leadership functions from scrutiny 
functions, as a result of the Local Government Act 2000, and then to a directly 
elected mayor with cabinet in 2012 as a result of the referendum earlier in the same 
year.  
 
For many years until 2002 Bristol City Council was run by a majority Labour 
administration, with a relatively stable leadership under Cllr Graham Robertson 
(1982-1997) until a challenge from within the Labour Group in 1996. Whilst this 
challenge failed and Cllr Robertson remained leader for a further year, it created 
enough disruption to force the leadership of the Labour Group to rethink its approach 
and to develop their own view on a successor. As a result, the following year George 
Micklewright11 was supported by Cllr Robertson to become leader of the Labour 
Group and hence Leader of the Council. There was then a short period of stability 
from 1997 to 2002, with Mr Micklewright at the helm and previous competitors 
encouraged to take up positions within the Group as committee chairs. However, 
politics once more intervened with a deliberate tactic from the main challengers on 
the council, the Liberal Democrats, targeting the Labour Leader’s seat and 
eventually defeating him at the local election in 2002. At this point leadership of the 
council changed once more, with Cllr Diane Bunyan (Labour) taking over the role. 
However, this only lasted for one year, as Cllr Bunyan was also the subject of a 
major challenge by the Liberal Democrats in the next local election and subsequently 
 
11 Mr Micklewright refused to use the prefix ‘councillor’ so he was always referred to as ‘Mr’ Micklewright in 
meetings and official papers. 
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lost her seat12. This was the beginning of the period of uncertainty and change that 
led to Bristol gaining a reputation for unstable leadership. 
 
In 2003 the Labour party lost control of the council, which led to a period of political 
uncertainty where political control of the council fluctuated between minority 
administrations and no overall control, with frequent changes in leadership until 2009 
when the Liberal Democrats took control for a couple of years until the council once 
more became a hung council in 2011. This period of uncertainty from 2003 until 2012 
is one of the reasons many believe Bristol was the only city to vote yes to a directly 
elected mayor in the referenda held in 2012 in a number of major cities. The notion 
of directly elected mayors was first introduced by central government in Local 
Government Act 2000 as one of three different forms of governance arrangements 
available to local government. At this point they could only be introduced by a 
referendum of local residents voting by a majority to change the system of 
governance to that of a directly elected mayor. In 2007 local authorities were also 
enabled to bring in a directly elected mayor via council resolution. The 2010 Coalition 
government committed to holding mayoral referenda in the 12 largest cities in 
England, and this was later enacted by the Localism Act 2011. Two cities, Liverpool 
and Leicester, established mayors by resolution, whilst the other ten cities held 
referenda in May 2012. Bristol was the only city with a yes vote, albeit with a small 
margin, all the others rejected the idea (Sandford, 2019). The reasoning behind 
these changes to governance structures was to enable greater clarity in terms of 
who is responsible for decision making. There are currently 15 directly elected 
mayors in England representing local authorities and 7 elected metro-mayors 
representing sub-regions (Sandford, 2019). 
 
The Bristol vote was certainly contrary to the trend in the other core cities where 
votes took place, as voters in all other cities rejected the idea. Having voted yes in 
May 2012, the mayoral election in Bristol was held in November the same year. 
Whilst it only attracted a low turnout (28%) there was significant interest locally with 
15 candidates standing for election and good coverage in the local media. This new 
 
12 This information is recounted from personal experience as a Labour Councillor and member of the Labour 
Group in Bristol between 1994-2002. 
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form of mayoral structure presented an opportunity to demonstrate ‘strong, 
accountable leadership’ in Bristol as suggested by the Localism Act (HMG, 2011.  
 
The mayoral model of governance has the advantage of a four-year term of office, 
clear accountability and visibility of leadership as well as providing for a direct link 
between leaders and electors (Sweeting, 2017). The downside of this form of 
governance relates to its strengths in some ways, in that a longer term of office 
means there are four years before the electorate can remove that person from office, 
there is potential for too much power to be vested in one person, leaving councillors 
with a less obvious role and little opportunity to challenge the mayor. The focus of 
the election on individuals also has the potential to focus on personality rather than 
policy and can be driven by the media in a way that council elections seldom are 
(Sweeting, 2017: 5).  
 
According to Fenwick (2013), the mayoral model gained support in Bristol because 
of the constant political change and the perceived lack of leadership demonstrated 
by the Council throughout the preceding years. 
 
“The context of unstable local administrations in the city, the cross-cutting 
political strands and the low turnout all combined to produce a ‘yes’ vote but 
on the basis of local political variables all coming together at the right 
moment.” Fenwick (2013:123). 
 
Bristol has for some years suffered from low voter turnout (average just over 30%), 
recent hung councils and elections held in thirds, with three in every four years being 
an election year. In 2016 this election by thirds was changed to all up elections, to be 
held at the same time as the mayoral election, something which previous 
administrations had debated but rejected. These changes when taken together 
generated a quite significant change to the local political system in Bristol. 
 
The Mayoral Elections 
The first mayoral election under the new system took place in November 2012. This 
election used a supplementary voting system in two stages, the same as used in 
Police and Crime Commissioner elections. The first stage is where the first 
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preference votes are counted, if a candidate receives more than 50% of these first 
preference votes then they are elected. If no candidate receives more than 50% at 
this stage then the two candidates with the highest votes go forward to stage two. At 
this stage the second preference votes for the two candidates are added to their 
totals and the candidate with the highest total vote is elected. 
 
There were 15 candidates in 2012, four from the main political parties13 and 11 from 
minor political parties or independent candidates. The main contest seemed to be 
between the Labour Candidate (Marvin Rees) and one of the independent 
candidates (George Ferguson) standing under a ‘Bristol 1st’ banner. Mr Ferguson 
had received the backing of the business community and was pushing the need for 
real change with “an independent mayor who puts Bristol first” (Bristol 1st Campaign 
Leaflet, 2012). The turnout for the election was just under 28% and George 
Ferguson was elected as the first mayor of Bristol after second preference votes 
were counted, beating Marvin Rees by just over 6,000 votes (Bristol City Council, 
2012). 
 
Housing featured in the discussions during the election process and the National 
Housing Federation (NHF) held a housing hustings meeting during the campaign 
process. They also produced a campaign leaflet entitled “Bristol Votes Housing: 
Housing Issues, Housing Solutions” supported by a number of national housing 
organisations14, local housing groups and organisations15 and the local business 
community16 (NHF, 2012). This leaflet called on the new mayor to show leadership 
to tackle the key housing problems Bristol was facing by freeing up land for 
development, helping to improve the private rented sector, supporting 
green/environmental developments and demonstrating a real commitment to house 
building. Whilst there was some discussion of housing issues it did not feature at the 
top of the list of priorities for the candidates as the discussion in 2012 was dominated 
by transport issues and a wider debate about the need to move away from party 
politics and the need for strong and decisive leadership. 
 
 
13 Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green 
14 SW Housing Institute, Chartered Institute of Housing, Home Builders Federation, Shelter, Places for People 
15 Local housing associations, advice centres, 1625 Independent People, Quattro Design Architects, Tetlow King 
16 Representatives from Business West. 
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Once the election was over, the newly elected mayor (Mr Ferguson) identified 
affordable housing provision as one of his key priorities in his Vision for Bristol (BCC, 
2013b) and following this in the setting up of the Homes Commission17. At the time 
he made a commitment to focus on social housing and to build new council homes 
as well as to work with local housing associations. He also stressed the importance 
of using the council’s own land to build houses, but this was something that proved 
more difficult than he anticipated and progress was slow. 
 
The second mayoral election took place in May 2016 at the same time as the city 
council elections across all 70 seats in the city and is the subject of study in this 
research. This mayoral election attracted 13 candidates, five from the main political 
parties and eight independents including the existing mayor, who decided to stand 
again. The main contest was once more between the Labour candidate and an 
Independent candidate (the existing mayor). There was a turnout of just under 45% 
and this time Marvin Rees (Labour) was elected as mayor of Bristol beating George 
Ferguson (Independent) by 29,000 votes after second preference votes were taken 
into account (Bristol City Council, 2016). According to Finding (2018) the incumbent 
mayor’s lack of action on housing was one of the matters that had influenced voters 
in this election. 
 
 
4.3 Housing in Bristol 
This section provides some background facts and figures about the state of housing 
in Bristol at the time of the election in 2016. The aim is to furnish the reader with 
sufficient information to capture the issues and problems of the housing situation in 
the city. This information is based mostly on official local and national government 
sources. The discussion then turns to housing policy in Bristol and how this has 
developed in recent years. 
 
 
17 The Bristol Homes Commission was set up by George Ferguson as one of a number of commissions 
established to look at key policy areas. The commissions brought in expertise from across the city, from local and 
national organisations with an interest in housing. Its primary aim was to consider how to increase the supply of 
affordable housing in Bristol. 
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There is significant demand for new housing in Bristol where house prices and rents 
are high and new house building has slowed considerably in recent years. The city 
has a lack of affordable housing and homes are less affordable in Bristol than in any 
other core city (Lakin, 2013). Demand is increasing and there is an undersupply of 
homes for both sale and rent, with a significant shortage of affordable housing and 
increasing levels of homelessness. The Right to Buy (RtB) policy has had an impact 
on the numbers of homes available for social rent and local authority revenue has 
been further reduced as the RtB extension forced them to sell high value homes. 
Between 1981 and 2014 18,670 council homes were sold under RtB in Bristol, 
leaving a total of around 28,500 still in council ownership (see discussion in Section 
4.3 below). 
 
The housing affordability ratio in Bristol is now the highest of all the English Core 
Cities at 8.61, compared to a national average of 7.72 (BCC, 2017a). At the same 
time there are a limited number of strategic sites in the city where significant new 
housing could be provided. Possible sites for large scale housing developments exist 
outside the city council’s boundaries, but these fall under the control of other 
councils’ planning and housing policies. There are, however, a large number of 
smaller sites, in council ownership, which could accommodate new homes.  
 
Other challenges within the city include the changes in finance arrangements making 
fewer grants available to build new affordable housing and less funding available to 
Registered Providers as rent caps were introduced. In addition, changes to the 
welfare system, including the introduction of Universal Credit and the reduction in the 
Overall Benefit Cap from £26,000 to £20,000 per annum, have had an impact on 
households in Bristol making tenants in the Private Rented Sector (PRS) more at risk 
of homelessness (BCC, 2017b:10). 
 
In 2015 there were just under 195,000 residential properties in Bristol (Bristol City 
Council, 2015). Of these properties 15% are owned by the council, 55% owner 
occupied, 24% private rented and 6% housing associations (BCC, 2015).  
 
As the statistics in Figure 9 illustrate, Bristol has seen a decrease in the number of 
new affordable homes from 2008, with only small increases from 2014 onwards, and 
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an average of only 350 per year delivered between 2006 and 2017. It is now 
estimated that there are in excess of 14,000 people on Bristol’s housing waiting list 
(NHF, 2012). With changes to the Right to Buy legislation in 2012, which increased 
the maximum discount available to council tenants, the number of sales of council 
houses increased from 37 in 2010, to 135 in 2012 and 207 in 2016. During this 
period very few new social rent homes were actually built. This coupled with the 
declining numbers of new affordable units being built has led to an increasing 
affordability crisis in the city. 
 













Source: BCC Residential Development Survey 2017 
 
Overall the supply of new homes in Bristol declined from 2008 to 2012, with small 
increases after that time but still below 2,000 per year (see Figure 10). Between 
2006 and 2014 affordable housing made up approximately 16% of new housing 
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Source: BCC Residential Development Survey 2017 
 
The private rented sector recently overtook the affordable housing sector in terms of 
tenure nationally and in Bristol, with private rented now making up 24% and 
affordable rented 21% of the 194,653 properties in the city (Bristol Homes 
Commission, 2014). National housing policy changes, in particular welfare benefit 
reforms, have made housing costs increasingly difficult for some groups. In Bristol, 
the number of homelessness acceptances has increased significantly from 2012 
onwards, from 324 to over 1,000 in 2016. The main reasons for this are loss of 
shorthold tenancy and parents/relatives not willing to accommodate (BCC, 2017b). 
The number of households living in temporary accommodation has also increased, 
from 663 in 2013 to 1,912 in 2016, reflecting the challenges Bristol is facing in terms 
of social housing (BCC, 2017b). At the same time the number of rough sleepers has 
also increased, from 18 in 2013 to 74 in November 2016, one of the highest figures 
nationally (BCC, 2017b). 
 
Housing Policy  
Bristol has a long tradition of building and managing its own social housing stock and 
unlike many cities, when given the choice, it took the decision to retain its housing 
stock, having achieved government approval for this course of action in 2005 
(Malpass & Walmsley, 2005). This was a political decision taken by the Labour 
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ownership. In 1981 Bristol City Council owned nearly 49,000 homes, but once the 
RtB legislation was introduced in 1980, the policy meant about one third of the 
existing stock was sold at discounted prices by 2003 (Malpass & Walmsley, 
2005:10). Maintaining direct provision of council housing has been a key part of the 
housing policy agenda in Bristol.  
 
Alongside this trend in social housing, new build levels declined across the private 
sector and the percentage of affordable homes built by the private sector through 
planning agreements reduced after the 2007/08 financial crisis, with current levels of 
new build still below pre-crash levels.  
 
The city council operates within a national context where changes to welfare benefits 
and social rent reductions present constant challenges that impact on the council’s 
own ability to deliver on its policy. Central government policy over the last decade 
has consistently supported owner occupation as the tenure of choice and has sought 
to roll back the state, locally and nationally, in terms of housing provision (Murie, 
2012). The approach adopted in Bristol appears, at one level, to be at odds with 
government policy, as the primary focus is on the council having a significant role in 
housing delivery and management. This approach is made more difficult by 
government policy that limits borrowing against the Housing Revenue Account 
(HRA)18 and increases incentives under the RtB which sees a further and continuing 
reduction in the number of homes owned by the council. The lack of flexibility around 
the HRA was seen as a particular hindrance in Bristol, limiting the amount the 
council could borrow, which in turn limits to very small numbers the new council 
homes that can be built directly by the council. The introduction of a benefits cap and 
the bedroom tax are also interventions that have the potential to make social and 
affordable housing less affordable to people in Bristol, potentially leading to 
increased numbers of people registered as homeless, as well as creating problems 
for housing associations in terms of affordable rent tenancies. 
 
 
18 More recent policy has now enabled greater flexibility in the use of the HRA. 
 85 
Recent policy  
After the election in 2012, the first mayor of Bristol made a commitment to improving 
the delivery of affordable housing. This commitment was set out in his ‘Vision for 
Bristol’ (BCC, 2013b), which stressed the importance of affordable and social 
housing using council owned land to enable development and the need to ensure 
housing was increasingly affordable (BCC, 2013b). The aims and objectives of this 
plan were focused on public sector land, working in partnership and encouraging 
new models of provision. The plan also set targets, with a commitment to increasing 
new affordable homes to 750 per year by 2017 and 900 by 2018, and for the council 
as a direct developer to build at least 1,000 new council owned homes by 2028 (254 
by 2017/18). 
 
The Affordable Housing Delivery Framework (AHDF) was produced in 2013, setting 
out how the council and the partnership board, Homes4Bristol (H4B), would work 
together to achieve a significant increase in affordable housing (2013a). This 
included a more flexible approach to the use of council land for affordable housing; a 
new programme of affordable homes in mixed tenure schemes; a new definition of 
affordability that would encourage affordable rent tenancies, opening up additional 
opportunities for funding; and the inclusion of a major custom build development for 
shared equity, self-build and co-housing.  
 
The council working together with other delivery organisations produced a new 
Housing Strategy in 2015 replacing the previous strategy, which was called ‘My 
Home is my springboard for life’ covering the period 2010-2015, with the new 
strategy ‘More than a Roof’ covering the period 2016-2020. This strategy focused on 
three main outcomes: increasing the number of new homes; delivering the best use 
of existing homes; and early intervention. 
 
The mayor at the time also established a Bristol Homes Commission (BHC) bringing 
experts together to identify how the supply of affordable housing in the city could be 
improved (BHC, 2014). The BHC published its final report at the end of June 2014 
which set out a series of recommendations including proposals to instigate a review 
of council land and property, the potential for stock transfer, a dedicated stalled sites 
team, and support for alternative models of provision (BHC, 2014:4). 
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Many of these recommendations were welcomed and supported by the mayor and 
councillors, apart from the suggestion that the council should consider the idea of 
stock transfer, which received some considerable criticism. Bristol council had 
consistently taken a stance that prioritised retaining its council stock and resisting 
calls for mass transfers. Politically the council had been committed to maintaining its 
role as a social landlord. The reaction to the initial report, that had a stronger 
recommendation around stock transfer, was that it would not receive the support of 
Labour councillors if it was included. Indeed, the officers report on the Homes 
Commission report and recommendations made it clear that it was not in the 
Council’s strategic interest to pursue any form of large-scale stock transfer. The idea 
was not pursued further at the time, even though an amended recommendation was 
included. 
 
One of the biggest changes these new policy documents introduced was a shift in 
the council’s approach to the use of their own land for house building. In the past 
council owned land was merely seen as a ‘cash cow’ to be sold at the highest price 
with funds going back into the general budget. The new AHDF included an annual 
plan of disposal and proposals for the council to invest land to achieve housing 
outcomes with the council as a direct developer of homes. This was a significant 
change in policy which had the potential to enable the delivery of additional 





This chapter has served to provide an understanding of politics and leadership in 
Bristol, highlighting the strength of the different sectors and their role in urban 
governance, as well as the changing nature of the political structures in the city and 
the city region. It has also outlined the main housing issues in the city, where the 
biggest problems are and where political priorities have focused over the years. With 
this information as background, the discussion in the following chapters, outlining my 
research findings, is well situated in the context of what has gone on before.  
 87 
5.0 The Bristol Mayoral Election 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, a consideration of the literature on the MSF suggests that 
an election could potentially generate two policy windows. The first occurs as a result 
of the election being called and a second when a new administration is formed. Each 
window draws on different levels of the agenda, with debate around the systemic 
and institutional agenda (public and party agendas) during the first window, the 
agenda window, and a confirmation of the institutional agenda and decision agenda 
(mayoral agenda) during the second, the decision window. 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the characters involved in agenda setting 
during the Bristol mayoral election. It then discusses the initial processes involved in 
identifying the public systemic agenda and why housing was one of the main issues 
on that agenda from the very start of the process. The next two chapters explore 
agenda setting during each of the two windows of opportunity, focusing on the main 
characters: the candidates and the influencers. 
 
Information throughout the findings and analysis chapters is drawn from a series of 
interviews with some of the candidates and influencers, regular phone conversations 
with C2 in particular, my own field notes taken whilst attending and observing private 
meetings, discussions, debates and roundtables on housing during the campaign 
(C1, C2, C3), attendance at hustings and from notes taken whilst listening to phone-
in debates and hustings online, as well as from campaign leaflets, influencer reports, 
manifesto documents and council reports. Using techniques drawn from Rhodes’ 
research on Westminster (2011; 2013), practice (P), talk (T) and considered writing 
(CW), as outlined in Chapter 3, I tell the story of agenda setting before, during and 
after the election. I use the main structural elements of Kingdon’s MSF, as defined 






5.1 The Characters: Candidates and Influencers 
The Bristol mayoral election in 2016 attracted 13 candidates, five from the main 
political parties and eight independents including the existing mayor. I spent time 
with three of the main candidates (C1, C2 and C3) during the election process, with 
varying levels of engagement with each, including interviews, observation and 
participant observation, as well as informal conversations and chats over the phone 
throughout the election process. Interviews were also undertaken with other 
candidates. 
 
C2 and C3 took similar approaches to their campaigns, with a mix of party processes 
and wider engagement with experts and local influencers, whilst C1 appeared to 
work more closely with a smaller group of people involved in his campaign. I discuss 
below the initial processes used to identify issues and the preconceptions, in terms 
of policy priorities, with which different candidates entered the election process. But 
first, I will introduce the other main characters: the campaign groups and influencers 
involved in housing issues.  
 
The two main campaign groups, and the individuals associated with them were 
almost self-selecting, in that they appeared early in the election process and were by 
far the most visible and active housing campaigns: the No Fixed Abode campaign 
(NFA) and the Mayor for Homes campaign (MfH). There were other individuals, 
groups and campaigns that I interviewed but more time was spent with the two main 
campaign groups and individuals associated with them because I wanted more in-
depth information from what appeared to be the main influencers. 
 
The No Fixed Abode campaign was founded with “the sole aim of highlighting the 
chronic situation facing the city; there are simply not enough homes to meet 
demand” (CW - NFA Press Release, January 2016). The campaign was funded 
privately by a business man and led and developed by a marketing agency, who also 
provided additional time for free to support the campaign. The main remit of the 
campaign was raising awareness of homelessness and the housing crisis in Bristol. 
The person instigating the campaign was a local, well connected business man who 
was also involved in a number of local projects, one involving employing ex-
offenders to renovate properties and others led by local community groups with an 
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interest in improving their local area. He was identified as an influencer in his own 
right as well as the person behind the NFA campaign.  
 
“No Fixed Abode has no political affiliations, but we do want people to vote for 
a solution to Bristol’s housing crisis. We want to make sure the right people 
are there to fuel the debate, or that they are conspicuous by their absence. 
Those in positions of responsibility, power and influence, and those who want 
to be, need to have some answers.” (CW - NFA press release, January 2016) 
 
The campaign was formally launched in January 2016 and was followed by a range 
of stunts, media interviews and personal stories that were aimed at keeping the 
issue at the forefront of media and public attention.  
 
“The purpose of the campaign is to ask questions, difficult questions that no 
one else will ask or can ask. I think the funder just wants to put something 
back, he’s made money out of student housing and maybe feels a little guilty 
about that, so now it’s time to show his social conscience and principles.” 
(INF3T, February 2016) 
 
“I got involved because I was lucky enough to be one of that generation that 
did get onto the housing ladder and made money out of housing. What’s 
happening now and the situation young people find themselves in is wrong. I 
want to try to do something about it in Bristol. It’s partly guilt, but also I feel I 
have some of the answers and the connections to make things happen.” 
(INF2T, January 2016) 
 
The Bristol Mayor for Homes Campaign was initially formed as a result of a 
suggestion made by one of the local housing association chief executives. It was 
then set up under the umbrella of the National Housing Federation (NHF) as had 
been the case in the previous mayoral election. It was a coalition of groups, brought 
together to campaign with a consistent message about the need to tackle the 
housing crisis as a priority.  Their message was clear and based on providing 
evidence to demonstrate the extent of the housing crisis, providing solutions in the 
form of a clear target and a commitment to working in partnership to help meet the 
target.  
 
The campaign coalition was made up of a number of organisations who were used to 
working with the Council and some who received funding from them: The National 
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Housing Federation19, Acorn20, Bristol Supported Housing Forum21, Bristol and Bath 
Regional Capital CIC22 and Business West23. The campaign followed a fairly 
traditional, formal process with a manifesto launch (Feb, 2016), press releases and 
some individual meetings with candidates. The Mayor for Homes coalition asked all 
candidates “to commit to producing an action plan within their first 100 days to get 
Bristol building.” (CW - NHF press release, February, 2016). 
 
“We are asking for the new Mayor to commit to getting Bristol building again. 
By setting up a new delivery vehicle we think that the Council could bring 
forward enough land to build 2500 affordable homes by 2021.  We want to 
invest in the city and build much needed affordable homes. We’re up for the 
challenge now we need to know the Mayor is too.” (INF5T, February, 2016). 
 
The two campaigns initially began their journey together, with clear alignment 
between the two groups in terms of aims and challenges at the early stage of 
discussions. However, once it became clear that the MfH campaign was likely to be 
more conventional and less challenging, the NFA campaign decided to go it alone, 
working alongside the MfH campaign rather than in partnership with it. They still 
worked together informally, but were not formally associated with one another 
publicly, enabling them both to work in the way that suited them best: 
 
 “We tried to work with the Mayor for Homes campaign but it was difficult to 
get agreement on approach and solutions. So, we decided to run separately 
to them. We wanted to be a bit more radical than that.” (INF2T, January 2016) 
 
A member of the MfH campaign explained this decision to split the two campaigns as 
follows: 
 
“It was necessary, because as housing associations we need to be careful 
about how we challenge the council, we work with them in partnership and 
rely on having a good working relationship. The No Fixed Abode campaign 
has been set up specifically just to raise the issues and challenge the 
candidates, they don’t have to worry about whether or not they are upsetting 
 
19 Representing local housing associations 
20 Representing tenants in the private rented sector 
21 A group of over 40 agencies involved in housing related support services 
22 A public benefit investment company providing investment solutions to catalyse regional change 
23 The local chamber of commerce and business support organisation 
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the council, but we do. Their approach is perhaps a little too alternative for the 
NHF and some of its members, so we’d have had problems getting them all to 
agree.” (INF6T, January 2016) 
 
What emerged was a mainstream campaign bringing key stakeholders together in an 
attempt to influence the mayoral candidates both directly and indirectly, privately and 
publicly and a second campaign aimed at raising public awareness of the issues and 
keeping them on the political and media agenda throughout the election campaign. 
The two campaigns together provided candidates with a range of challenges, 
evidence, solutions, targets and options. They were largely complementary 
campaigns, pushing similar issues in different ways at different times, both publicly 
and privately, from the inside and the outside of political and policy-making arenas.  
 
The way in which they worked and the extent to which they attracted attention during 
the election process is discussed in the two chapters that follow using Kingdon’s 
three streams as a framework to highlight how skilled policy entrepreneurs used 
different tactics to bring issues to public and political attention during two distinct 




5.2 Agenda Setting – Why Housing? 
The political agenda setting process begins with the identification of the issues and 
problems that needed addressing. From a candidate’s point of view this can initially 
be about identifying what you would do differently to the current regime, what they 
are not doing well and/or are not addressing at all (Froio et al, 2013). This helps to 
demonstrate what is different about you and your campaign and what you would 
bring to the role of Mayor that makes you different to the other candidates. In Bristol 
it appeared to me, right from the start, that several of the candidates had identified 
already what the issues on the public systemic agenda were because they had been 
the main issues for local government over many years. They therefore focused less 
on identifying the general issues and were more interested in finding solutions and 
working out what their priorities would be and what they could focus their attention 
on. This seemed to set the framework for discussion in the early stages, with relative 
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agreement that the issues were clear, the debate would be about housing, transport, 
economy, environment, education and skills, and social care. It could be argued that 
these are generally speaking the issues that local government has traditionally been 
involved with, as they are the ones that have an element of local responsibility and 
power. It is no surprise that within a constrained local governance system, the issues 
identified by the different candidates seemed to be largely the same.  
 
The range of services local government in England is responsible for has largely 
remained the same over recent years but the methods of delivery have changed: 
commissioning, outsourcing and shared service delivery agreements between 
councils have become the norm. According to Copus et al, this change has not 
necessarily been born out of choice but is more of a “necessity due to financial, 
political and legal controls imposed by central government” (2017:7-8). Indeed, as 
Copus et al explain “it has become commonplace for commentators to narrate 
England as the most centralised country across the globe.” (Copus et al, 2017:6). 
This weakening of control and financial pressure on service delivery has undoubtedly 
played a part in the perception of constraints that candidates made reference to. 
 
When I asked C2 about the issues that needed addressing, he was particularly keen 
to emphasise that it was not worth talking about what these issues are, as they are 
obvious and have been for some time. From his point of view, it was more important 
to talk about what we do about them and how we can change things. 
 
“I could just do a shopping list approach, the obvious answers, transport, 
housing, social care. There’s always a list of to dos that need to be done. In 
terms of sorting things out, you’ve just got to look at what the crisis is now, 
what’s driving social ills and they’re the same challenges that we’ve been 
facing for 25 years, which drives me to the question, not what you are going to 
focus on because we’ll all focus on the same things, strong economy, 
inequality, infrastructure, but the question is why haven’t we been successful 
in the past? Why are we talking about the same challenges again?” (C2T, Jan 
2016) 
 
After a brief pause, he went on to explain his frustration about the ‘usual approach’ to 
politics. He came across as really passionate about Bristol and wanting to change 
the way things are done in the city. This was a recurring theme with the three 
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candidates I spoke to throughout the campaign, their interest, passion and 
commitment to improve things was clear.  
 
“The other thing for me, is I have a nagging question, what is Bristol for? It’s 
more a lying awake at night kind of thing, what’s Bristol for, what’s the 
economy for? It’s not just to grow. It’s there to create the right conditions in 
which we can flourish. Not a simple question, not a leaflet or manifesto 
question. So, we need to do both, people need to know the practical projects 
we are going to get involved in, but I think there’s another element about what 
kind of Bristol do we want to be, what kind of story do we want to tell about 
ourselves? That’s more than just building houses, more than just having a 
nice shiny public transport network and having decent social care. It’s very 
hard to define, very hard to measure, but I think it’s the thing that great 
meaningful political movements have been made of, asking those deeper, 
soulful questions.” (C2T, Jan 2016) 
 
C3 made a similar point, highlighting that the focus had to be on issues local 
government had responsibility for and could do something about.  
 
“The issues are obvious, they’re... well the ones local government can do 
something about, and the ones that crop up all the time. It’s housing, 
transport, environment and education. There may be others, but these are the 
ones we are all talking about, maybe with a different emphasis, but that’s it.” 
(C3T, Jan 2016) 
 
He went on to explain his thought process: 
 
“I’m trying to avoid using phrases like housing is at the top of my agenda. 
There’s a habit with certain individuals putting everything at the top of their 
agenda and you end up with a reverse triangle of sorts. But the reality is that 
housing interacts with loads of other policy areas as well.” (C3T, January 
2016) 
 
However, after further discussion of the issues, he went on to say that it was 
necessary to prioritise to some extent:  
 
“Even though it’s the obvious thing to say, housing is and has to be at the 
forefront, and when I was working out what my four key policy areas were 
going to be, the one that went down on the page first was housing, the other 
three are transport, energy and education/skills.” (C3T, January 2016). 
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C4 also identified housing as one of a limited number of issues that the mayor could 
do something about: 
 
“There’s the potential for the mayor to bring people together to tackle the 
important issues. The priorities tend to be set in the budget, which is a 
balance of issues. Housing is important, but so is transport and social care. 
The key is balance and identifying priorities.” (C4T, January 2016) 
 
In discussions with C1 early in the campaign it was obvious that his time was still 
being monopolised by council business and finalising some current projects, with 
little attention being given to campaigning or setting priorities. His approach was very 
much to carry on with what he had started rather than begin a process of identifying 
new issues and priorities. He did not actually appoint a campaign manager until 
January 2016, several months after the campaigns of other party candidates had 
already begun. It was clear from initial discussions with C1 that his approach would 
be to focus on achievements during his first term of office and that any list of issues 
or priorities that were developed would be based on what he was already doing. 
 
“You can’t separate my priorities from the council’s, I know what the 
limitations are and what we can do. My focus is on carrying on what I’ve 
started. That includes housing, transport, economy, and environment. My 
priority is to keep the momentum going.” (C1P, December 2015) 
 
What is interesting about this discussion is that several of the candidates I was able 
to speak to, either formally or informally, seemed to start with a list of issues before 
they had engaged in any meaningful public debate about them. Some discussion 
had taken place informally amongst party members, or as part of a small campaign 
group, but nothing more generally. At this point therefore, the similarity and clarity 
over the main issues is perhaps indicative of the fact that there are a limited range of 
issues that local government can have an influence over and/or derives from the 
belief that the same issues really are prevalent for long periods of time. I discussed 
this earlier and identified the different levels and types of agenda in Table 1, this 
showed the difference between the agenda universe, which includes all possible 
issues and ideas, and the public systemic agenda, which includes issues perceived 
as meriting public attention and are within the legitimate concern of the governing 
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authority and the institutional or party agenda which is a subset of the systemic 
agenda where issues are actively considered by decision makers. 
 
What this discussion seemed to show is that the public systemic agenda was limited 
to a small number of issues that candidates were likely to raise during the campaign 
and that there was relatively common agreement on what this agenda included. The 
difference of course would potentially come when the detail of each issue was 
explored and when the prioritisation of the party agenda was developed. 
 
In these initial discussions with candidates during December, January and February 
it was clear from the start that housing issues would feature amongst their priorities. 
When asked why and where this had come from as a priority the responses were 
both similar and different. All candidates spoke of putting housing on their party 
agenda because they were aware of a general issue relating to the lack of new 
housing being built, the lack of affordable housing available and the high price of 
housing in Bristol. Several candidates also linked this to the rising homelessness/ 
rough sleeping problem, which was attracting media attention at the time 
(December/January) and was becoming more visible on the streets of Bristol.  
Both C2 and C3 also made the point that housing was one of the main issues they 
felt the mayor could do something about and where there were some clearly 
identifiable problems and challenges. They were quick to identify that C1 had not 
done enough on housing and had taken a different approach to the one they were 
proposing, particularly with regard to the use of council owned land and buildings.  
 
It soon became clear that housing would become a key political issue during the 
campaign and that it had already reached the party or institutional agenda. This was 
reinforced in the early stages of the campaign where the point was made about the 
amount of talk on housing in the recent past, but with little real change: 
 
“There’s been a lot of talk about housing, but little action, [C1] has had his 
mind elsewhere. Even the things he said he’d do or started he hasn’t finished. 
You only have to look at the Housing Commission to see.... there was a 
report, with some good recommendations, but I was disappointed with some 
of the reaction to that. Not just [C1], but others. I thought people were being 
driven to oppose some of the recommendations because of past ideology. It’s 
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a shame it wasn’t pushed through, there was no real thought out plan for 
implementing. (C3P, Dec 2015) 
 
“The housing delivery programme has largely stalled over the last few years 
and affordable housing delivery has been appalling” (M1P, Dec 2015). 
 
“Bristol doesn’t work in partnership it’s a dictatorship, with the mayor at the 
helm. What he says goes... on housing that’s very little... we haven’t seen 
enough action” (CL4P, Dec 2015) 
 
Indeed, when I talked to C1 after the election he identified housing as an area where 
he would like to have done more but admitted that perhaps he had not prioritised it 
sufficiently: 
 
“There’s some things I wish I had done differently, where I could have focused 
things in a different way. I’d like to have been more innovative about housing, 
there’s lots we could be doing about factory-built housing, creating 
opportunities... self-build and custom build, I’d be interested in that but didn’t 
really push it. You have to take decisions, prioritise, and sometimes day to 
day issues take over, it’s harder to maintain that vision.” (C1T, July 2016) 
 
But in an earlier interview, prior to the election, he also stressed that tackling housing 
issues is always going to take time, it is not a short-term issue, identifying a site and 
making something happen will take at least 3-5 years, so progress is slow: 
 
“You know and I know that you can hardly build a house from a standing start 
in 3 years, let alone change the whole strategy on building new homes. I did 
put in over optimistic figures last time... [pause] which when I look back were 
genuine, but I didn’t realise the level of barriers to achieving that.  Mine were 
under half what [C2] is saying now and said last time. At the time I thought 
that was irresponsible... [sighs] impossible, ludicrous even, to suggest 4,000 
by now. My targets were lower but still not achieved... what I should have 
taken more account of is that we’re not actually in control of the number of 
affordable homes, because of Section 106 and the daft planning system 





The above discussion provides a general introduction to the issues being raised as 
part of the public systemic and institutional or party agendas during the election 
campaign and begins to identify housing in general terms as a key priority and the 
lack of affordable housing and homelessness as two more specific issues raised. 
Attention will now turn to the election process itself in more detail as I explore the 




6.0 The Agenda Window 
 
This chapter considers how the agenda window operated during the Bristol mayoral 
election. It begins with an introduction to the initial stages of the election process 
then discusses the process from the perspective of the candidates and how they 
identified priorities, as well as from the perspective of the influencers (policy 
entrepreneurs) and how they attempted to push certain issues onto the public and 
party agendas and keep them there. 
 
The agenda window opens as a predictable window in the politics stream generated 
when the mayoral and council election process began24. The build-up to the election 
provided an opportunity for opposition parties to develop their own priorities and for 
the existing administration to highlight achievements and develop new priorities. It 
provided an opportunity for individuals, interest groups and campaigners to attempt 
to influence those priorities and to bring their issues into the public arena. It ended as 
the manifestos and party agendas were produced and the election itself took place. 
 
The MSF literature suggests that when there is a predictable window, the dominant 
stream is the stream in which the window opens, in this case the politics stream, 
resulting from an election. The streams can then be brought together by policy 
entrepreneurs identifying problems and proposing solutions that are acceptable to 
the politicians. The next section looks at each of the streams and how they operated 
up to the production of party agendas/manifestos and then the election itself. 
 
 
6.1 The Initial Stages of the Election Process: Information Gathering 
As the election campaigns began, the mayoral candidates embarked on a process of 
collecting information and the policy entrepreneurs were ready with evidence and 
information on both problems and solutions. C2 and C3 in particular sought to hear 
from a wider audience than just party members, using roundtable discussions with 
invited participants and individual meetings with key influencers. C2 also held 
 
24 I interpreted this as Oct-Dec 2015, before the election in May 2016, as this was when the opposition parties 
publicly began their election campaigns, although selection processes had taken place prior to this for both 
Mayoral and Council candidates. 
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meetings with national think tanks to learn about best practice and regularly spoke to 
national party politicians to find out how national policy could be changed under a 
different government. C3 spoke with and met national party politicians and 
colleagues in other local authority areas to learn from their experience. Both 
candidates had been collecting information prior to their campaigns beginning, by 
talking to colleagues, experts and other individuals, reading reports and documents 
on a range of subjects relevant to local government as well as more broadly on 
national policy and programmes. In my conversations with them it was very clear that 
they had both researched different policy areas and were conversant with many of 
the issues locally and nationally. In particular, in relation to housing, they both had a 
good knowledge of the problems, from reading reports and other information sent to 
them, as well as from discussions with those involved in housing policy in Bristol and 
elsewhere. 
 
The influencers, or policy entrepreneurs, as Kingdon terms them, sought to take 
advantage of the agenda window to promote particular ideas and solutions. They 
joined together in coalitions and collaborations to lobby and influence the candidates 
in different ways through a common agenda. They also operated individually, both 
formally and informally, throughout the election process. As Kingdon (1984) 
suggests, policy entrepreneurs use their knowledge of the process to further their 
own ends and promote their own projects; and they can also provide ready-made 
solutions to problems as they are identified (Cairney, 2018): 
 
“...they lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, 
waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, 
waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their 
advantage” (Kingdon, 1984: 165-6) 
 
“...entrepreneurs can help make things happen because they know the 
importance of framing problems to generate attention, to have a solution 
ready, and to help create and exploit infrequent opportunities to act” (Cairney, 
2018: 202)  
 
The policy entrepreneurs in Bristol possessed varying skills and employed different 
strategies and tactics to influence the candidates. They identified both solutions and 
problems, often together, to demonstrate why a particular issue was important as 
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well as how it could be solved. They also offered to be part of the solution, offering 
their own expertise to help deliver policy change. 
 
In the early days of the campaign, C2 took a collaborative, partnership-based 
approach to identifying problems. He was keen to hear what experts and 
stakeholders had to say about policy issues in Bristol and beyond. The different 
groups and individuals within the housing sector also seemed very willing to engage 
and were active participants in the roundtables. Some of them were members of the 
two main campaign groups, others were not; whilst some were also party members, 
many were not.  
 
As part of the process C2 identified party members as roundtable conveners and 
asked them to bring people together in a series of meetings leading up to the 
election. This was about engaging beyond the party and learning from people with 
practical experience of working on the key issues in Bristol and nationally. Some of 
these roundtables worked better than others, largely depending on the person 
convening them and the people they were able to get around the table. Some 
conveners were more signed up to the approach than others, so progress was 
patchy. From what I observed, the housing group actually worked better than most, 
with the convenor at least to some extent willing to bring people together from across 
sectors, working in parallel with party members in the Housing Policy Group (HPG1). 
However, when I discussed this with both C2 and the convener (M1) separately, they 
each had a slightly different perception of how the process had worked. Both 
acknowledged the role of different stakeholders but placed a different emphasis on 
the extent to which they influenced decisions. M1 felt that party members had been 
more influential through the work of the HPG1, whilst C2 took more from the 
roundtable discussions and felt these had formed the basis of his priorities. As well 
as the quotes and comments below, I will return to this point as part of the discussion 
in the politics stream on the role of party politics and processes. 
 
“The process was let’s get together, as a small group, to see what we’ve got 
so far. We did some stuff for the last election. Then meet with [party] 
members, pull up some priorities, but don’t just talk to [the party], get the key 
players from the city and have the conversation with them as well. It’s been a 
bit slow with some, I set up seven groups in all, but what’s interesting is that 
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people who are used to the way we always do things are used to working with 
[party] members and councillors, but get a bit stuck on involving others. Some 
of the roundtables haven’t taken place yet, I’ve left it to others to do this, so it 
takes time to work at their pace.” (C2T, January 2016) 
 
“Our priorities came from discussion at the [...] Party Forum, the Housing 
Policy Group. We asked people what their big housing issues were, they 
came back with four main themes – the supply of affordable housing was the 
biggest issue, with empty properties, tenants’ voice and homelessness the 
other issues.” (M1T, June 2016) 
 
The process was wider than the [party] group, we had the [...] Housing Policy 
Group, then a Policy Conference, which I presented at. Then there was a 
small group responsible for putting things together, copywriting the manifesto 
pledges. [C2] also ran some roundtables with key stakeholders. These ran in 
parallel with the party process and similar issues came up, with some more 
technical, geeky type issues because we were talking to experts.” (M1T, June 
2016) 
 
The aim of the roundtables as described to me was to bring people together to 
discuss the issues, problems and solutions, focusing on what the council could do to 
enable and support people to deliver. The first housing roundtable took place in 
December 2015 and drew stakeholders together from across sectors in a discussion 
with another city mayor (M2). M2 was invited as someone who knew what it was like 
to be a city mayor and who had taken some innovative and different approaches to 
housing. It is a good example of how wider party support is available to those who 
are party candidates rather than independents and serves to demonstrate how the 
party nationally was rallying around to help get their candidate elected. This was 
followed by a further roundtable discussion in January 2016 involving the party’s 
national lead on housing, with a different group of stakeholders from the private 
sector. 
 
The dynamics at the roundtable meetings were interesting, firstly because few 
people around the table were party members, and secondly because they were 
chaired by the convener of the HPG1 (M1) rather than C2 himself. My perception of 
this was that the candidate took a back-seat role and enabled the chair to outline 
issues and lead the debate. In fact, at the first meeting, the candidate was almost 
invisible, and made little contribution until the end of the meeting. He seemed to be 
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playing a listening role rather than a directing or more active role. He explained this 
to me afterwards as a “process of learning” with “experts around the table, my role is 
to listen and learn... I want to hear what they have to say about how we can improve 
things, make things work for them”. He went on to explain why he had asked 
someone else to chair the roundtables  
 
“[M1] is an expert in housing, he knows more than I do, other experts can 
relate to him on this. He’s the convener of the policy group, so it brings them 
together, that’s what I want for all the roundtable meetings.” (C2P, February 
2016) 
 
The tone of that first meeting was set by M1, which to some degree was 
collaborative and inclusive, but also came across as controlled and defined. Equally, 
by the time of the first housing roundtable meeting, the HPG1 had already met and 
had identified five key policy areas. M1 made a point of setting these out at the 
beginning of the roundtable meeting, almost setting the agenda, but not quite. The 
five policy areas outlined were affordable housing supply; quality and cost of private 
rented housing; tenants representation; impact of welfare reform and; the need to 
bring empty properties back into use. 
 
The roundtable discussions did of course move beyond these issues as the people 
around the table wanted to raise their own issues, indeed some were barely touched 
on as the focus was much more on housing numbers, delivery of affordable housing 
and issues with the private rented sector in Bristol. In the first roundtable there was a 
focus on identifying barriers to the delivery of affordable housing, with stakeholders 
and policy entrepreneurs keen to outline just where they thought the problems were 
with the way things worked in the city at the moment. The discussions were focused 
on the council and stakeholder perceptions of what worked and what did not. There 
was a real willingness from participants across the different meetings to talk candidly 
and honestly about their experience of working with the council in Bristol compared 
to how they worked in other areas. Participants were encouraged to highlight the 
negatives about working in Bristol and problems associated with the existing mayor. 
This might well have meant they became a forum for complaint and moaning, but 
actually most participants seemed willing to offer solutions to problems rather than 
just raising the problems. They seemed keen to share in taking things forward, which 
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was interesting given they were in discussion with someone who was not currently 
the mayor. There was agreement at the first meeting about the need to share 
information, to provide C2 with evidence of problems and experience of barriers, as 
well as define more clearly what some of the stakeholders around the table could 
offer and how many houses they could build if they could work in positive 
collaboration with the council.  
 
At the end of the first roundtable I asked some of the participants why they had come 
along and what they hoped to get out of it. Their response was interesting in that 
most had identified C2 as the most likely challenger to the existing mayor, and they 
were pleased to be asked to take part and have an opportunity to influence his 
thinking. They also talked about how frustrated they were with things at the time and 
how the existing mayor was hard to reach. 
 
“We identified [C2] as the main challenger, so we’re happy to engage and 
share our frustrations. There’s a lot wrong with the way things are done at the 
moment. [The existing mayor] is great, but not one for detail, so you raise 
things and he agrees but then it’s just left to officers and nothing happens. I 
was keen to see what [C2] has to offer, we talked to him last time... we want 
to help change things.” (INF1P, Housing Roundtable, Dec 2015) 
 
“It’s good to be asked, means he’s trying to understand and change things, 
that’s got to be a good start.” (INF19P, Housing Roundtable, Dec 2015) 
 
“If [C2] is going to win and be the next mayor, then we want to talk to him, 
there’s a chance, so why not.” (INF20P, Housing Roundtable, Dec 2015) 
 
The second meeting, with the party’s national lead on housing, discussed the 
national situation and how national policy hindered local progress. There was 
particular concern expressed about the content of the then Housing and Planning Bill 
2015-1625 which proposed the extension of right to buy policy to housing association 
tenants, as well as identifying existing problems with the use of Section 106 
agreements to secure new affordable housing units. Participants seemed to see this 
roundtable as an opportunity to raise matters that needed to change nationally as 
well as to identify what could be included in future devolution discussions. This was 
 
25 This later became the Housing and Planning Act 2016 which no longer included reference to extending right to 
buy policy to housing associations http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/22/contents/enacted/data.htm  
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in marked contrast to the first meeting where discussion was much more focused on 
what could be done locally, now, to improve things and how they could help. Most 
participants were able to relate their frustrations with national policy to how this also 
played out in Bristol, which generally led to criticism of the planning department of 
the council, and the perception that they were particularly negative and difficult to 
work with. 
 
Bristol was commonly identified as one of the worst places to work as a developer 
and housebuilder by participants in the roundtables, with ‘lack of interest’, ‘lack of 
trust’ and the ‘risk averse’ nature of the council most frequently referred to as the 
reasons why. One participant (M4) in the first roundtable talked about the lack of 
interest from the council in their proposals to develop affordable housing, even 
though they had funding in place to deliver, and as a result they went to another city 
and expanded there instead. Another participant (CL3) talked about the “can’t do, 
won’t do culture” and the ‘lack of urgency’ at the council which drew the following 
response from the other city mayor (M2): 
 
“It sounds like a very antiquated approach, doing things the way they’ve 
always done them. You need to break through this. You need to get the key 
tools in your toolbox, they’re all there already, but you have a padlock on the 
box. You need to change that culture and break through the lock, surround 
yourself with the right people and create partnerships” (M2, Dec 2015) 
 
The role of the mayor was also raised as a key issue, with participants saying they 
had a good relationship with the existing mayor but as one stakeholder put it “he 
doesn’t do detail, so then you are reliant on officers, and that’s where it gets stuck” 
(INF20). This officer culture seemed to be the problem most participants were 
identifying and, in their view, this was further compounded by the fact that few of 
them had actually met the City Director (Chief Executive), so were less engaged with 
the top-level officers of the council, although most said they worked well with other 
key officers. Planning officers came in for particular criticism, highlighting their 
negative approach to working with the private sector and their general unwillingness 
to do anything different. There was a real sense of frustration with this, with some of 
the private sector agents and developers suggesting they would choose not to work 
in Bristol on housing developments, as it is easier elsewhere. These points will be 
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returned to in the section on the politics stream as local context is an important 
aspect that needs to be considered in the agenda setting process. 
 
As C2 described things to me after the second roundtable, he saw these meetings 
as the beginning of a process to build new partnerships and where possible “shape 
some deals before the election, so things are ready to go once it’s over”. He 
explained the process as “an iterative process, involving a wider group of people, 
experts, locally driven with no national agenda imposed, it’s up to us” (C2P, January 
2016). The policy entrepreneurs around the table were willing to engage and share 
expertise and most saw it as an opportunity to influence the next mayor of Bristol, 
they were pleased to have been invited and involved. They undoubtedly came with 
their own agenda and raised the points they were keen to push, but also seemed 
happy to discuss the issues raised by the candidate and his colleagues. 
 
C3 used a similar approach to C2 to some degree as he tried to get beyond the party 
machine by holding a roundtable discussion with key stakeholders on housing 
issues. This meeting involved the leader of the party at the time (M5), alongside CL6, 
C3 and four developers who had been involved in housing development in the city 
and who were asked to talk about how they could realistically deliver more affordable 
housing. Like the roundtables organised by C2, this meeting was dominated by 
discussion about what the council could do better and how they face barriers from 
the planning and property departments of the council. It also covered issues at the 
heart of the party campaign, around energy efficiency in housing, with both M5 and 
C3 outlining how they thought this was more than just an environmental issue. As C3 
described it to me, the process of collecting information was mixed: 
 
“It’s a combination of factors, talking to people on the doorstep, chatting to 
people, my own built-in think tank group – my family, 50 or so relatives who 
live on council estates in Bristol. It’s generally talking to people, there’s also... 
party policy, but also blogs written by people like Jules Birch, Alex Marsh, Red 
Brick, yourself, and various policy papers covering a lot of ground. That’s 
where I get my information from.” (C3T, Jan 2016) 
 
“Also, from my own experience, I knew there was a problem just from living in 
the city and having the contacts I do, but there’s no good just knowing there’s 
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a problem without having some idea of how to solve that problem.” (C3T, Jan 
2016) 
 
The process outlined to me by C3 did include information from another recent 
campaign (the parliamentary election in 2015), feedback from residents as well as 
information from reading about the subject matter. But it also involved very formal 
processes within the party which included a Housing Policy Group (HPG2) made up 
of party members with expertise and interest in housing and a Policy and Ideas 
group (P&I) which met monthly. These groups, made up of party members, were 
responsible for identifying and agreeing issues and priorities. 
 
C1 as an independent candidate was obviously not tied by party processes but also 
seemed to have a less structured approach to developing policy ideas. From 
informal discussions with his campaign team and more formally with C1 he seemed 
to rely mostly on existing council policy and processes. He was quite clear on this 
when interviewed: he pointed out that as far as he was concerned, as the existing 
mayor, he was focused on delivery rather than developing priorities just to satisfy an 
election campaign: 
 
“Most of the ideas are already there. There was a Housing Commission, 
which came up with some good recommendations and we’ve got to work 
through those. We’re already doing a lot of it, or have plans to, so when it 
comes to housing, we know what we have to do... The new housing strategy 
is about showing how we can deliver. That was agreed at the November 
Cabinet Meeting. It’s a framework that’s building up to a strategy, a five-year 
strategy. We had one before and this is renewing that. So, this is a framework 
that the new Homes Delivery Board... that we’ve just set up, we are turning 
that into an action plan.” (C1T, Feb 2016) 
 
“The action plan went to Scrutiny the other day and there was a very good 
scrutiny inquiry day, other than the fact that it came up with 39 
recommendations, which as I said was ludicrous, some were just added by 
[the commission chair] afterwards. I distilled that down to six principal actions, 
don’t test me on those at the moment [laughs], but they come from the sort of 
things we’ve been talking about. They reflect the key points of the scrutiny 
day, what came out of that day was good. These things are forming my 
priorities going forward, I’m not developing priorities for an election campaign, 
it would be artificial to do that, to come out with anything different really, it 
would be odd if I came out with something different.” (C1T, Feb 2016) 
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The above quote suggests that C1 did not see the election as a real opportunity for 
change or a chance to develop new ideas through engagement. In this instance 
there would be no window of opportunity generated by the election, as C1 indicated 
that this would be part of an artificial process and not something he would engage in. 
He felt the main issues and priorities had been developed throughout his term of 
office and he had constantly engaged with key stakeholders during this time.  
 
One issue that C1 did raise as something that needed attention and where work had 
already started was the need to address the increasing levels of rough sleeping in 
Bristol. This was an issue also picked up by the other main candidates and had been 
the subject of media attention in the early stages of the election process: 
 
“There’s the real difficulty, the tip of the iceberg, which is rough sleeping, true 
homelessness... That’s become an increasing challenge. So, we rely very 
much on our partnership with St Mungos and others. They’re great to work 
with. At the end of the scale, emergency beds have been increased, 20 
through St Mungos, 15 through the Quakers, we’re providing four new 
buildings. (C1T, Feb 2016) 
 
I think we are doing the right things but the pressures are high, Bristol has a 
reputation as being quite welcoming to the homeless, so when I talk to people 
who are on the streets, they are just waiting to have been here for 6 months in 
order to get accommodation as a priority. Some cities don’t do that, so we’ve 
become quite a magnet. That pressure of being a relatively rich city makes it 
worse, and harder to compare to other cities that might have more affordable 
housing than us. Affordable homes in Liverpool are affordable to more people. 
But that’s a reason rather than an excuse.” (C1T, Feb 2016) 
 
The above discussion demonstrates the types of activities and processes used by 
some of the main candidates to identify housing problems and potential solutions. It 
demonstrates the willingness by housing stakeholders, policy entrepreneurs and 
influencers to engage in discussion and bring forward indicators to support their 
ideas, problems and solutions. From attending some of these discussions and 
talking to the candidates and some of the influencers I was able to identify the main 
housing problems that had been raised, the possible solutions and the perceived 
issues, constraints and barriers to them being developed further. These are set out 
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in Table 8, which illustrates the wide range of issues identified using Kingdon’s three 
streams to categorise problems, solutions and political issues.  
 
Table 8: Housing Issues Raised During Fieldwork, Bristol 2015/16 
Source: author’s own analysis 
 
The issues are listed in no particular order and are there as a complete record of the 
types of issues raised during my fieldwork and forming part of the broader systemic 
or public agenda leading up to the election. Some were mentioned frequently, others 
may only have been brought up once or twice. Some issues have solutions attached, 
others do not and there are some solutions that are not necessarily linked to a 
Problem 
Stream 
• Lack of social and affordable housing 
• Increasing homelessness and pressure on support services 
• Lack of new housing construction 
• Private rented sector (PRS) – cost, security, quality 
• Poor mix of housing and low density on outer estates 
• Insufficient land made available for self-build and community housing 
schemes 
• Local political resistance to delivery of new homes – stifles growth 
making it harder to recruit and retain staff 
• Problems of welfare reform and impact on housing of universal credit 
• Problems of gentrification 
• Number of empty homes in Bristol 
• Lack of engagement with tenants 
Policy Stream • Make better use of council owned land and property 
• Showcase modular build affordable housing 
• Support self-build and self-finish housing options  
• Work with local communities to develop local housing schemes 
• Plan for housing growth positively 
• Set up council owned/arm’s length company to deliver social and 
affordable housing 
• Increase the number of night shelters and provide additional temporary 
accommodation 
• Improve range of move on options from supported housing 
• Introduce city wide landlord licensing scheme 
• Promote and roll out Ethical Lettings Charter 
• Better enforcement of existing powers in relation to PRS 
• Introduce local lettings policies 
• Address the backlog of housing benefit claims 
• Give tenants a voice 
Politics Stream • Local context – council risk averse, difficult to work with, controlling, 
lack of trust in others, bureaucratic, silo mentality 
• Constant change in political and officer leadership locally 
• Austerity programme – council cuts, reduction in staff, survival mode 
• Capacity and time constraints on local leaders 
• National policy impact – Right to Buy and HRA borrowing allowance, 
budget cuts, lack of support for rent controls, lack of incentives for 
housing delivery, welfare policy 
• Balancing different interests, scared to upset people, don’t take the 
difficult decisions 
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particular problem or issue, or at least they were not when they were initially 
discussed. At this point, it was more important to understand the range of issues 
being raised and discussed rather than attaching any particular level of priority. As 
priorities were developed by the candidates throughout the process, this table acts 
as a useful reference point. 
 
 
6.2 The Problem Stream 
In the problem stream the discussion in the MSF is about how an issue gets defined 
as a problem for which a response is required. There are many policy issues that 
could be brought forward as problems and defined as such by different stakeholders, 
as is commonplace in agenda setting theory. Different issues can also be defined in 
different ways to appear as different problems with different solutions. It is at the 
problem definition stage that the policy entrepreneur can be quite active, bringing 
ideas and issues to policy makers’ (the candidates) attention, framing them in a 
particular way to engage interest, and attaching them to identified problems.  
 
Within the problem stream the literature on the MSF suggests that indicators, which 
include evidence and knowledge, as well as focusing events and feedback, can each 
be key elements in how and why issues rise onto the public and political agenda 
(see Kingdon, 1984:95). In addition, the MSF suggests the importance of the role of 
time constraints and capacity issues in whether or not issues make it onto the 
agenda, although this is likely to be more relevant as part of the discussion in a 
decision window rather than at this stage (see Kingdon, 1984:193-194). The 
discussion below seeks to demonstrate how this process worked during the election 
campaign, drawing on interviews and participant and non-participant observation 
involving three of the main candidates, and the main influencers. It highlights the 
main issues identified (as discussed above) and what brought them to the attention 
of the candidates. 
 
Indicators: Evidence and Knowledge 
Indicators seem to have played an important role in the identification of issues and 
definition of problems in the Bristol case, with C2 and C3 both seeking to collect 
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information from different sources to inform them throughout the process. The 
roundtables and party discussions both served to highlight the main housing 
problems, with expert participants, party members and councillors all providing 
evidence in the form of statistics and trends highlighting the extent of and changes to 
a particular problem and the impact it has in Bristol. The main issues identified 
around the lack of affordable housing and homelessness/rough sleeping in particular 
seemed to attract a lot of attention. For example, at the first few meetings of HPG1 
there were various reports circulated outlining housebuilding rates, waiting list 
figures, affordable housing numbers and properties sold under the right to buy. C2 
shared with me a series of reports he had from local and national bodies outlining 
the extent of the housing crisis, whilst C3 talked about the range of sources he used 
to inform himself of background statistics and information.  
 
Issues relating to the lack of affordable26 housing seemed to be prevalent from the 
very beginning of the election campaign. All the candidates recognised that house 
prices in Bristol were high, that right to buy policies meant the most desirable social 
housing stock had been sold and not replaced and that the cost of renting privately in 
the city was also high. Candidates were also aware of the high numbers of people on 
the council house waiting list. When I spoke to C1, C2 and C3 in the early stages of 
the election campaign they were all able to quote similar figures on waiting lists, 
rough sleeping numbers and housebuilding, and the percentage of affordable homes 
built in recent years. They were conversant with the extent of the problems and 
seemed to be well informed on these main issues.  
 
Both of the main campaign groups chose to use different indicators in the early 
stages of the election process to highlight the extent of the housing problem. Whilst 
indicators on their own are seldom enough to convince policy makers that action is 
required (Kingdon, 1984:95) as part of a broader campaign it seemed to be an 
accepted mechanism for increasing awareness and bringing the issue of lack of 
affordable housing and homelessness to the attention of the candidates. Indicators 
were used to raise the profile of the issue and to define the problem.  
 
26 The term affordable housing in this research is used to cover social and affordable housing for rent at lower 
than market rents, incorporating the official government definition of affordable (80% of market rent) and social 
rent (council housing). The term was used interchangeably by candidates and influencers throughout. 
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Indeed, the NFA campaign chose to highlight these indicators in a very visual way 
with a large installation placed in front of City Hall (Picture 1) spelling out the number 
of new affordable houses needed in Bristol, a figure taken from the statistics on 
waiting list numbers in the city.  
 
Picture 1: Installation by NFA Campaign 












Source: authors own photograph 
 
In contrast, the MfH campaign chose to use statistics in their press releases and 
campaign document to demonstrate the extent of the problem and how it was 
increasing, a selection of these are included below: 
 
“Around 41,000 households are expected to form in Bristol by 2037” 
 
“3,738 too few homes were built in Bristol between 2011 and 2014  
to keep up with demand” 
 
“The average home in Bristol costs £235,547 – 9.5 times the average local wage of 
£24,830” 
 
“The average private rent in the city is £814 a month, swallowing up nearly half of 
people’s wages” 
(Mayor for Homes Campaign Document, 2016) 
 
These statistics were used to highlight the issues and the financial impact that not 
building enough homes has on people locally. 
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“It’s got to be about building more houses, that’s our central aim, the aim of 
the campaign. We need to forge agreement over a key target for new homes, 
so we are all focused on the same thing.” (INF11T, February 2016) 
 
The NFA campaign initially focused on the issue of increasing homelessness to 
highlight the extent of the housing crisis in Bristol. In the early stages of the election 
process, this housing issue was brought to the attention of policy makers and 
politicians through the annual charity campaigns on street homelessness such as the 
‘Caring in Bristol’ campaign run by volunteers to provide shelter, food and other 
support over Christmas for people sleeping rough in the city. The focus on this issue 
was raised by a very visual increase in the numbers of people sleeping rough on the 
streets of Bristol. The use of statistics to illustrate the growth in numbers, images of 
street homeless and media attention generated by charity sleep outs meant the 
issue rose rapidly up the agenda for a short period in December 2015 in the lead up 
to Christmas. The NFA campaign focused on this and they used their campaign to 
reinforce the issue, as shown in the following comment. 
 
“The lack of decent homes that people can build a life around has reached 
epidemic proportions. The lack of suitable housing is wrecking lives – young 
and old, no one is immune to the devastation that occurs when the simplest of 
housing needs are not met. It’s an embarrassment that this situation has been 
allowed to develop in the way it has.” (INF3T, January 2016) 
 
At this point in the election campaign, lack of affordable housing and homelessness 
had already been identified as issues, so the NFA and MfH campaigns provided 
supporting evidence to highlight particular areas of concern and to pick up on an 
issue that was clearly already on the agenda of most of the candidates and had 
already been identified in various media reports. In Cairney’s (2018) terms it seems 
that the policy entrepreneurs involved in this instance were keen to influence how the 
candidates understood the problem by providing them with evidence on the issues 
identified, rather than bombarding them with too much information on other issues at 
this point in order to attract attention.  
 
In addition to evidence, knowledge is also a key part of almost all problem definition, 
as information is needed on what the problem is about, and can be provided through 
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professional and local knowledge. Indeed, according to Mulgan (2005: 216-219), 
there has been an increased reliance on knowledge from governments as they “seek 
proof and demonstrable results” to back up their decisions drawing on scientific 
knowledge, professional knowledge and political knowledge. In the Bristol mayoral 
election, some of the main candidates appeared to be willing to consider a broad 
range of knowledge and expertise when defining problems and developing solutions 
beyond the usual indicators already discussed. They actively sought information 
from different professionals, as well as other politicians. They took notice of public 
opinion, demonstrated through media coverage, questions and comments at 
hustings and general support for particular issues. In terms of housing issues, C2 
and C3 in particular seemed to take on board the information presented to them and 
sought by them, whilst others seemed more willing to ignore information where it did 
not meet with their own preferences (C1 specifically on use of council property and 
land). 
 
The approach adopted by the MfH built on this desire for knowledge and used their 
own professional knowledge and expertise to demonstrate the problems in relation to 
their own experience of working with the council and the difficulties this presented. 
They were able to talk from personal experience about a range of issues and were 
able to use this knowledge to identify potential solutions. Their approach was to 
focus particularly on the candidates as the main people they sought to influence. 
 
“It’s important to raise awareness of the issues, get people interested, but to 
be honest the people we need to influence are the candidates. We need to 
access the main candidates to speak to them and see what their response is. 
We’ll use our experience and connections, to persuade them and to work with 
them” (INF5T, February 2016) 
 
“We have meetings set up with the two main candidates, [C1 and C2], we’re 
focusing on them as one of them is more likely to win than any of the others. 
We need to be clear about our aims when we speak to them, set out what we 
want and how we can achieve it, how we can help them achieve it. That’s 
more important than winning over the public or the media. It’s about 
influencing the right people, we’ll leave the No Fixed Abode people to attract 




The approach used in the NFA campaign was different and is more akin to the idea 
developed by Jasanoff and Martello (2004) based on the importance of local 
knowledge. This refers to the experience gained by professions or lay people in their 
everyday lives and serves to bring an element of practical experience to an 
understanding of problems and issues helping to open up alternative policies for 
consideration. In Bristol local knowledge was important in how the debate about 
homelessness was addressed. The NFA campaign drew attention to the problem 
using stunts aimed at attracting media and public attention, but this soon progressed 
into why there is a problem and what we should be doing about it. The solutions, as 
they were offered by the campaign, were borne out of one person’s local knowledge 
and practical experience of why things did not happen and what stops things 
happening in Bristol.  
 
When I discussed the issue of these indicators (evidence and knowledge) with C2 he 
explained how helpful he found it to have all this information available to him, and 
was grateful for the time and effort people had put into providing it and for talking 
about their own experiences of the council. But as the campaign went on, whilst still 
finding it useful, he did admit that it was difficult to keep up with all the information, 
reports and discussions. This is something I made a point of noting in my fieldwork 
diary, as I felt at various points during the campaign, that I too was receiving such 
large amounts of information from different influencers and candidates that I was 
finding it hard to keep on top of it all, and I was focused on just one issue, whereas 
the candidates had to cover a whole range of issues, not just housing. With an 
election campaign there is a defined period in which this information can be received 
and acted upon, thus providing clear time constraints on what is possible. Capacity 
issues came to the fore as the election campaign progressed and different 
individuals, groups and organisations became more active, providing evidence and 
information from personal experience to support their cause.  
 
Several of the individuals and groups seeking to influence the candidates were 
aware that providing indicators to support their claims was an important part of the 
process. They came to roundtable meetings with reports and statistics to quote, met 
with candidates individually with briefing reports as well as personal stories outlining 
not just why something was an issue but also providing potential solutions. In that 
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sense it is difficult to separate out the problem stream from the policy stream, as 
solutions were frequently attached to problems during the same discussions and by 
the same people, which is classic policy entrepreneur behaviour. But the key point 
here is that many of those raising problems were able to support their claims with 
indicators and they recognised the need to do this. They were in fact seeking to 
couple the problem and policy streams by interpreting the issues, recognising the 
problems, defining the problems, evidencing them and providing the solutions at the 
same time. This coupling took place throughout the period up to the election, for 
example, different discussions took place and information was received and 
analysed prior to decisions relating to policy outputs being taken. This demonstrates 
a clear link between the production of evidence and indicators and the recognition 
and definition of a problem, as the candidates sought information and evidence prior 
to deciding priorities. 
 
Framing a Problem 
In the problem stream, every problem can be defined or framed in a number of 
different ways in order to attract attention. Zahariadis (2003) identifies framing as a 
tool that policy entrepreneurs use to define both the problem and the solution. This 
was certainly the case in the NFA campaign, where very careful thought was given 
to how to frame the problem and when, so it received attention from the public and 
media during the election campaign.  
 
The same could be said of the MfH campaign, where the coalition group was very 
keen to highlight the problems without being too challenging or critical of the council. 
They used statistics to demonstrate the extent of the problem and carefully crafted 
solutions that were about partnership working rather than pointing the finger solely at 
the council. Indeed, in the early days of the campaign, when the MfH campaign 
document was taking shape, there were many iterations before all partners were 
prepared to sign up to the wording and commentary. One local influencer explained 
it to me as follows: 
 
“There’s an important campaign here but trying to get everyone to agree on 
how challenging we can be and what commitments we are asking for is hard 
work. We’re on about the twentieth version of the document now and each 
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time it is being watered down and the detail lost. We’ve ended up with 
something that merely sets a target and asks for an action plan. The earlier 
documents had some clear statements about specific actions and changes 
that are needed, about land and working in partnership, these have now been 
dropped.” (INF1T, March 2016) 
 
During an informal discussion INF1 explained that she had been involved in the MfH 
campaign from the start and had put a lot of effort into writing a briefing paper, 
campaign document and an outline plan for the campaign, but had then handed over 
to the NHF to bring it all together, as their role was to bring other housing 
associations on board with the campaign. However, she had been disappointed with 
the lack of profile of the campaign, lack of publicity and lack of communication 
across the coalition, as well as the final campaign document which she felt had been 
‘watered down’ too much.  
 
The process of framing the problem can also be based on ideas of why we should 
care, which brings values and emotions into the process. Connecting a problem to 
values highlights what is at stake, what is threatened or what needs to be protected, 
which in turn can motivate action (Knaggård, 2015:456). The idea of using links to 
values and emotions was evident in the debate around homelessness and housing 
in Bristol. When faced with a barrage of statistics that illustrate the problem and how 
it has got worse, it is easy to fail to engage with the issue. However, when the 
problem is demonstrated using pictures of blue plaques where people are sleeping 
rough in doorways, or by placing a glass image of a rough sleeper around the city 
























(source: artist’s website27) 
 
The policy entrepreneurs in the NFA campaign sought to attach the problem of 
homelessness to values and emotions to create attention. Emotions can come to the 
fore in framing through the use of powerful symbols to make a problem seem more 
urgent, leading to a sense of crisis which brings attention to an issue. Using emotion 
to frame a problem could be related to expressing fear about a problem, sympathy 
for those affected and anger towards those responsible (Knaggård, 2015:457). This 
is precisely the approach taken by the NFA Campaign, which used real life stories as 
an emotional hook:  
 
“These stories have been quite powerful and have helped to make the issue 
real. We went out and talked to people living on the streets, got their stories, 
their pictures, so we could talk about real people. It helps to tug at people’s 
emotions, brings feelings and sympathy into it”. (INF3T, March 2016) 
 
Some of these stories were linked to blue plaques that were placed at key points 
around the city where people sleep on the streets. They highlighted the issue in a 
visual and emotional way, using people’s names attached to stories to reinforce the 
point that these are people not just statistics. 
 
 
27 Luke Jerram - https://www.lukejerram.com/invisible-homeless/ - photos by Mark Simmons 
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“I’m 35 years old and I have been homeless for a year. My husband abused 
me. I had my jaw wired, he left me for dead. I lost my daughter, I was eight 
months pregnant. This was one year ago. If it wasn’t for me giving my 
neighbours the spare key on the sly, I wouldn’t be here now. When I came out 
of hospital, I went back to the flat and found out I was never on the tenancy. I 
was made homeless. People have spat at me on the street, telling me I don’t 
deserve to be here. I’ve been beaten up on the streets. Sometimes I sleep in 
a hostel, when I have money. It’s not nice being out here, the weekends are 
the worst, especially when people are drunk, they can be quite nasty. I don’t 
understand, I’m homeless, I am as low as it goes, yet people are still horrible 
to me.” Cindy (CW - NFA Website, January 2016) 
 
This tactic of associating the evidence and statistics with real people served the NFA 
campaign well. They received significant local media coverage for their stories of 
homeless people and the placement of blue plaques where homeless people slept 
(see Picture 3).   
 
Picture 3: Blue Plaques for Rough Sleepers 
        Source: NFA Campaign 
 
One of the NFA team told me that their whole campaign was based around the idea 
of giving the media a story to tell: 
 
“We were trying to create something they (the media) couldn’t fail to report. 
There are lots of accusations about media bias, they worry about that when 
selecting stories to report on, so we tried to take the politics out of it, we 
created news to enable the BBC and others to pick it up. We made it easy for 
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them to get to the issue by providing the story and people they could talk to, to 
make it personal.” (NFA3T, September 2016) 
 
In a conversation I had with a local journalist (NEWS3) from the BBC, he made it 
quite clear to me that the images and stories provided by the NFA campaign were a 
useful tool to persuade editors that the story about homelessness was worth picking 
up. The fact that the campaign led people through the story from numbers, to 
homeless people, to identifying the possible solutions and who could make it 
happen, was all part of the attraction for the media, as was the fact that they made it 
visible. 
 
“It was easy to get interest and see how this could be reported, the pictures 
were there, the people, their stories, the blue plaques, all of it... it made my 
job easier and there was a front man, willing to be filmed, to talk about 
homelessness and the people involved... we even got visuals on what could 
be done, the billboards on plots of land... that all added to it.” (NEWS3P, April 
2016) 
 
Whilst the MfH campaign took a more conventional approach, it too used statistics 
that related to emotions, and reminded people that homelessness and lack of 
affordable housing impacts on people as well as the economy.  The MfH campaign 
appeared to be less focused on gaining media attention to raise awareness of the 
problem and at this stage was more focused on informing and raising the issues with 
the candidates themselves in private meetings. The approach of the two campaigns 
was different but also complementary, both working to bring homelessness and the 
lack of affordable housing to the attention of the political candidates. The candidates 
responded to the visual nature of these campaigns and to the stories they told, C2 
and C3 were both aware of the campaigns as they began and commented on them 
to me during informal conversations. They stopped short of saying the campaigns 
had influenced their views but both made it clear that these campaigns had provided 
information and identified a range of issues both through media attention and reports 
and documents provided to them. C2 in particular drew on the nature of the stories 
being told about homeless people and brought these into conversation as examples 
highlighting a problem that needed attention. He seemed keen to relate statistics and 
evidence to real life stories and real people. 
 
 120 
Focusing Events and Crises 
Focusing events or crises can play an important role in bringing specific issues to the 
attention of decision makers. During the campaign there was an interesting ‘crisis’ 
point when in April, just before the election, a political row erupted as a result of a 
council decision to sell at auction some recently vacant council homes that needed 
repair. The reason given for the sale was the extent of the likely cost of repairs to the 
properties, which made it more viable to sell them and use the money to provide new 
homes, rather than repair the properties so they could be let once more by the 
council. The decision was taken by council staff based on existing council policy and 
was one of many similar decisions taken during the term of office of the existing 
mayor. In the past, these types of decisions would have been stalled during an 
election campaign as ‘purdah’ would have been implemented. However, as C1 
explained to me in April, when I raised this point with him, he had decided purdah 
was unnecessary and the council should carry on with its business up to the election, 
with no constraints implemented on the decisions that could be taken by officers. He 
appeared not to understand the significance that this could have in relation to the 
election and stuck by his decision saying the council needed to carry on with its 
business despite politics. 
 
The decision to sell the properties attracted attention as it was so close to the 
election and was at a time when part of the debate on housing was about making 
best use of council resources to increase the number of homes for social and 
affordable rent. To the public and media, it seemed bizarre that the council was 
selling homes rather than repairing and re-letting them when so much of the 
discussion during the campaign had been about the lack of affordable homes and 
the need to provide more. The protest even made it into a national newspaper28, with 
a local campaigner quoted as follows: 
 
“There is a lot of anger out there. Private rents and the number of people on 
the housing waiting list are rising. Tent villages of homeless people are 




28 Steven Morris, The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/20/bristol-campaigners-disrupt-
auction-council-homes ) 
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One of the other independent mayoral candidates also decided to make a particular 
example of this issue and constantly challenged the existing mayor about it. Various 
campaign groups and activists, supported by Acorn29, also focused in on the sale of 
these properties, raising concerns, demonstrating and squatting in the properties to 
stop them being handed over to the private sector. These demonstrations received 
significant publicity and kept the issue on the public agenda for several weeks right 
up to election week. The demonstration and lobbying eventually led to the sale of 
some of the homes being delayed, one because a homeless man and his son had 
taken up residence in one of the houses and the others because of protesters 
blocking access. 
 
This is a good example of how a particular issue, at a moment in time, can rise up 
the agenda and will stay there whilst attention is focused on it. Previously the issue 
of selling council homes in need of repair had hardly featured in the debate - the 
focus had been on use of council land for new building rather than existing properties 
- but from the moment the auction was announced it became big news, with 
significant local media and public attention. However, from C1’s point of view it was a 
non-issue which had gained momentum because of political opportunism: 
  
“The decision had been taken a while ago, it’s council policy, everyone signed 
up to it. But then this happened just before the election, which was perhaps 
bad timing, but it was out of my control. Anyway, it’s about proper 
management, anyone with a property portfolio knows that you have to 
manage your stock, which means selling properties that maybe need more 
investment in time and money than is worth it. That’s always been the case, 
this just came at a time when people could make political capital out of it. 
They jumped on the issue, Acorn, they’re just a Labour front, so they did what 
they could to make it worse. Then the press gets involved and... well it just 
went mad, but it’s the right thing to do, there wasn’t a decision to make, I 
didn’t know about it, it was agreed policy.” (C1P, May 2016) 
 
To the other candidates it was a gift of an issue and an easy chance to demonstrate 
how their approach would differ from C1s.  
 
 
29 Acorn is a community-based union bringing people together to support each other to improve their lives and 
their communities. In Bristol they have been particularly active on housing issues in the private rented 
sector https://acorntheunion.org.uk  
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Another example of an issue that seemed to rise to the top of the agenda, as a result 
of a crisis or focusing event, was street homelessness. It was an issue that 
candidates had on their ‘list’ already but was also something that in the early stages 
of the election process was brought to the attention of policy makers and politicians 
through the annual charity campaigns around rough sleeping in the lead up to 
Christmas. The particular focus on this issue was exacerbated by an increase in the 
numbers of people sleeping rough on the streets of Bristol. The use of statistics to 
illustrate the growth in numbers, images of street homelessness and media attention 
generated by charity sleep outs meant the issue rose rapidly up the agenda for a 
short period in December 2015. In addition, it was the main issue initially raised by 
the NFA campaign and by local stakeholder organisations, such as St Mungos, who 
held one of the earlier hustings meetings (January 2016) on homelessness. A local 
artist had also produced a piece of artwork that was placed around the city centre, 
depicting a person sleeping on the street, which attracted media attention. 
 
In addition, the city council in partnership with others held a Homelessness 
Awareness Week in late February 2016, which served to keep the issue on the 
agenda for a while longer. Both C2 and C3 mentioned the issue of rough sleeping to 
me in December and January, as something they were concerned about and both 
had seen media coverage relating to the artwork and the NFA campaign. They had 
been contacted by St Mungos to attend the hustings meeting in January and were 
aware of some of the complex issues surrounding homelessness and rough 
sleeping. They also attended exhibitions and events during Homelessness 
Awareness Week. At this point they were at the stage of developing ideas for 
solutions as well as collecting information on the extent of the problem. 
 
During the Bristol election campaign both the provision of evidence to support issues 
identified as problems and focusing events identifying specific problems were 
important aspects in relation to raising awareness of particular issues and getting 
them on the agenda. Issue identification and problem definition relied on indicators, 
through the provision of evidence, and local knowledge with less perceived role for 
values and ideology (this is explored further in the discussion in the politics stream). 
Two of the candidates actively brought people together to provide evidence and to 
tap into their knowledge and expertise, they were keen to receive written reports and 
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information to support what the policy entrepreneurs were saying and had their own 
sources of information that they used to supplement this. The incumbent mayor took 
a different approach, and appeared less receptive to new information and ideas, 
falling back instead on what he was already doing. 
 
 
6.3 The Policy Stream 
When it comes to identifying solutions to the challenges and problems being raised 
then the process is complex. At times it appeared that solutions were being offered 
alongside problems whilst at others, as suggested by Kingdon in the MSF, they 
seemed to be available even before the problems were fully expressed. It is clear 
from this research that problem identification and policy formation run in parallel as 
well as in sequence, and may well be both connected and disconnected. The 
literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that policy communities and networks are 
important in the policy stream and that at a local level the role of political parties in 
policy development and alternative selection is likely to be more prevalent. Whilst 
there is some need to also consider viability and feasibly at this stage, in an agenda 
window it may well be less relevant than during a decision window.  
 
The two main campaigns focused on raising housing issues and had identified both 
problems and solutions. Both campaigns were keen to go beyond just raising 
problems and the MfH campaign in particular provided some very clear actions the 
council would need to take and how the member organisations could help to deliver 
solutions in partnership. Providing solutions was an important part of the process, as 
there was a clear recognition that the candidates would be interested in how to 
address the problems being raised, as well as merely understanding the problem.  
 
As discussed above, the roundtables, party discussions, interest group campaigns 
and hustings all identified both problems and solutions. It is difficult to separate the 
two processes as they appeared to run together. Candidates were then able to use 
their own specific campaign processes, normally in smaller groups of key party 
members or supporters, to identify the most viable and acceptable solutions to the 
most pressing problems.  
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To some extent it would seem that the solutions were obvious and were not 
necessarily new solutions, particularly given that the problems identified were the 
same as they have been for some time. They needed to be solutions that could be 
implemented locally, directly through the council or in partnership with others. The 
biggest housing problem identified in Bristol during the election campaign was the 
lack of new and affordable housing being built in the city. There was a wealth of 
different evidence and statistics being used by different candidates to illustrate the 
point, as discussed above. C1 was keen to point out that he had built the first new 
council homes for decades and had a higher rate of home building than most other 
UK cities, whilst his opponents highlighted the reduced rate of overall build and the 
lack of affordable housing being built. It is interesting to note here that the C1 
regularly resorted to using comparisons with other core cities30 which were more 
favourable to make his point rather than compare the situation to previous years in 
Bristol where the evidence was perhaps less supportive.  
 
Discussion in this section focuses on three main aspects: providing solutions; 
feasibility, viability and acceptability; and campaigns, networks and influence. 
 
Providing Solutions 
The MfH campaign was very traditional in its development of solutions, seemingly 
taking great care to ensure that the answer was not just about what the council could 
do but was more about how the different agencies and individuals could all work 
together to find the right solutions and deliver them. The campaign focused on 
making a clear statement about the solution: 
 
“Bristol needs a Mayor for Homes to ensure that 2,000 new homes are built 
each year for the length of the mayoral term. 700 of these need to be 
affordable homes.” (CW - MfH Campaign Document, 2016) 
 
 
30 The Core Cities network represents the councils of England’s eight largest city economies outside London 
(Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield) along with Glasgow 
and Cardiff https://www.corecities.com/about-us/what-core-cities  
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The document then went on to publicly ask the candidates the following two 
questions regarding how they would commit to ending the housing crisis: 
 
A) “Will you produce an action plan within your first 100 days, which will use your 
powers as Mayor to get Bristol building more homes, including at least 2,800 
new affordable homes by the end of your term as Mayor to help meet the 
needs of Bristolians?  
 
B) Will you take practical steps to help private renters in Bristol, particularly when 
it comes to accessibility, security of tenure and protection from bad living 
conditions?” 
 
The decision to ask for an action plan was described by one member of the coalition 
group as “a bit of a compromise”. He went on to explain that “we wanted to ask them 
to make a commitment to delivering on the target, but others in the group didn’t want 
to be this prescriptive” (INF7P, March 2016). Indeed, as mentioned previously, the 
early drafts of the campaign document did include more ‘asks’ of the council but 
these were left out of the final public version as agreement could not be reached 
amongst all the partners and there was some concern that they did not want to be 
too prescriptive. In the Coalition Briefing document, produced in February 2016, the 
asks were set out quite clearly, but this was a private document for those involved in 
the campaign rather than something they would use publicly at this stage. They did 
however use the information in briefings to candidates, as set out below: 
 
“A) Deliver the homes that are needed; 
1. BCC to set up a majority owned but independently managed vehicle with a clear 
remit to deliver new homes of which at least 30% minimum of affordable.  
2. BCC to invest sufficient land into this vehicle to build a minimum of 2500 
affordable homes by 2021 
3. BCC to use their land and powers to work in partnership with others to build as 
many new affordable homes as possible.    
 
 
B) Support private renters across the city; 
1. Introducing a city-wide landlord licensing scheme 
2. Full enforcement and application of Council powers with regards to the Housing 
Health and Safety Rating System and an end to ineffective informal action. 
3. Active and ongoing support and promotion of the Ethical Lettings Charter, with an 
emphasis on moving landlord and letting agents from the entry-level bronze standard 
to the silver and gold.“ 
CW - MfH Campaign, Coalition Briefing Final Draft, 2016. 
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This approach seems to be aligned with suggestions made by Cairney (2018:205), 
when he suggests forming coalitions with allies and engaging in networks is 
important to increase the support for particular policy solutions. The MfH campaign 
brought different groups and organisations together to provide a challenge to the 
council, but had been through quite a lengthy process of modification and 
compromise before agreement was reached on what that challenge would be. This 
enabled an approach that brought together some of the main delivery agencies with 
a common agenda, with solutions they could help to deliver without being too 
challenging.  
 
In the NFA campaign there seemed to be some confusion, or disagreement between 
funder and marketing agency, about whether or not solutions would be promoted 
and what should be the main purpose of the campaign. The individual funding the 
activity was very clear about where he saw the necessary solutions and that these 
would inevitably come out of the debate and discussion. The approach taken in this 
case seemed to be a classic example of a policy entrepreneur promoting an idea 
and softening up the system so their own ‘pet project’ received a positive response 
from politicians (Kingdon, 1984:214).  
 
“The council needs help with project management and development, they are 
not geared up to do this. My solution, take land out of council ownership, put 
the process in the hands of a social enterprise, let them buy in the help they 
need to get things done. My interest is in making it work and making a 
difference.” (INF2T, January 2016) 
 
This seems to suggest that the whole campaign was organised around arriving at a 
particular solution, but the marketing agency running the campaign seemed less 
clear that that was the case, repeating that the focus of the campaign was about 
awareness raising: 
 
“The campaign isn’t really about providing solutions but about raising 
awareness and encouraging debate. It’s about creating an asset for the 
media. Solutions may arise from the debate but that’s not the main focus.” 
(INF3T, January 2016) 
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It did appear that the campaign had at least one fixed solution to the problems they 
were identifying. The main proponent of the campaign, who remained very much 
behind the scenes during these early stages, during an informal conversation clearly 
identified that council use of land was where the main barriers were to achieving the 
delivery of more affordable housing in Bristol. He was convinced that the required 
solution was to identify the land, prepare it for development and sell it on with 
planning permission for the private sector, local communities or housing associations 
to deliver. The barriers were identified as the council not being willing to use their 
own land, too many hurdles in the planning system and the council being risk averse 
which hampered their ability to do anything different (INF2P, January 2016). 
 
It seemed that as far as the NFA campaign was concerned the raising of issues 
illustrated in the previous section was also about raising awareness so that an 
already defined solution could then be promoted, although this is perhaps a harsh 
assessment of the process it does appear to have some basis. The public element of 
the campaign soon moved to identifying council owned sites and buildings, which 
had been derelict for some time, as potential sites for development. The marketing 
agency created public interest by placing ‘window frames’ on the site with pictures 
illustrating what it could look like if someone was living there (see Picture 4). This 
was done just two weeks before the election. 
 
Picture 4: Window Frame onto a Derelict Site 
Source: NFA Campaign 
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“It’s about ending rough sleeping and sofa surfing. We will put up these 
images, portraying comfortable homes on sites that are derelict and empty. 
We’re trying to show what the future could look like on these sites, with new 
homes for people who need them.” (INF3T, March 2016) 
 
This was then followed by the identification of individual derelict plots of land and 
buildings, where house building could take place, all on sites owned by the council. 
Part of the purpose of this was to illustrate where large numbers of homes could be 
built, but part was also to show where they would not be built.  
 
“We set about producing a map prior to the election showing where the first 
6000 homes can go. Identifying individual plots, where development could 
happen. Lots of the land is owned by the council but delivery is slow and falls 
short of what is needed.” (INF3T, March 2016) 
 
The campaign team was keen to make it clear to people in areas like Clifton and 
Redland, where development is strongly resisted, that they would not be affected by 
the proposals. They hoped that this would enable people in those areas to support 
the campaign. This is an interesting commentary both on the pressures that 
politicians face but also the perception of power in different types of communities. 
 
“...it’s a bit of a comment on Nimbyism and the power of middle-class areas. 
We felt that outer estates and other more working-class areas wouldn’t be 
able to mobilise support in the same way or be as vocal. We wanted to reduce 
the opposition that politicians supporting the campaign would face” (INF3T, 
March 2016) 
 
This identification of sites was promoted at the housing hustings meeting organised 
by the NFA campaign team in collaboration with the MfH group, where pictures were 
used to demonstrate a range of densities, and how the lower density outer estates 
could provide sites for plenty of new housing.  
 
At this stage the campaign had moved into providing viable solutions, identifying 
land, showing how it could be used and even highlighting a site in Southmead, 
where there was community support for development. It appeared that the whole 
campaign had been carefully constructed to get to this point, from raising the initial 
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problem using statistics and real-life stories, to identifying sites and then providing a 
practical project to demonstrate how things could be different.  
 
Indeed, a document provided to me in December 2015 by the NFA campaign made 
it very clear what the solutions were and how the barriers to delivery could be 
overcome. This document outlined why he thought it was all about de-risking the 
process for both the council and developers and providing council owned land for 
development. This was both the starting point (privately) and the end point (publicly) 
of the NFA campaign: 
 
 “Bristol City Council is the largest landowner in Bristol with enough land to 
build over 7,000 homes. Cutbacks have led to resource constraints within 
the council. This combined with a high level of fear amongst council 
officers of being sued under state aid, procurement and best value 
legislation, has led to a very slow rate of development of BCC land.” 
(CW – INF2, Affordable Housing in Bristol, 2015) 
 
It seemed to me that the NFA campaign started with the solutions to an identified 
problem, and then worked through stunts and media attention on homelessness and 
the lack of house building to move the debate into that area as an obvious solution. 
This is a good, and perhaps unusual, example of how policy entrepreneurs work to 
attach their own solutions to problems that they or others raise. The whole campaign 
was focused on the use of council land and gradually built up to illustrate the 
opportunities on particular sites in Bristol. The role of the policy entrepreneur 
seemed to be critical in this process in that the campaign raised awareness of the 
problem and demonstrated a range of solutions, even demonstrating policy transfer 
as examples of what works were used from elsewhere in the UK and Europe.  
 
“In discussions, the biggest problem raised by those in a position to do 
something about the issue is the regulatory authority, the council. 
Stakeholders [in the MfH campaign] have identified them as the main block on 
progress when it comes to building more homes. So, we’ve been brought in to 
ask the difficult questions, be a little controversial, a bit naughty and do things 
differently. The stakeholders can’t do that, they work with the council. They 
know the solutions and want us to ask the questions that steer things in the 
right direction.” (INF3T, January 2016) 
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“We know the solutions, but we need to illustrate the problem and lead people 
there gradually. Our campaign is about awareness raising and, working 
alongside the Mayor for Homes campaign, it is about trying to provide the 
solutions.” (INF2P, December 2015) 
 
The NFA campaign is an excellent example of how to construct a story to highlight 
an issue and the potential solutions and demonstrates the skills of the NFA 
campaign as policy entrepreneurs. Not only did the initiator of the campaign employ 
a marketing agency to tell the story in the right way to attract attention, he also had a 
clear view on the solutions to the issues identified and built these into the story from 
the very beginning.  
 
Feasibility, Viability and Acceptability  
There was a lot of discussion at the roundtables and individual meetings about what 
the council could actually do to solve housing issues locally. In some respects, the 
perception amongst the candidates was that there was little local government can do 
within a constrained national policy framework to change the way housing policy is 
dealt with locally and the options are limited in terms of delivering more housing. 
However, there did seem to be an acknowledgement that there are different degrees 
to which local councils can make housing a priority and focus their resources on 
addressing the issues. This seemed to be a matter for debate, with C1 coming under 
attack from other candidates and stakeholders for not prioritising housing and not 
using council owned land and property to deliver on affordable housing.  
 
“There’s no doubt [C1] made a pledge on housing, back when he was first 
elected, and there wasn’t any real plan, it wasn’t a top priority for him, there 
were other things that he was more interested in and felt more passionately 
about and felt were more urgent, like putting Bristol on the map” (INF4T April 
2016) 
 
“I think in terms of [C1], the problem is he’s got no plan. There’s a get out of 
jail card basically, when push comes to shove, he will just say ‘I don’t control 
the planning process’ and that is a tricky one.” (CL2T, April 2016) 
 
“When it comes to housing [C1] is going to get a bashing for what he hasn’t 
done, and he hasn’t done a lot. It’s not looking good for him is it, not a lot has 
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happened... the problem with housing is it’s medium to long term...” (CL4P, 
February 2016) 
 
The use of council owned land was an issue raised at the housing roundtables, it 
was the main issue that participants from housing associations, development 
companies and other individuals were particularly keen to discuss as a viable 
solution. For them, the council talked about delivering new housing but was not 
prepared to release land to enable this. Council owned land was still seen as an 
asset from which the greatest monetary value could be released rather than as an 
asset that could be used to deliver priorities. The explanation for this was often 
related to how officers and politicians perceived the particular institutional constraints 
they were working within. One officer described the situation to me as complicated 
“because the property people want to sell land to the highest bidder, that’s their 
approach, always has been, whereas we want to use it to control and support 
development” (BC1P, April 2016). This point was reinforced by C2 in a chat we had 
over coffee, early in November 2015, before the campaign really got started. He was 
keen to see a change in the way things worked so that land and buildings, owned by 
the council, could be used to support and enable affordable housing to be built, 
rather than sold to the highest bidder. In his view it was about using council assets to 
deliver priorities rather than seeing them as a means of income. This was the main 
point emphasised by the NFA campaign and seemed to be the issue that prompted 
the campaign to begin with. One of the main influencers involved in various housing 
projects explained it to me as follows: 
 
“It’s simple, there’s a housing crisis in Bristol. Recent policy changes at a 
national level haven’t helped, but locally we can do things differently. Use of 
council owned land is a must. You should read Detter31, which is all about use 
of state assets and how local government are sitting on these and not using 
them. My solution would be to take the land out of council ownership, put the 
process in the hands of a social enterprise, let them buy in the help they need 
to get things done... Councils need help with project management and 
development, they’re not geared up to it. That’s why they shouldn’t try... The 
current approach to council land is to put it on the open market for tender. It’s 
all about getting the most money. The key to success on housing is council 
land. We need to provide a better way of developing that land for housing that 
 
31 Detter, D. & Folster, S. (2015) The Public Wealth of Nations. Palgrave MacMillan. 
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removes the barriers... gets through the bureaucracy and fear that surround 
the council” (INF2T, January 2016) 
 
This discussion reflects the point made by Christophers (2018) about the importance 
of land and land ownership in his book discussing and highlighting the trend in the 
UK for the sale of public land to non-public bodies: 
 
“Whoever owns the land has the ability to determine how it is accessed and 
used, and by whom.” (Christophers, 2018:4). 
 
One of the related solutions that seemed to be around from the start was the idea of 
setting up a council owned company to deliver housing on council owned land, 
keeping the land in public ownership and using it to deliver priorities. Indeed, the 
idea had been mooted by the housing scrutiny day held in October 2015 which 
focused on improving the supply of affordable housing in the city with the idea of a 
housing company suggested as an option to help support this aim. One of the 
recommendations was as follows: 
 
“... particular interest was expressed in having a housing company – which 
could act as a mechanism for delivering low cost house building. It could also 
be a way to offer ‘ethical lettings’ ie. participate in the private rented sector. 
The model used by Birmingham City Council was thought to be an example of 
good practice.”  
(CW - Report to Full Council, January 2016 – Report of the Scrutiny Inquiry Day  
‘How can Better Housing Delivery Secure the Best Outcomes for Bristol’) 
 
This type of approach actually contradicts the recommendations in the Elphicke 
House report (2015:3) the origin of much of the recent interest in local housing 
companies. It suggested councils should take a more central role in providing new 
homes, as enablers, using their own assets to unlock opportunities and deliver more 
homes in partnership, through land disposal. 
 
During the campaign, all of the main candidates backed this idea of setting up a 
council owned company as part of the solution to the problem of the lack of 
affordable housing provision. At the housing hustings at the end of April, all 
candidates stated they would set up a housing company, but when pressed further 
 133 
there seemed to be both a lack of detail on what this would look like and how it 
would work. As one housing officer explained to me after the election: 
 
“This [the housing company] is obviously a big commitment in the manifesto, 
but there’s no real view on what it is or what it’s for. We need to be clear that it 
won’t solve everything and can’t be the answer to everything. It’s important to 
remember that form follows function, not the other way around.” (BCC1T, July 
2016) 
 
In contrast, the solutions suggested in terms of homelessness were varied, with most 
commenting on the need to use empty council properties to provide more shelters 
and all candidates publicly supporting the no second night out32 campaign.  
However, as C1 pointed out to me the solutions are not that simple. 
 
“People think you can just open empty buildings, but we can’t do that, we 
need to get the services in place. The so-called simple solutions are never 
quite that simple. It takes time and resources to make it happen.” (C1T, 
January 2016) 
 
A small number of experts provided more detailed solutions on expanding the range 
of options for temporary accommodation and support services, but the focus was 
largely on providing additional shelters to solve the immediate problem of street 
homelessness.  
 
At the campaign stage there was little discussion about how to deal with the issue in 
the medium to long term, the focus was on short term solutions. The main exception 
to this was the discussion at a housing hustings in January, organised by St 
Mungos33, where not only were the problems and issues debated but there was also 
a focus on the need for more comprehensive longer-term solutions, with the 
provision of support services a key aspect alongside more accommodation. Indeed, 
the point was made at this meeting that temporary, short term measures were only a 
small part of the overall solution. 
 
32 No second night out (NSNO) was launched in April 2011 as a pilot project aimed at ensuring those sleeping 
rough in central London for the first time need not spend a second night on the streets. This approach is now 
being adopted in different cities across the country http://www.nosecondnightout.org.uk  
33 St Mungos is an organisation contracted by Bristol City Council to provide services to homeless people in the 
city and to run temporary accommodation. 
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Campaigns, Networks and Influence 
As much of the debate within roundtables and party meetings was taking place (Nov-
March) so too were some of the stakeholder campaigns. The NFA Campaign 
launched in January 2016 and the MfH campaign launched its manifesto at the end 
of February. Alongside this Acorn was also beginning to step up their public profile 
on issues to do with private renting in the city. This was more a continuation of a 
longstanding campaign, begun in 2015 when Acorn first set up in Bristol, but was 
also concentrated around the election process, as they identified this as an 
opportunity to get their voice heard. These groups were well-resourced and able to 
use paid workers to make their case, contact candidates, arrange meetings, and 
produce documents. They were also well connected and able to draw on media 
contacts, engage with social media and seek support from other groups. The MfH 
campaign in particular established a network of key influencers and organisations in 
one campaign, to lobby and promote the same agenda, which was clearly set out in 
a short document provided to the candidates and the media. The National Housing 
Federation (NHF) who were leading the MfH campaign arranged a number of 
meetings with the different candidates during March and April, to discuss housing 
issues. They seemed to have good access to all the main candidates at this time and 
were able to discuss the content of their campaign in more detail with those 
candidates.  
 
The MfH Campaign was very clear about the problems and the solutions, these were 
outlined in a campaign leaflet produced for their launch event in February 2016. The 
emphasis in the leaflet was on identifying the problem, providing solutions and 
making “asks” of the candidates in the form of commitments that they could sign up 
to. The process of getting to the final wording of the leaflet that everyone involved 
could sign up to was explained to me by one of those involved as ‘painfully slow and 
tortuous’ with an emphasis on how much had to be left out in order to reach 
agreement: 
 
“It’s difficult, we have some partners who are more campaigning and wanted 
the leaflet to be more challenging, whilst we have other partners who work 
with the council and were worried about challenging them too much. It’s a 
difficult relationship and balance to maintain when working across sectors and 
groups. What we came up with is still worthwhile, but it could have been 
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better. We were also short of time and resources to make it happen, people 
have day jobs...” (INF1T, Feb 2016) 
 
This serves to highlight the downside of bringing groups together to lobby alongside 
one another as part of one campaign. Whilst there is strength in numbers it also 
makes it harder to agree the terms of the campaign and finalise what will be the 
primary focus. Indeed, as part of the discussions those involved in the NFA 
campaign were initially looking to work as part of the MfH campaign, but differences 
over approach and style of the campaign meant they agreed to work separately but 
supportively. 
 
Acorn led the campaign on issues relating to the private sector, but were also part of 
the MfH campaign. Whilst they undertook separate lobbying and met with some of 
the candidates, they were also able to feed their concerns and solutions into the 
broader campaign to ensure the private rented sector (PRS) was identified as an 
issue and as part of the campaign document.  
 
The impact of campaigns is always difficult to assess, but some of the candidates did 
sign up to deliver similar targets in terms of new build housing to those identified by 
the MfH campaign, which clearly resonated with them in terms of approach, and 
there was also general support from the candidates for the Ethical Lettings Charter 
(ELC) developed and promoted by Acorn. It seemed to me that the solutions 
provided were easily acceptable to the candidates, they linked to the problems they 
had identified and provided acceptable solutions. The idea of having a target for 
affordable homes was considered by most to be a useful option and the ELC was 
something the council had already agreed to, so supporting greater promotion of this 
was an obvious step forward. Other more difficult solutions, like the citywide 
licensing of landlords, rent controls and providing the detail on how better use could 
be made of council land was more difficult. However, even the simple solutions were 
not universally acceptable, as the quote below from C1 demonstrates: 
 
“I won’t fall into committing to a number as requested in their [MfH] campaign, 
others can but I won’t. The Housing Federation are great, but I was a bit 
miffed with the title of their campaign because it’s been taken by others to be 
a criticism of me... because Bristol needs a mayor for homes implies it hasn’t 
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got one. They absolutely say it’s not in any way an attack on me or what I’ve 
done but I think my answer is that it’s pretty irresponsible to sign up to an 
arbitrary figure when we are not entirely in control of delivering on it and 
where some of the conditions have got worse since...over the last 3-4 years 
it’s got more difficult. I am absolutely happy to take it as an aim but not a 
promise and that’s a really important differentiation. I will aim for a figure that I 
think...[hesitates] with everything coming right would be achievable, knowing it 
would be pretty damn fortunate for everything to come right.” (C1T, February 
2016) 
 
It is interesting to note here the unintended consequences of policy, as C1 had 
clearly interpreted the title of the MfH campaign as a criticism of him, when this was 
not the intention and it merely mirrored the terminology in other housing campaigns 
run in Bristol previously and indeed elsewhere. 
 
Other smaller, less well-resourced groups, did engage in the election process to 
some extent but generally had more limited access to candidates, had less time to 
engage and were promoting projects that were smaller in scale and/or less proven. 
One example was the use of self- and custom-build to address issues of affordability. 
I spoke to two individuals who were trying to promote these as solutions but had met 
with resistance and lack of interest. One influencer explained how frustrating he 
found the process of approaching the council, the mayor and some of the other 
candidates: 
 
“I tried to meet with [C1] and his officers but I can never get a date, he keeps 
saying yes when I meet him at things, but nothing ever happens as a result. 
I’ve emailed him, called his office and still no meeting. It’s like he’s not really 
interested. I’ve also tried talking to M1 and C2, and both appear very 
supportive but they seldom commit to anything. It’s ... frustrating and I’ve got 
the solution, using factory systems and modular build to provide cheap 
homes, we just need the land... we’ve even managed to get interest 
elsewhere, but not in Bristol. It’s just so slow” (INF21T, Dec 2015) 
 
Another individual representing the self-build community talked about his frustrations 
with the council over many years and said things still had not improved: 
 
“I haven’t got the time to lobby and do any more promotion to make the case 
for self-build. I’ve spoken to the MfH campaign group and hope they’ll pick it 
up as an issue, but I can’t do it myself. On existing projects, the council if 
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anything is getting worse, there’s a lack of trust, they don’t trust anyone else 
to deliver...and [C1] has his own projects, so all the effort is going into those.” 
(INF17T, Mar 2016) 
 
He went on to explain how he thinks innovation is stifled by the council:  
 
“We have been looking for a site for some years, we tried during the Green 
Capital Year, to showcase our concept... a small modular build unit at 
affordable prices that could be built locally, but we got nowhere, no help from 
the council or the Mayor. The same thing happened when we were looking for 
a warehouse to construct the units, the council couldn’t even come up with a 
shortlist of possible options for us... we had to do all the work then they came 
up with reasons why not...” (INF17T, Mar 2016) 
 
These groups were also less well-resourced and less able to mount an organised 
campaign than the two main campaigns identified above but did receive some 
attention from the candidates and were able to undertake a small amount of lobbying 
which consisted mostly of asking questions at hustings debates or sending 
information on their projects to the candidates, or meeting them on site at particular 
projects. 
 
“A couple of the candidates contacted us, and we’ve invited them to visit the 
site, but we haven’t really done much else. We’re focused on delivery. I’m the 
only worker and my job is project management, so I don’t have much time for 
other things. It’s difficult, you see all this debate about housing, other groups 
pushing their agenda and we know we’ve got a potential solution, but we don’t 
always invest the time in spreading the word, because we just don’t have the 
time. We rely on volunteer board members, and they can only do so much. 
But we have seen [C3] and [C2], they contacted us and came to look around 
and to talk about how this is working. It was good, they were really interested.” 
(INF18T, February 2016) 
 
The solutions that were gaining attention were a mixture of issues raised during 
debates, hustings, roundtables and discussions, together with ideas that members 
and candidates already had and those being promoted by different campaigns. It is 
difficult to fully define what was most influential in drawing attention to possible 
solutions, but candidates were aware of both main campaigns and had discussed 
the issues with some of their members. It is also difficult to define whether or not 
media and public attention raised the profile of an issue or responded to an issue 
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and proposed solutions. My impression would be that it worked both ways, the local 
media did respond to issues that were being raised, used press releases promoted 
by the two main campaigns, used photos of the installations the NFA campaign had 
promoted and reported on issues raised at hustings. They also had an awareness of 
housing issues from existing debate in Bristol, and from reports of the Housing 
Commission and scrutiny meetings on housing that took place prior to the election. 
Informal conversations with journalists suggested to me that they were well aware of 
the main issues at an early stage but then welcomed the approach taken by the NFA 
campaign to make the issue of street homelessness very visible and personal, with 
images and stories. As they put it to me, it saved them time and made their job 
easier. 
 
The problem and policy streams appeared during the campaign to run together, with 
problems and solutions merging, moving apart and pre-empting one another at 
different points in time. Issue identification and problem definition often ran together 
with the promotion of solutions, whilst solutions also appeared to be identified before 
any real discussion about the issues. Overall there was what appeared to be an 
informed debate where most stakeholders were keen to propose solutions as well as 
raise issues and problems. The debate also focused on what could be done locally 
and appeared to spend less time on attacking national policy, although some of the 
discussion within political groups spent time on this, the expert stakeholders were 
more focused in their approach on what could be done at a local level within the 
national framework. 
 
Having identified the issues and provided some of the solutions the campaigns then 
appeared to move into the next phase, and as the election got closer and manifestos 
were developed, their priority was to ensure their solutions were part of the 
candidate’s commitments. Whilst the priority for the candidates was to prioritise 





6.4 The Politics Stream 
Within the politics stream the literature suggests that party ideology, public opinion 
and national mood are key influences on how and why issues rise onto the agenda 
(Kingdon, 1984). In addition, the role of local context and levels and types of 
governance have been highlighted as important factors to be added to the MSF. One 
of the other key issues that has been identified in the politics stream in terms of 
keeping things on the agenda is maintaining the interest of policy makers as other 
issues, that may be of more current or immediate concern, compete for attention. 
The role of positive engagement was particularly important in the period just before 
the election as was increasing public awareness of the issues and providing simple, 
viable solutions that could be adopted as manifesto commitments. With the election 
providing a predictable window, policy entrepreneurs, as described by Cairney 
(2018:208) have the opportunity to link their issues with election debates and provide 
popular solutions at a time when policy makers and politicians are open to ideas. 
The discussion below seeks to demonstrate how these issues influenced the agenda 
setting process in Bristol and how different candidates made their decisions about 
what made it into their manifestos and election commitments and how different policy 
entrepreneurs attempted to influence their decisions. 
 
Party Processes 
Alongside the roundtables and broader discussions highlighted above, both C2 and 
C3 used party processes to develop views on problems and solutions and to finalise 
priorities. These involved councillors and party members from across the city, as well 
as nationally, in a process that could be expected as party groups meet privately to 
agree positions and develop ideas and policies (Copus, 1999:310). This process will 
be discussed in relation to each of the three main candidates involved in my 
research (C2, C3 and C1) in order to establish how influential party processes were 
in agenda setting in this instance. 
 
Candidate C2 Process 
For C2 this process was carried out through the Policy Groups, where party 
members were able to bring ideas into the discussion and where the initial draft of 
the different themed sections of their manifesto were developed. The Housing Policy 
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Group (HPG1), involving 10-15 members/councillors, met from November 2015 
onwards and was one of several groups set up around the main issues of housing, 
transport, social care, economy and education. The HPG1 was chaired by M1, who 
also convened the housing roundtables for C2, enabling some degree of consistency 
and sharing across the two networks. The issues raised in the roundtables seemed 
to be similar to those raised at the HPG1, although there were issues and priorities 
developed by the HPG1 that were not raised during the roundtable discussions. For 
example, the issue of welfare reform made it onto the party agenda even though it 
was hardly discussed at the roundtables as the view there seemed to be that nothing 
could be done locally to bring about change, so it did not feature as a key part of the 
discussion. Whereas in the HPG1 it was raised and discussed, then included as an 
issue in their priorities in terms of lobbying government and seeking to amend 
council policy where possible to support those most in need. By the time the 
manifesto was produced this had been amended into a more feasible action point 
about addressing the backlog of housing benefit claims, something that the council 
did have some control over. The same is true of the issue raised about the need for 
a tenants voice, this was mostly included in the priorities as a result of discussion at 
the HPG1 rather than at the roundtables, although one of the influencers had made 
the point at a roundtable meeting it was not central to the debate at the time. 
 
Following the roundtables and HPG1 meetings, at the end of January a key part of 
the policy development process and prioritisation of issues for C2 was a members 
policy meeting, held on the last Saturday of the month, involving most of the existing 
councillors and other members. This meeting brought councillors and members 
together to discuss progress being made in each of the party policy groups and to 
agree priorities and commitments to be included in the election manifesto. It was 
seen as a key part of the political process by members and councillors but when I 
spoke to C2 on the Monday after the meeting he was quite ambivalent about it, 
seeing it more as a necessary step in the process rather than an important part of it: 
 
“There was this policy meeting, of councillors and members, which I had to go 
to... We were presenting our ideas, what we had been doing in the 
roundtables and policy discussion groups, for a wider group to engage with. It 
was necessary but I got some comment about how I was only there for a 
couple of hours, rather than the whole day. It wasn’t a priority. The key point is 
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whatever comes out of it everyone has had an opportunity to have their say. 
They need to remember that if an issue is not included in the manifesto, we 
can still do it, it just won’t be our first priority. That’s important.” (C2P, January 
2016) 
 
By contrast I also spoke to a leading Councillor (CL1) on the Sunday after the 
meeting and her perception was quite different in terms of the importance others 
were attaching to the meeting. She also alluded to the divide between C2 and the 
group of existing party councillors. 
 
“We had this really important meeting on Saturday... a policy discussion, our 
only real chance to get together to talk about the issues and what we would 
do about them and what should be our priorities. The problem was he [C2] 
was only there for a couple of hours, he then left, that didn’t show much 
commitment to engaging with members. I thought that was pretty bad... gave 
a poor impression, it’s like he just wants to do what he wants and isn’t 
interested in what we have to say... I find myself in this difficult role, acting as 
mediator, trying to defend him to the rest of the group and keep them happy... 
It’s difficult, we have a wealth of experience but he doesn’t seem to respect 
that... he has his own contacts who he listens to.” (CL1P, January 2016) 
 
This raises the issue about who is genuinely influential during agenda setting and 
who the candidates really listened to. Traditionally, there is a view that party issues 
will dominate party candidates, and party members will be influential in the 
discussion (see Copus, 1999 & 2004). In the case of C2 this was less obvious 
because C2 was not an existing councillor in the city and never had been, he was 
not part of the ‘clique of members’ that existed, many of whom had been councillors 
for quite a few years. This clique, at least from my experience and from comments 
made to me during the campaign by existing councillors, had been used to 
dominating debate and positions of responsibility within the local party for decades, 
so it was something of a surprise to some when the candidate that was selected was 
not from this clique or promoted by them: 
 
“We put up our own candidate for selection, an existing councillor, that’s who 
most of the councillors would have voted for, but he didn’t make it. Instead we 
have someone who is not part of things, most of us don’t really know him, he 
moves in different circles. Last time there was a falling out when he was 
candidate, over comments in leaflets, we wouldn’t work for him. This time, we 
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have to... we have to change things to get rid of the current Mayor.” (CL4P, 
January 2016) 
 
In several of the almost weekly telephone conversations I had with C2 he was keen 
to explain and outline his approach to identifying the issues of concern within 
housing. He was keen to keep reinforcing the point that his “audience is not the party 
and its members, it’s the city. The role of the mayor is about city priorities, not just 
the party or the council” (C2P, Dec 2015). This approach supports the notion that 
local government is becoming ‘depoliticised’ and that the role of the directly elected 
mayor is more about facilitative leadership, working in partnership with others 
outside of the party and keeping party politics in the background (Sweeting and 
Hambleton, 2019:7). C2 described how he wanted to reach beyond the party and 
engage with a wider audience, but that this was causing problems within the party: 
 
“I wanted to set up these roundtables early on to get people together to talk 
about housing. The audience for these roundtables is not just the [....] Party, it 
has to be wider than that, it’s the whole city. We need to be more outward 
looking, it’s not just about the Bristol [....] Group (of councillors). I’m getting 
some stick for that, councillors and members think it should just be them that 
input to decisions. But that’s not the way I want to do it. There’s all those 
experts who know the problems, I want to talk to them, to get the solutions, to 
see what we can change.” (C2P, December 2015) 
 
“Overall there have been problems with my idea of the roundtables, even [M1] 
didn’t really fully embrace it. I wanted national organisations there, but had to 
leave the invites to him...... That didn’t really happen....... We need to get 
beyond the Bristol conversation, seek information from others. Policy leads 
need to reach out, but it’s not happening enough.” (C2P, December 2015) 
 
As time went on and resistance to his approach increased, he seemed to become 
ever more exasperated with the lack of willingness amongst some councillors to 
work with others from outside the party. In one phone call he described how the 
process was being blocked by party members and his resulting frustration at the lack 
of progress in some areas: 
 
“It’s like fighting a losing battle, I’ve got councillors who are resisting 
everything I’m trying to do, even though I’m trying to understand where they’re 
coming from... I set up the roundtables across topic areas but some haven’t 
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happened because the conveners are less interested in being collaborative. 
That hasn’t been the case in housing but that is one that’s worked better. It’s 
frustrating but that’s just how it is, I‘m trying to change things but there’s 
constant resistance.” (C2P, January 2016) 
 
This reluctance to engage outside of the party was something I experienced first-
hand, as C2 left it to his campaign office and M1 to ensure I was invited to the 
relevant housing meetings. This did not always happen and at times it felt like I was 
deliberately being left out or invited at the last minute as my presence was not seen 
as necessary. I was often given only partial information so I found I had to chase 
both M1 and others in the campaign office to find out when things were happening, 
where and at what time. On one occasion I was called by C2 as one meeting was 
about to start and he had only just discovered I hadn’t been invited despite his 
request that I should be. Talking to him afterwards, when he phoned me to outline 
what the main points of the discussion had been, he expressed his annoyance about 
me not receiving an invite and once more reiterated that he was happy for me to 
attend all meetings, he even went through his diary with me for the next few weeks 
to make sure I had the detail of some other meetings. My fieldnotes from that 
particular day noted my own frustration with missing out on a meeting, but also 
reported how I was pleasantly surprised and reassured by C2’s response. 
 
The prioritisation process for C2 was an iterative process, involving a wider group of 
people, stakeholders and experts, all locally driven with no imposition of a national 
party agenda. A small group (the Advisory Group), made up of party members and 
convened by his agent worked on the issues that had come out of discussion at 
policy groups, roundtables and local party meetings. This group was ultimately 
responsible for putting together the manifesto commitments and party agenda over a 
couple of weeks in early February. This group was therefore responsible for 
narrowing down the policy ideas and putting them into a document that was ready for 
public consumption. It was this same group who helped C2 prepare for hustings 
meetings, interviews and speeches. 
 
From informal discussion with the chair of the Advisory Group and C2, their 
perception was that this group was where the real decisions were made about the 
campaign as a whole and about what priorities would make it onto the party agenda 
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and into the manifesto, and which would be left out but be kept as part of a wider 
agenda. There was also a recognition that the manifesto itself had to have support 
from existing party councillors and candidates, as it was also the platform on which 
they would be standing for election. The policy conference and policy groups were a 
key part of the definition of ideas and policies, even if the final decision about what 
was included was left to a smaller group which did not involve any of those 
councillors. The chair of the Advisory Group was keen to stress the collaborative 
nature of the process, repeating a similar mantra to the one I had already heard from 
C2 “people have had a chance to comment, party members have been involved, 
councillors have been involved, even if their ideas are not there at the end, they’ve 
had their say” (M3P, April 2016). 
 
When discussing how the decisions were made about what to include and what to 
leave out, C2 made clear that it was a mix of influences: 
 
“We could only include some things, ideas that were left out were because we 
had to narrow it down to a sensible list, otherwise it would have been a huge 
document. We talked to lots of people, listened to what they were telling us. 
We heard comments at meetings and events, talked to the people involved 
about their frustrations and their ideas for how to improve things. We’ve 
involved and listened to members.  If an issue is not included in the manifesto, 
we can still do it, it just won’t be our first priority.” (C2P, Feb 2016) 
 
In discussion with C2, the week before the launch event, he outlined to me his 
general dissatisfaction with the policy development process:  
 
“It [the process] necessarily gets taken over by this issue of keeping it simple, 
doing what will impress people, what will have the most traction rather than 
what is most needed”. (C2P, Feb 2016) 
 
He described it as an “unsatisfactory process that is too shallow” but also as a 
“necessary evil” to try and identify what will have the most resonance with people, in 
his words “this is an election after all, so that’s what we have to do” (C2P, Feb 2016). 
It seemed to me that he was more interested in detailed, in-depth debate about the 
key issues, rather than the sound bites and simple statements that he felt were 
necessary for manifesto commitments and pledges. He explained that the depth was 
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there, but that he could not use it in his manifesto because “people won’t get it, we 
have to make it clear, simple and digestible” (C2P, Feb 2016). 
 
The launch event, which was very much a political party event, was held on a 
Sunday in February at C2’s old primary school in Lawrence Weston. C2 talked about 
the Bristol Plan and what the party priorities were and went into detail on the housing 
commitments in the Plan. It was clear that the manifesto was well developed at this 
stage and ideas had been formulated into clear commitments. It was also very clear 
that housing was featuring as a top priority. Talking to people at the event there was 
definitely an air of optimism, tinged with desperation. Longstanding members 
expressed how desperately they wanted to ‘get rid’ of the existing mayor and how 
having a party mayor could make so much difference to the city. They talked about 
the need to tackle poverty and inequality, something they did not feel was on the 
agenda of the existing Mayor. They also talked about housing, how they were 
making this a key priority in their campaign, and how ‘people on the doorstep’ were 
talking about the housing crisis in Bristol. 
 
I left the event with a feeling that there was a real momentum to the campaign, both 
around C2, but also in support of their local council candidates, where the feeling 
was that they could regain control of the council as a whole. To me this helped to 
explain the support and levels of activity amongst members and existing councillors, 
where perhaps there may be questions or concerns from some of them about C2 
himself, but where there was a real desire to take control back and win council seats, 
as well as having a party mayor. As one member said to me “I might not like [C2] 
and the way he does things, but he’s got to be better than [the existing mayor]”, for 
me that just about summed up some of the feelings about C2 from existing 
councillors. Others were far more supportive in their comments about C2, “he’s 
absolutely the right person, he brings something different. He’s not got the baggage 
of having been involved with the council before, he’s a different face, a new face, not 
tarred with people’s negative perceptions of the council and that can only be good” 
(M8). 
 
The above discussion highlights how C2 tried to move away from an approach 
dominated by party politics, councillors and members, but met with constant 
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resistance. It also demonstrates the difference in perceptions about how policy 
issues were identified. To some extent it is clear that whilst the party group were a 
key part of the process, they were only part of it, the debate did go wider and 
included a range of stakeholders and influencers from outside the party, although it 
is also clear that different actors within the party had a different view about the extent 
to which insiders or outsiders influenced priorities. Despite this difference in 
perceptions, they were able to produce an agreed end product, which was important 
given this was not just a mayoral election but also a whole council election with 70 
other party candidates and they were all standing on the same platform. 
 
From my own perspective it seemed to be a combination of influences, with the 
wider group of stakeholders and influencers providing ideas, information and support 
and the HPG1 bringing together priorities for the Advisory Group to confirm. From 
discussion with C2, in terms of housing at least, the Advisory Group made few 
amendments to the priorities agreed by the HPG1, which also seemed to broadly 
reflect the issues identified by the roundtable discussions and main campaign 
groups. It is not clear what would have happened if there had been any fundamental 
disagreements between the different groups, but the impression I got from the 
candidate was that he would decide along with the Advisory Group. It would also be 
fair to say that national policy was not a key issue at this stage.  
 
Candidate C3 Process 
By contrast the process for C3 was more dominated by party processes, bringing in 
the wider membership in a collaborative process. From formal and informal 
discussions with C3 and some of his party members and councillors, I was able to 
establish the formal process used by this candidate in terms of party involvement. In 
this case, the Housing Policy Group (HPG2) involving members, developed a draft 
housing policy using previous policy, input from the roundtable discussion and some 
initial thoughts on new policies. This then went to the Policy and Information (P&I) 
meeting in January 2016. At that meeting there were about 40 people, all party 
members and councillors, who came together to discuss the policy issues they 
should include in their election commitments. In total three main housing themes 
were discussed: social rent, market rent and homes to buy. According to members 
the process was about challenging what the HPG2 had come up with and bringing 
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forward new ideas. Participants were encouraged to think about what they would do 
if the party were running government and the council as well as what they would do 
under the current situation as an opposition party. This was then followed by a 
ratification of the draft housing policy by the executive of the P&I meeting, where it 
seemed little had changed as a result of the wider meeting. In this case party 
members and councillors were clearly in control of the process and worked closely 
with the candidate to define the final agenda, in contrast to C2 where the process 
was more mixed with outside involvement as well as party processes. 
 
The campaign launch for C3 was planned as a day of media activity in early March, 
with C3 and the national party leader as the focus, with as many of the local council 
candidates attending as was possible. The campaign as a whole was organised by 
an existing councillor (CL5) who was also standing for election at the same time. 
This meant, as he admitted to me, that things tended to get done at the last minute 
and he didn’t really have much time to organise things. The event itself was an 
opportunity for some discussion and for photo opportunities with C3 and the national 
party leader. During the day I walked along with a small group of the candidates and 
chatted to a couple of them about their campaign and what they were hoping for. 
Generally, there was a positive feeling amongst the group, with hopes for new 
council seat gains, on the back of the gains made during the General Election the 
previous year.  
 
I also managed to have a brief conversation with the national party leader about their 
housing policy and what she would like to see changed. During our chat she was 
very positive about the local party and C3, holding them up as a great example for 
other areas to follow. She also talked about the processes for agreeing policy, saying 
there was a tendency to try to include too much to satisfy all the members involved in 
the discussion rather than really focusing on a small number of specifics. There 
followed some further discussion about different policy areas. There was some 
debate about priorities and how they fit with national policy as well as how they could 
help to inform national party policy. I found the discussion informative, with C3 
clearly well informed about the issues and possible solutions. At the end of the 
afternoon there was a further party gathering including a wider audience than just 
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members, which was described as a networking opportunity and a chance to meet 
the national party leader and C3.  
 
In relation to both these party candidates the process of policy selection was a mix of 
formal and informal discussion, insider and outsider views, information and evidence 
and personal preferences. My overriding impression was one of dissatisfaction, 
where detailed discussion and debate had to be boiled down into bite size, simple 
priorities and commitments that were merely formed in order to appeal to voters. 
Both candidates expressed their frustration at having to reduce everything to a small 
number of issues, in short, sharp sentences or phrases. They were both keen to 
hang onto the detail behind these and use the information they had gained but were 
disappointed with how simple things had to be when communicating in manifestos, 
action plans and leaflets. 
 
Candidate C1 Process 
By contrast, C1 seemed to use quite a closed process to bring in ideas and issues 
for consideration. As an independent candidate, he had a small campaign team, led 
by M6, which basically drew together the issues that they wanted to include in their 
2020 Action Plan. This Plan was mostly the work of M6, C1, and a small number of 
supporters and relied on outlining past achievements and the continuation of council 
policy as its foundation. In one discussion, according to one supporter I spoke to 
(M7), they went through a list of issues C1 had brought with him and talked about 
how these would work as a leaflet. They also looked at the leaflet they produced for 
the first Mayoral election in 2012, and the achievements leaflet produced for this 
campaign. There was a discussion about how they needed to focus on C1’s 
experience and demonstrate how he was the ‘right man for the job’ compared to C2. 
The outcome of that discussion was a leaflet that focused on C1 as a non-party 
candidate, as someone with a proven track record of delivery. They used a table that 
showed his experience compared to C2 and made the point that C1 is “The only 
candidate who can stop [...] control of Bristol for years to come”. This leaflet failed to 
outline any new policy commitments and was entirely focused on the person and his 
experience versus one other candidate. At this stage of the campaign (March/April), 




This leaflet received particular interest from C2 and his party who believed it played 
into their hands and was ‘a gift’ as far as they were concerned, as one of them said 
to me: 
 
“Have you seen [C1s] latest leaflet, it’s brilliant. It plays him off against [C2] 
and makes it clear to everyone that it’s a two-horse race. So basically, if you 
want to get rid of [C1] you have to vote [C2], brilliant.” (CL1P, April 2016) 
 
Another added that lots of people had seen the leaflet and mentioned it and that the 
party were going to use it themselves:  
 
“We got a lot of comment on the doorstep about that leaflet. People saying it 
would prompt them to vote Labour because then they wouldn’t have to put up 
with [C1] any more. They really did us a favour with that one, so we’re using it 
to show people why they need to vote for [C2].” (CL2T, April 2016) 
 
This point serves to demonstrate the difference between an experienced political 
campaign, supported by a party machine, and an independent candidate with less 
experience and supported by individuals with less political experience overall.  
 
C1 held his campaign launch event on a Friday, just two days before C2’s launch, 
with a lot of fanfare and celebration, but without the ‘Plan’ or policy commitments, as 
these were launched at a later date in mid-April at his manifesto launch. The 
campaign launch seemed to be more of an opportunity for business people and 
others to network and chat with one another, as well as maybe to get a few minutes 
of C1’s time. This is an illustration of the one of the differences between party 
campaigns, where there is a core of active members, and independent campaigns 
where support is less organised. There was undoubtedly a core of loyal supporters 
there, but there were many others there who seemed to be observing and watching, 
rather than supporting. 
 
C1’s manifesto launch on 23rd April, less than two weeks before the election, was an 
altogether different affair compared to C2 and C3. It was held in a public square in 
the centre of Bristol where C1 chose to stand on a ‘soapbox’ to deliver his speech 
outlining his ‘2020 Action Plan’ to a small crowd of supporters, interested observers 
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and a larger crowd of protesters. The whole event was awkward, with C1 
desperately trying to shout over the protesters and hecklers. I chatted to C1 and M6 
informally afterwards and C1 was quite philosophical about it all, with M6 less so. 
 
“I expected a little bit of heckling once I saw [other mayoral candidate] there, 
but that’s fine... it’s part of the game. It makes it more real... shouting over 
others, making my voice heard. It was good.” (C1P, April 2016) 
 
“You just can’t keep him quiet [other mayoral candidate] it’s not really fair, he 
should’ve allowed [C1] to speak. I tried to shut him up so did others... but it’s 
hopeless. The protest wasn’t right... it’s all about a council decision, it’s a side 
issue, it shouldn’t take over. But we got our points over and people can see 
the Action Plan, and the media are here, it’ll be interesting to see how they 
pick it up.” (M6P, April 2016). 
 
The above discussion highlights the different processes used by party candidates 
compared to the main independent candidate and demonstrates how the experience 
of political parties can help to avoid some of the pitfalls of campaigning. The smooth 
running of a campaign can be reliant on the party machine behind a candidate, 
which means independent candidates are potentially at a disadvantage from the start 
unless they bring in the right kind of expertise. 
 
Local Context 
The importance of local context is raised by critics of the MSF (Zahariadis, 2016: 
Ackrill et al, 2013) suggesting that the framework makes inadequate reference to 
locality and the implications of local institutions and structures. In my research this 
refers both to the culture and operation of the local council and other actors as well 
as the scope for local government to take decisions and the barriers they experience 
as a result of national policy. 
 
The first issue, about the culture of the local council, was raised by just about 
everyone I spoke to during my fieldwork. Several people referred to the decision 
taken in Bristol to have an elected mayor and how the constant changes in political 
leadership in the past had led to the perception that an elected mayor could be part 
of the solution. Comments from business representatives in particular focused on the 
need for strong and consistent leadership. 
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There was an overwhelming view that the council were risk averse, frightened to 
take decisions, reluctant to work with others, to trust them to do a job properly and 
primarily wanting to control things themselves. This view came from councillors, 
party members, stakeholders and influencers. As one business person explained to 
me: 
 
“What can the council really do? They’re hemmed in geographically and policy 
wise... the centralised state means there’s a lack of flexibility and council 
officers themselves are constrained, they don’t think creatively. There are 
things they could do but don’t...increase capital in HRA, CPO, own land etc. 
all could be used to greater effect. It’s like they’re scared...” (INF11P, Feb 
2016) 
 
At some of the roundtables this was a significant topic for debate, where different 
influencers recounted their stories of instances of how the council were impossible to 
work with and had blocked different projects from happening.  
 
“[C1] had been quite supportive of what we were trying to achieve but that 
didn’t seem to translate further down the council. Things got stuck and [C1] 
didn’t seem to be in control of that or even know. There’s a risk averse nature 
to the council, trying something different is difficult for them.” (INF13T, Aug 
2016) 
 
Another influencer, who worked closely with the council, explained this perception of 
the council further: 
 
“I think they feel frustrated when people say they are risk averse or there’s a 
negative culture or they’re hard to work with, because they don’t know what to 
do about it. They seem to lack vision, their view is more operational, even at a 
higher level. Maybe it’s about leadership, that’s the way it’s run or maybe it’s 
to do with her [the city director]. I’m in Bristol a lot and I’ve never seen her at 
any event, anything advocating housing as an issue for the city.” (INF4T, April 
2016) 
 
One influencer (INF13) described the council to me as ‘paternalistic’ and talked 
about the need for communities to take more control, but even then, he said “the 
process is difficult and it only takes one decision by the council and months of work 
is ruined. We see this time and again...we’re working with the council and then 
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someone else gets involved and it all changes”. He also went on to describe the type 
of approach he has seen from the council in recent years, where it feels like the local 
community are being asked to be grateful for anything the council do: 
 
“He [C1] came out to Lawrence Weston recently, after he had promised £1m 
from the sale of port land would come to the area. When he was challenged 
about a couple of things by some of the locals, about things not happening 
quickly enough, about the council not helping, he got quite bolshy and said he 
could take the money away and spend it somewhere else. That’s the kind of 
attitude that people associate with the council.” (INF13T, Aug 2016). 
 
The same point was made to me by another influencer during an informal chat we 
had after a meeting (INF14P, May 2016): 
 
“When [C1] came along to a community meeting in... he did the big hero thing, 
saying he had secured them £1m and had expected a bit more gratitude. The 
response was entirely negative, as you can imagine, with local residents 
making it clear to [C1] that the council had done nothing for the area in 
decades and he had done nothing for them in three years. He then threatened 
to take the money away and spend it elsewhere.”  
 
The consistent message seemed to be both about lack of leadership and deeper 
cultural problems within the council that had stopped them being creative and 
innovative in their approach to housing issues. Quite what was at the heart of this 
approach was difficult to identify because when discussing this informally with 
officers their view was, they were held back by lack of political leadership and lack of 
clarity over priorities. Whereas, externally, influencers seemed to be suggesting that 
it was the council officers who were the problem, within a negative institutional 
environment, cultivated over many years.  
 
Positive Engagement 
Maintaining interest in an issue and engaging positively with decision makers is a 
key part of the politics stream. In my research this could be seen through both of the 
main campaigns. As the process of manifesto development and policy commitments 
began to take shape, the NFA campaign stepped up its activity. As well as 
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continuing to illustrate the extent of the problem and some of the ‘obvious’ solutions, 
the NFA group also introduced new elements to their campaign: 
 
“Between now and 5th May, we will be conducting a series of activities to 
make sure that this issue is at the top of the political agenda and is not 
allowed to slip out of the spotlight.” (INF2T, January 2016). 
 
They wrote to each candidate asking them a series of questions about how they 
would deal with the housing crisis and what they would do differently. Their 
responses were then published in a leaflet that was hand delivered in areas of 
central and west Bristol as well as added to their Facebook campaign page and 
publicised to the media. 
 
The approach taken by the MfH campaign was mainly focused on talking to the 
candidates, providing them with briefing information and discussing the issues with 
the two main candidates (C1 and C2). They were keen to discuss detail and help the 
candidates to incorporate their target as part of their manifesto commitments and to 
work out how to achieve it if elected. This appeared to work with C2 and C3, who 
adopted targets similar to that outlined by the MfH campaign. They were also keen to 
keep the conversation going beyond the election, so much of the discussion within 
the group and with the candidates was about how members of the MfH coalition 
could work with the council and the new mayor to make things happen. 
 
The only hustings based purely on the topic of housing was organised by the NFA 
group, in collaboration with the MfH campaign, on the Friday before the election. It 
was a key opportunity for those interested in housing issues to engage directly with 
the candidates. The planning for the event was undertaken by the NFA campaign 
and was carefully managed from start to finish. Only the five main candidates were 
invited to be on the panel – the existing mayor, and the four main party candidates. 
One of the other independent candidates who had been excluded from the panel 
was in the audience. The meeting began with a film made by the NFA marketing 
agency, illustrating the stories of a number of homeless people, this was followed by 
short presentations from each of the candidates and a question and answer session. 
Prior to the event they had privately asked a number of people to submit questions 
(including myself), as well as publicly seeking issues through their Facebook page. 
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These were then sifted through by the marketing agency and another representative 
of the funder, at which point they were shared with me for comment, in an effort to 
achieve a balance in terms of issues, as well as detail on issues. The organisers 
were keen to get beyond the usual generic answers and delve into the issues in 
more detail, enabling a livelier debate. They then invited a couple of people from the 
homeless community and those living in temporary accommodation to attend and 
ask questions at the event itself. The whole event was very carefully managed by the 
campaign team in terms of message and process.  
 
The debate started with a question about homelessness, reminding people why we 
need to build more homes. There was common agreement from the panel of five 
candidates that in a city like Bristol it is a disgrace to see people sleeping on the 
streets. All candidates agreed that building more homes was a priority and that some 
form of housing company was needed to enable the council to build more using their 
own land. The point was made about choices and that with limited budgets and a 
lack of resources it was important to make the most of the assets the council have to 
support their own priorities. The hint here was that the current regime had not 
prioritised housing and had instead used both land and funds for other priorities 
instead, a point as strongly denied by C1 at the meeting as it was and in my one-to-
one discussions with him. 
 
All candidates agreed that the council needed to make the best use of council and 
other publicly owned land to deliver affordable housing in the city. How this is done 
and how you can break down the very considerable barriers that seem to exist was 
less clear from the debate. The meeting heard from people in the audience involved 
in community-led housing initiatives who have witnessed those barriers first hand, 
who claimed dealing with the council was impossible, slow and ponderous. There 
were examples given of communities in Bristol that had identified space for housing 
through their local neighbourhood planning processes, spaces communities were 
willing to see developed, but which have stalled because of issues over land 
ownership, planning, and council commitment. What they described instead was the 
council selling off public land in their areas for private developers to build on with 
limited input from the community and limited affordable housing. They stated a 
preference for community-led development, on sites identified by the community, 
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where they have a real say over the type of housing, what it looks like and what 
facilities are needed alongside it. This type of approach featured as part of the NFA 
campaign when it came to offering solutions. Indeed, many of the people in the 
audience who raised the issues had met and discussed those issues with people 
from the NFA campaign in the weeks leading up to the hustings meeting. 
 
There was also a discussion about how to make the private rented sector (PRS) 
work better for people. Most of the candidates agreed with the Ethical Lettings 
Charter (ELC) promoted by the campaign group Acorn, who were present in large 
numbers at the hustings meeting. They had been invited to attend and ask questions 
because they had been very proactive during the election process in raising issues 
to do with the PRS. 
 
The housing hustings helped to illustrate just how big an issue housing was in the 
election. On a Friday evening, on a bank holiday weekend, several hundred people 
turned up to listen, heckle and support the discussion on “what next for Bristol 
housing?” What this illustrated is that the issues are obvious, the solutions are 
available, but somehow the two are not currently being connected well enough to 
make a difference. This very point was the basis of the NFA and MfH campaigns. 
They had spent the last four months trying to bring all the main issues together with 
acceptable solutions that would be supported by the candidates. From their 
perspective the meeting was a success, they had the five main candidates there, 
there was press and media coverage, and the issues raised were particularly well 
aligned with the campaign itself: 
 
“The meeting worked well; it got a bit feisty at times but there was lots of 
agreement for the priorities we have raised. What happens next is now what 
is most important.” (INF8P, April 2016) 
 
The politics stream highlights the importance of local context: in this instance the 
perceived culture of the council was a major issue for many of the policy 
entrepreneurs. They identified a risk averse culture, where partnership working was 
difficult and the lack of leadership had led to a fear of creativity and innovation. In 
addition, my research suggests that the role of party politics is less important at a 
local level, particularly in relation to the influence of national party policy but also in 
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terms of the role of the local party members and councillors. Whilst the local party 
was important for both C2 and C3, they also sought to actively engage with other 
stakeholders on housing issues, to seek other expertise and knowledge to use 
alongside local party concerns and issues.  
 
My research also demonstrates the difference between party candidates and an 
independent candidate in terms of how they identify issues and solutions during an 
election campaign. The main independent candidate (C1) used a more closed 
process and involved fewer people during his campaign, instead he relied on a 
handful of long-term supporters and a campaign manager to develop his action plan. 
He also focused on existing achievements and priorities developed during his term of 




6.5 Policy Outputs 
All of the candidates in the mayoral election provided some form of written agenda or 
manifesto at some point during the campaign. Some of these were launched as 
events, others were used as leaflets and on websites and social media. But 
whatever the format, all candidates produced something in a written form as their 
party agenda. For C2 this came in the form of the manifesto ‘Our Bristol Plan’, which 
outlined the party’s vision for the city and set out quite clearly its seven main 
commitments as follows: 
 
“Bristol should be a city 
• In which everyone benefits from the city’s success and no-one is left behind. 
• Where people have access to decent jobs and affordable homes. 
• In which people can get around and services and opportunities are 
accessible. 
• Where life chances are not determined by wealth and background. 
• That leads on tackling climate change.” 
 
“Our seven commitments to you... 
1. We will build 2,000 new homes – 800 affordable – a year by 2020. 
2. We will deliver work experience and apprenticeships for every young person. 
3. We will stop expansion of RPZs and review existing schemes. 
4. We will protect children’s centres. 
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5. We will increase the number of school places and introduce a fair admission 
process. 
6. We will put Bristol on course to be run entirely on clean energy by 2050 and 
introduce a safe, clean streets campaign. 
7. We will lead a European Capital of Culture bid to make culture – and sport – 
accessible to all.” 
(CWC2 - Our Bristol Plan, February 2016:4-6) 
 
In terms of detail, there was a key section on housing in the Plan (Our Homes), 
which set out ten key commitments on housing that the new administration would 
prioritise during its term of office (see Table 9). These included many of the main 
points identified at the roundtables and other discussions, as well as others identified 
at party meetings and provided some quite specific policies for immediate action, as 
well as some longer-term aspirations. 
 
C1 set out his policy in a ‘2020 Action Plan’, which covered seven main policy areas, 
as his pledge to deliver a “Better Bristol for All” (CWC1 – 2020 Action Plan, April 
2016):  
§ Skills and jobs for all 
§ Homes for all 
§ Culture and sport for all 
§ A sustainable and healthy city for all 
§ An independent and safer city for all 
§ Efficient transport for all 
§ A fairer caring city for all 
 
The housing element of the plan had five main priorities, building on existing 
achievements and outlining how these would be taken forward. Interestingly, as this 
action plan was developed quite late in the campaign, it seemed to make an attempt 
to respond to the priorities set out by C2, particularly in relation to the new homes 
target, by claiming that plans to deliver 2,000 new homes a year were already in 







Table 9: Housing Policy Commitments 
Party Candidate Main Housing Policy Commitments 
C1 § Homes for all (1 of 7 key pledges) 
§ I will tear up the rule-book to accelerate the delivery of more 
affordable, social and interim housing across the city to ensure 
that we make substantial inroads into the homelessness 
challenge within 24 months 
§ I will unlock Bristol’s share of the £2bn new funding available 
from the HCA to deliver starter homes for first time buyers 
aged 23-40 
§ I will establish a Bristol City Council owned company to 
develop new affordable rented accommodation to include key 
workers in health, education and the emergency services 
§ I will extend the role out of an ethical lettings charter to protect 
tenants’ rights 
 
C2 § Build 2,000 new homes – 800 affordable – a year by 2020 (1 
of 7 commitments made) 
§ Set up a council owned company to oversee housing projects 
across the city 
§ Work with local communities to identify land and support the 
development of alternative housing initiatives 
§ Establish a Bristol Ethical Lettings Charter 
§ Bring empty homes and buildings back into use 
§ Give tenants a voice – create a Bristol wide Tenants’ 
Federation 
§ Tackle homelessness – early intervention and support, adopt a 
‘No Second Night Out’ approach to reducing rough sleeping 
 
C3 § A decent home for everyone (1 of 10 priorities) 
§ Deliver 8,000 new homes in the next four years, including 
2,800 affordable (80% social rent) 
§ Continue to work with tenants’ organisations like Acorn to 
ensure private rented homes meet appropriate standards of 
safety and comfort, and that exorbitant fees and rent rises are 
curtailed. 
§ Improve social housing and retain homes for social rent 
§ Minimise the number of empty homes 
 
C4 § Provide more affordable housing in the city (1 of 7 priorities) 
§ Set up a central ‘one stop shop’ for homeless services and 
advice 
§ Ensure that all suitable brown-field sites in the city are 
developed for new homes, including social and affordable 
housing stock 
 
C5 § Building more homes (1 of 6 priorities) 
§ End Bristol’s housing crisis – a new Council Housing Company 
will build homes using £9m of secured funding 
§ Get Bristol building to build more homes to tackle 
homelessness 
§ Increase resources to the planning department to facilitate a 
better service to developers and investors in Bristol  
§ Use tax paid on new buildings to provide more shelters and 
set-up skill centres to help Bristol’s homeless 
 




The written policy output for C3 was again included in leaflets but was initially 
launched online rather than as a printed policy document. The top ten priorities were 
quite specific and detailed, they are summarised below (CWC3 – Mayoral Manifesto 
2016, March): 
“Our priorities are set within the context of our ongoing opposition to austerity. The 
top ten priorities a [...] mayor will set out to achieve are: 
1. Work with tenants’ organisations like Acorn to ensure that homes in the private rental 
sector meet appropriate standards. 
2. Delivering a low emission zone covering the city centre by 2020. 
3. Implementing an active transport strategy for the city. 
4. Establishing a fresh start to partnership working with neighbouring authorities. 
5. Delivering 8,000 new homes in the next four years, including 2,800 affordable (of 
which 80% will be at social rent levels). 
6. Increasing the number of apprenticeships in the city by 50%. 
7. Ensuring there are enough school places in the city to meet demand, and that 
schools tackling the highest levels of child poverty are prioritised. 
8. Ring fencing the Independent Living Fund grant for the purpose it is intended. 
9. Combating the impact of inequalities and prejudice. 
10. Delivering re-use and recycling facilities across the city to support a target of sending 
zero waste to landfill by 2020.” 
The housing section, “A Decent Home for Everyone” set out their priorities in more 
detail under six main headings focusing on new homes, private rented sector, social 
housing, tenants and empty homes: (see Table 9). 
 
These policy outputs (party agendas) were produced as the main written output from 
the election campaigns, and were used to clearly promote the priorities that each 
candidate believed to be important. They were the main electoral platform on which 
the candidates stood and were asking people to judge them on. The key housing 
policy commitments contained in these party agendas are outlined in Table 9. This 
demonstrates the common elements of those commitments as well as the difference 
in detail across the different parties. 
 
What was clear from these formalised commitments was that housing issues had 
made it into the written commitments and statements of all the main candidates. 
Many housing issues had stayed on the agenda from start to finish and had clearly 
resonated with the politicians as well as the media and public. 
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It could be argued that both of the main campaigns seemed to influence the 
candidates and that they served to illustrate just how effective one person or one 
campaign can be when they are equipped with the right knowledge and resources to 
get their message across and when they have the right access and the right 
connections. What is not clear is just how much the commitments and promises of 
each candidate would have differed if the NFA and MfH campaigns had not 
happened. What is clear is that the campaigns were visible throughout the election 
process and had good access to the main candidates at key points. The main points 
raised by the campaigns were covered in the policy outputs and they did succeed in 




This chapter has demonstrated how the agenda window operated during the mayoral 
election in Bristol. It has shown how candidates developed their priorities and what 
made it into their election manifestos (party agendas). It has illustrated how the two 
main campaign groups sought to exercise influence throughout the process and the 
different tactics and strategies they used to bring housing issues to the forefront and 
keep them there. 
 
The window opened in the politics stream as the election was called. Issues and 
solutions were raised and discussed alongside one another. The role of evidence 
and local knowledge has been discussed together with particular focusing events as 
the mechanism by which problems and issues were identified. The solutions to these 
problems were raised as part of the discussion about the issues, bringing viable 
solutions to the table at an early stage. The different campaign groups and 
influencers were evident throughout the process, both individually and together as 
policy communities, bringing knowledge and expertise to the table and engaging 
positively with the candidates to develop ideas and policy priorities. 
 
The role of party politics has been discussed, with clear processes locally bringing in 
party members and supporters alongside non-members, experts and other 
influencers in discussions about the issues. This is a key point, and elaborates on 
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the work of Copus (1999 & 2004) which highlights the important role political parties 
play in local government. My research suggests that the process in Bristol is mixed, 
with clear evidence that the involvement of members and councillors is still important 
but is now played out alongside a process of wider involvement with local experts, 
professionals, and businesses, from outside the party.  
 
The importance of local context, institutional behaviour and culture is touched upon 
as a key influence on how housing issues are dealt with, identifying barriers to 
change and innovation within the council. C2 and C3 seemed determined to change 
this by bringing in new ideas and more innovative policy on some of the main 
housing issues through discussion and engagement with people from outside of the 
council who were less inhibited by council culture and structures. 
 
As the agenda window drew to a close, party agendas were produced by the 
candidates from February to April, reflecting much of the debate and discussion that 
had gone on before. At this point there seemed to be a lull in activity, as both 
candidates and influencers waited for the election to happen. A revised diagram 
(Figure 11) outlining the process highlighted by my research during the agenda 




































Source: author’s own diagram 
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7.0 The Decision Window  
 
The literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that there is the potential for a new, 
smaller window to open after the election as a new administration is formed. The 
streams once more diverge as new issues come into play. This could be described in 
similar terms to that used by Exworthy and Powell (2008), as a little window within a 
big window, when the big window is, as described previously, opened because of the 
election process. Once the election is over the new administration comes under 
pressure from new and different sources to reprioritise and consider new issues. It is 
a time when a new administration may need to take stock and rapidly reconsider 
priorities as new problems and issues become known, before finalising their agenda, 
bringing the streams back together to produce a new policy output (the mayoral 
agenda). 
 
In this chapter I explore the issues that immediately came to the fore once the new 
administration was in place after the election in Bristol: election priorities and 
mandate; existing policies and council agenda; and the role of partnership working. 
This incorporates information from the candidates and the influencers, to provide a 
complete picture of this part of the process. 
 
 
7.1  A Change of Administration  
Once elected, the decision process seems to be a balance of delivering on electoral 
promises, responding to short-term changes in public opinion, policy legacies and 
existing policy commitments as well as responding to new problems as they emerge 
(Froio et al, 2016). In Bristol, for example, the extent of the budget challenge became 
more obvious after the election, but both C2 (now the new mayor) and M1 (now the 
Cabinet Member for Homes) were very clear about sticking to their pre-election 
commitments and pledges and not getting distracted from their carefully constructed 
party agenda on housing which forms part of the overall institutional agenda. 
 
From a campaign point of view, it was clear that the pre-election process was just 
the beginning of the lobbying. Once the election was over, the NFA campaign 
continued, but this time with the person who instigated it actually becoming a more 
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visible figure. The policy entrepreneur at the centre of the NFA campaign was very 
clear about needing to keep the campaign going and continuing to influence the 
agenda. 
 
“No Fixed Abode Bristol will provide the platform and the opportunity for those 
seeking your vote to say how they will fix things. Once they are elected No 
Fixed Abode Bristol will continue to be here to make sure that they live up to 
the promises that they have made.” (INF2T, December 2015) 
 
Within the first few days of the Cabinet Member for Homes being announced, the 
policy entrepreneur behind the NFA campaign had secured a meeting with him, 
which I was invited to attend as an observer. During that meeting he was able to 
reinforce all the main points of the campaign, highlighting where the barriers and 
sticking points were with the council and securing information on empty sites and 
buildings that he had been trying to get from the council for a couple of years. He 
was also then invited to further meetings and to be part of a group of experts 
supporting and helping the Cabinet Member on an ongoing basis. The main 
influencer behind the NFA campaign explained his approach to me when we met just 
after the election for a chat: 
 
“The post-election period will be just as important in terms of influence. We 
will be working on assessing delivery and action, as well as holding the new 
Mayor to account for commitments made during the election and see if the 
barriers can be removed.” (INF3P, May 2016) 
 
“After the election we’ll employ someone to lobby to get commitments to 
action. This is just as important as the pre-election campaign, we need to be 
able to follow it through and keep the pressure on. I’ll be meeting the Mayor 
and his Cabinet Member to keep things going.” (INF3P, May 2016) 
 
The MfH campaign were also one of the groups that M1 met with shortly after the 
election, although the make-up of that meeting was mostly housing associations and 
the NHF. The discussion was based around the MfH manifesto and was about 
working in partnership to deliver. This built on some of the earlier discussions that 
took place in the housing roundtables prior to the election, which involved several 
members of the MfH campaign coalition. 
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In July, the person behind the NFA campaign wrote an article in a local online news 
site “More houses and fewer parks might not be bad” identifying the point about 
council owned land, low densities and future opportunities for providing new 
affordable housing. The campaign approach was to keep the pressure on, keep it in 
the public eye and keep challenging the council to work in a different way, using their 
land and properties to deliver new housing. This emphasis was similar to that used 
by the MfH campaign who also identified the need for the council to use their own 
land and properties to deliver new housing. This was reflected in the immediate 
actions of the new administration where the first major announcement made by M1, 
in the first week of his appointment, was to stop any more council land and 
properties being sold until a full review of the options had been undertaken by the 
council.  
 
In the words of M1 just after the election: 
  
“it’s now time to deliver, we need housing associations and others to help us 
and to stick to their promises” (M1T, June 2016) 
 
This was a clear departure from the actions of the previous mayor and administration 
where council homes and land were being sold off as part of council policy. 
 
“It’s all about land and at the moment the approach is to sell. The mentality of 
officers is all about cuts, needing money, selling assets and retreating. 
They’re currently focused on problems rather than solutions. There needs to 
be a strategy, a more holistic approach. There are solutions but by focusing 
on the problem we miss the joined-up thinking to make solutions work” (M1T, 
June 2016) 
 
Election Priorities and Mandate 
With a change of administration there is a further opportunity for new issues to get 
onto the institutional agenda. When taking office, a new Mayor will have to set a new 
agenda. To some extent this comes from the debate, discussion, media attention, 
commitments and pledges made during the election campaign, but it is also 
influenced by a growing level of understanding and realism as the reality of the 
situation takes hold. In the Bristol mayoral election, all candidates had made 
commitments in writing about what their priorities would be post-election. The 
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winning candidate, C2, had set out his party’s agenda in ‘Our Bristol Plan’ with clear 
priorities developed around a number of key themes.  
 
These same priorities were clearly set out once more in C2’s inauguration speech, 
which took place the Monday after the election. C2 took an interesting approach to 
this event. Normally it is something that councillors attend with a few members of the 
public, but this time, C2 decided to make it an event in itself, an opportunity to make 
a statement about his plans and the way forward in a more public arena. The 
inauguration event had been discussed and planned prior to the actual election, 
there was a clear plan for the event, which took place just two days after the election 
result was announced. The same small group that had formalised the ‘Our Bristol 
Plan’ had also worked on what they would do immediately after the election if their 
candidate won. 
 
The inauguration event was planned as an opportunity to clearly set out C2’s agenda 
from the start. It was described to me as being about “inclusivity and diversity” and 
reflecting the approach to city leadership that is needed to make things happen, as 
well as seeking to demonstrate a clear break from the previous administration. The 
audience was a mix of supporters, party members, key stakeholders and partners, 
business and community representatives. It was held at the Bristol Museum (M 
Shed) away from City Hall, with around 200 people attending.  
 
C2, the new mayor, started with the following comments: 
 
“I was reminded today of the need for a big vision. What story do we want the 
city to live? For my part I believe that story should be one in which Bristol 
becomes a city that has no areas that rank among the top 10% deprived in 
the UK. Children get off to the best possible start in life, we break the link 
between economic background and educational attainment and we are known 
as a city that produces leaders. We break the link between wealth and health, 
and have the healthiest population and workforce in Europe. We meet the 
challenge of doing development in a way that reduces inequality and makes 
the city more not less affordable.” (C2P - New Mayor’s Swearing in Speech, 
transcript of author’s own recording, 9th May 2016) 
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He then talked about the type of leadership that was needed and introduced the idea 
of the ‘City Office’ to widen the leadership role beyond the council to the city as a 
whole, working in partnership with others: 
 
“.... city leadership must be understood as a collective endeavour.... Desmond 
Tutu talks about Ubuntu, the African concept that ‘I am because you are’. I 
suggest this is as true for the city institutions and sectors as it is for individuals 
and communities. This is not a command and control leadership. It is 
convene, ask and serve...... And so, I ask you to tell me what you need from 
me as an individual, as a mayor and what do you need from the city council. 
What do you need from us that will enable you to flourish? If I can support you 
to flourish, Bristol wins. That’s why under my leadership I want to set up a City 
Office in which I hope you will all play a full part.” (C2P - New Mayor’s 
Swearing in Speech, transcript of author’s own recording, 9th May 2016) 
 
He also took the opportunity to clearly outline his priorities, with housing featuring 
strongly as an issue: 
 
“This is the only way we will be able to exploit the opportunities and tackle the 
challenges we must tackle on route to making our vision for a better Bristol 
real. This includes building the new homes the city desperately needs; making 
our urban spaces cleaner, greener and congestion free, tackling the 
inequalities that exist between different parts of the city, rolling back the child 
poverty that is blighting so many young lives and creating decently paid jobs 
and meaningful careers for our young people. Only together can we build a 
better Bristol.” (C2P - New Mayor’s Swearing in Speech, transcript of author’s 
own recording, 9th May 2016) 
 
The theme of partnership was at the heart of what C2 had to say as he invited others 
to the stage to outline the kind of leadership needed in the city to help ‘build a better 
Bristol’. This theme continued in his first speech to Full Council at the end of May, 
which once more outlined his priorities and how these could only be achieved by 
working together: 
 
“Today we are about to start a journey and I am reminded of an African 
proverb, ‘if you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together’... 
the major problems facing Bristol as a city cannot be solved by individual 
organisations, no matter how effective and progressive they may be in their 
own specialist area of operations... If we as a council work in a new way with 
partners we have a unique opportunity to build a better Bristol ... we can 
create an approach to city governance where all partners have a role, and 
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indeed, where all communities in the city can have a role to play. And, 
importantly, where progress is made it benefits the city as a whole.” (C2P, 31st 
May 2016, minutes of full council meeting) 
 
The manifesto commitments made by C2 prior to the election continued to be the 
focus for their attention afterwards. M1 made it clear that his focus was on delivery 
and doing things differently. He also took the opportunity to reiterate the priorities for 
housing as set out in the manifesto. When I interviewed him just two weeks after his 
appointment as a cabinet member, he outlined the following immediate priorities 
(part of his decision agenda and the Mayoral agenda) that he would be working to: 
 
“I’ve identified the following as priorities from the Bristol Plan, these are the 
things we will seek to address immediately. There’s building new homes and 
as much affordable housing as possible with the council itself building some 
as well as enabling others... We’re sticking to our pledge to build 2,000 new 
homes per year by 2020, with 800 of those affordable... Improving housing 
quality is another priority particularly in the private rented sector. Creating 
balanced communities, we talked a lot about this before the election, it’s not 
just about housing...we need to look at allocations policy and rationing of 
housing... There’s also homelessness, that’s a priority and something we 
need to focus on.” (M1T, June 2016) 
 
The discussion of how to deliver these commitments was based on collaboration and 
working in partnership with the council taking the lead by committing to using its own 
land and property to deliver new homes. He also began his role as cabinet member 
by actively touring the city, visiting different wards with the local councillors to identify 
sites, owned by the council, with the potential for housing development.  
 
The other priority C2 and M1 acted upon quickly was to bring tenants together at The 
Big Housing Conversation, in early September 2016, with the aim to enable tenants 
“to contribute to setting priorities for the housing agenda locally whilst sharing stories 
about your experiences of renting in Bristol” (CW – as described in the email invite to 
the event, Sept 2016). At this meeting a series of priorities relating to the private 
rented sector were identified as well as issues raised by council tenants, these 
included the need for more social housing, concerns about homelessness, the poor 
condition of private rented housing and concerns about changes to the welfare 
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system. A follow up meeting was held in March 2017 to identify further priorities for 
action. 
 
It was very clear to me that immediately after the election both C2 and M1 were 
absolutely committed to the priorities they had identified before the election and were 
keen not to get side-tracked away from them. They quickly moved from their party 
agenda to their mayoral agenda making it clear which items from the broader 
institutional agenda would be acted upon. 
 
Existing Policies and Council Agenda 
The setting of priorities, alongside the full written plan outlining vision and objectives, 
served to set a clear agenda for the election and the immediate post-election period. 
However, as soon as C2 took office, he was immediately hit with a series of briefings 
from senior officers of the council, outlining what they thought the priorities should be 
and setting out their own carefully developed 100-day plan. This plan included officer 
priorities and immediate issues that needed to be addressed, including some 
commitments made by the previous administration. There seemed to be an inbuilt 
inertia and a culture amongst officers that was trying to carry on as usual, according 
to their own with little recognition that there was a new administration with their own 
plan. This process was explained to me as follows by the new mayor and cabinet 
member for homes: 
 
“In the first week, before I was announced as the Cabinet Member for Homes 
and Communities, we had a briefing on housing issues, with me, [C2] and key 
officers. They talked about the housing strategy and other documents that 
[C1] had approved. It didn’t look like they had even looked at our Plan. They 
came with a business as usual type approach. So, we took them through our 
manifesto section on housing and told them that’s what we’re doing.” (M1T, 
June 2016) 
 
“Council officers were initially quite defensive, they had their plan, a 100-day 
plan for decisions that needed to be taken. They wanted to bombard us with 
lists of what they were doing and what needed to be done. They clearly hadn’t 
done their homework on looking at our Manifesto. I had to point them towards 
it and say those are our priorities, read it.” (C2P, June 2016) 
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Some officers were a little more welcoming of the Bristol Plan and seemed glad that 
they had some clear, written priorities to work from: 
 
“It’s great to have some clarity about objectives and policy but we do need to 
be careful not to jump in to particular solutions, like the housing company, 
which may not be the answer. But it is great to have a lot more clarity, with the 
Bristol Plan... their manifesto having quite a lot on housing, their priorities are 
very clear.” (BC1T, June 2016) 
 
This clarity of objectives and constant mantra of ‘we’re sticking to our Plan’ was 
reinforced with some immediate decisions to change policy made by both C2 and 
M1. In terms of housing this was done with a very quick decision to amend the 
council’s approach to the sale of council homes, where the previous decision to 
auction properties was reversed and a halt on all sales was put in place. I 
interviewed M1 two weeks after his appointment and he made clear to me that 
changes would be made quickly where needed: 
 
“I’ve already made an important announcement on land and buildings, and 
stopped any more being sold off until we have to... I’ve constantly reminded 
officers about Our Bristol Plan, and the priorities we set out there.” (M1T, June 
2016) 
 
He also outlined some of these early actions in an article in The Guardian34 as 
quoted below (2-6-16): 
 
“We have taken quick action to tackle our inheritance. Eighty hectares of land 
were removed from the marketplace, and auctions of council homes deemed 
too expensive to repair have been halted. We intend to use our assets more 
creatively, establishing our own development arm to provide a range of 
housing for sale, rent and shared ownership. Rather than leave homes empty, 
we want to work with charities to refurbish properties that can be used to 
provide specialist provision, or returned to council management.” (M1CW, 
June 2016) 
 
He also commented about the culture of the council and how officers seemed to 






“There’s a capacity issue with officers, they’re currently focused on problems 
rather than solutions, just trouble shooting with no real strategy. Their 
response to problems is negative rather than seeking positive solutions. For 
example, the changes to HRA35 and rent cuts have led to a likely deficit in 
HRA in a year or so. The officer solutions to this have been entirely negative, 
such as, stop building processes, reduce repair standards, spend less on 
relets. There’s nothing positive at all.” (M1T, June 2016) 
 
There were some officers who seemed to be on board with the new messages and 
broadly welcomed the change in policy approach made clear in comments made by 
C2 and M1. They were also very positive about the priority being given to housing: 
 
 “Using land and property to deliver priorities is a shift in approach; land has 
always been used as a means to make money. Now the push is for it to help 
us deliver housing. It’s a critical shift of thinking in terms of the way we do 
things. There’s a key issue there about best return even where other priorities 
are being met. It could make a big difference.” (BC1P, July 2016) 
 
“We’re expecting significant change in the way housing is viewed now under 
the new Mayor. I think having a cabinet member with a sole focus on housing 
for me is massively helpful. There’s already been some policy changes, as I 
am sure you are aware, in terms of the auction, then there have been more 
changes. [C2] has been very clear, as has [M1], about putting a hold on 
selling off any properties. I totally get it, if you are a member of the public and 
you see us selling council houses that looks like a scandalous thing to do. But 
I guess in terms of our HRA and trying to build some more housing then 
obviously things that are too expensive to repair or bring up to standard, we 
have been selling in order to put the money into new build. That’s now 
stopped, clearly [C2] doesn’t want to do that, so that policy has already 
changed, we won’t be doing that.” (BC2T, May 2016) 
 
“I think in terms of everywhere that [C2] has been and spoken, he’s 
mentioned housing, so it feels like a real priority. The fact that there’s a whole 
chapter in the Bristol Plan that talks about housing, absolutely it’s a priority. 
It’s very clearly a priority, it’s spoken about everywhere and we’ve got the 
cabinet member with an exclusive focus on housing.” (BC1P, July 2016) 
 
“It feels, you know, [M1] has got really clear views about things, and it’s 
actually really helpful and I’m sure there’ll be some challenges in that, but yes, 
that’s a good place to start.” (BC2T, May 2016) 
 
35 Housing Revenue Account 
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The same officers whilst being supportive about clarity and direction and welcoming 
of the priority being given to housing, were also quick to mention the existing council 
policy and strategy on housing, the Homes Board set up by the previous mayor and 
how changes in policy were being made quickly, perhaps too quickly, without 
thinking through the impacts. They seemed to be hanging on to policies and 
strategies that they had clearly spent time on and were supportive of, despite the fact 
that these may have different priorities and approaches to that outlined by C2: 
 
“We’ve got the new Homes Board that [C1] set up, and we’ve got the housing 
strategy ‘more than a roof’, which is there. A lot of work went into that, and I 
think it meets with [C2’s] idea of partnership and it not just being about the 
council. We’ve got other schemes and projects that we need to continue with, 
like the landlord scheme we are rolling out, some of the work on 
homelessness started by [C1], the licensing scheme... all these things need to 
keep happening.” (BC2T, May 2016) 
 
 “A lot of our members on scrutiny saw housing companies as the answer, but 
when you start asking to do what, people aren’t clear. What we are trying to 
say to C2 and M1 is yes, we should explore that model but we have to be 
really clear about what it should do. We can’t just see it as the answer, not on 
its own it’s not.” (BC1P, July 2016) 
 
“I slightly worry with C2, as I did with C1, that I don’t want us to jump to one 
conclusion and one solution because it’s there and because everyone is 
talking about a housing crisis. We need to make sure, and need to make it 
work, and put some pace to it, but ensure we have explored all the 
possibilities, and we get the right thing for Bristol rather than anything for 
Bristol.” (BC2T, May 2016) 
 
Early in the new administration it also became clear that the budget situation was 
even worse than anticipated and previous anticipated savings had not been 
achieved so bigger budget cuts would be needed. The full picture did not become 
clear until September/ October 2016 when C2 announced the level of cuts that would 
be needed - £92m over the next five years. This was both a reflection of the national 
situation and policy on austerity that has hit local government particularly hard (see 
Lowndes & Gardner, 2016; Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012; Bailey et al, 2015) and the 
situation locally where the previous administration had failed to deliver the level of 
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savings required in previous years, thus leaving a bigger budget gap than 
anticipated. 
 
In December, C2 produced his Corporate Strategy outlining how these cuts would be 
achieved, by which time the total had risen to over £100m. When I talked to C2 and 
M1 in late 2016 and early 2017, they both made clear that they were determined to 
stick to their agenda despite these cuts and the potential distraction they could 
cause. Indeed, given the scale of cuts and the pressure to deliver it is easy to see 
how this could become all-consuming as an issue and take over from previously 
agreed priorities. 
 
“We have more work to do than we thought but whatever happens we have to 
focus on our top priorities and deliver on our seven commitments, including 
our promise to build 2,000 new homes in the city every year by 2020. We 
need partners, volunteers and others to take on services they want to keep 
and help us deliver some of the services that are needed. We can’t be all 
things to all people any more, there’s a different role for local councils now.” 
(C2P, January 2017) 
 
“We can’t get distracted by other things; we have to stick to what we said. We 
engaged with people and set priorities; we now need to deliver on those. We 
have a very clear agenda, which officers will try to steer us away from, but 
we’re determined to stay focused and keep reminding them that this is what 
we’re doing.” (M1T, October 2016) 
 
Working in Partnership 
One of the early decisions on partnership working was taken within the context of the 
City Office, an idea first suggested by C2 when he stood for election in 2012. The 
City Office was also part of C2’s campaign in 2015/16 and was cemented into policy 
in his inauguration speech. The City Office was proposed as a new way of working:  
 
“The concept of the city office is about bringing key stakeholders and 
organisations together from across the city to develop solutions to the issues 
that matter most, issues that to date we have failed to adequately address. 
The core proposition at the heart of the city office is to take us toward a 
fundamentally different way of working together and applying collective 
resources to the challenges we face... The city office is unique in that its long-
term aim is to change the way we do things and the way we apply our 
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collective resources... taking a truly total place approach to city development.” 
(CW - Outline document on City Office36, May 2016) 
 
The first formal meeting of the City Office wider partnership group took place in July 
2016, but prior to this, even before the election, a small group had been meeting with 
C2 to develop the idea. Indeed, I had been involved in a number of individual 
discussions on the idea with C2 as far back as the summer of 2015. I was also part 
of the small group that first met informally in January 2016, with a couple of further 
meetings before the election, then a series of meetings immediately afterwards to 
develop the concept fully before a public launch in September 2016. The July 
partnership meeting was the first opportunity to introduce the concept properly to a 
wider audience and engage in a debate more publicly about the idea. At this meeting 
stakeholders talked about priorities and began to identify the main issues around 
which the city office could make a difference. In the roundtable discussion I chaired, 
the debate soon focused on affordable housing, homelessness and poverty. This 
discussion was followed by another meeting in September 2016, which saw the 
public launch of the city office. 
 
A group of stakeholders had also been brought together after the first City Office 
partnership meeting in July to discuss the challenge of homelessness. The 
conclusion of that meeting was that building on existing partnerships was important 
as many different stakeholders were providing services for the homeless but that 
greater coordination was needed. Their recommendation back to the city office and 
the launch meeting in September was that: 
 
“there would be real merit in presenting this as a key ask of the new city 
office. There’s a need for immediate project-based work (e.g. Level 1 and 2 
for rough sleepers) but within the context of developing a strategic plan aimed 
at: 
• Increasing accommodation/housing supply at all levels; 
• Ensuring we create the right type of accommodation/housing to build 
community; and  
 
36 This was a document I was involved in helping to write but was not made public. Some of the 
information was included in a blog I wrote about the city office for the Policy Studies Blog site, 
available:  https://policystudies.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/2016/10/04/the-bristol-city-office/  
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• Overcoming the obvious ‘bottlenecks’ at each stage, and longer-term 
Level 5 housing in particular.” 
(CW - Housing Provision for the Homeless, meeting notes July 2016) 
 
At the September meeting two key projects were identified for action, one of which 
was about bringing key stakeholders together to tackle homelessness. The fact that 
housing featured as the first major initiative for the city office to address was 
significant. It had been raised at all the initial informal discussions I was involved in 
and at the wider partnership meeting in July (sometimes by myself, but often by 
others). Homelessness in particular was raised as an issue that could benefit from a 
more joined-up, coordinated approach and where the city office could make a major 
contribution to bringing people together to address this as an issue of concern. 
Following the September meeting a project group was brought together to develop 
solutions and actions to address homelessness. This is a further example of how 
housing was a real priority for the new administration and how it filtered through into 
their overall approach to change. 
 
Beyond the city office, there were meetings between C2, M1 and other influencers 
specifically on housing issues. The success of these policy entrepreneurs to some 
extent rested on their ability to attract and maintain attention, and to stay involved in 
the discussions over quite a long period of time. They needed to be persistent with 
their efforts, have access to the candidates, mayor and cabinet members and more 
importantly they had to appear credible (Knaggård, 2015:462). Both of the main 
campaign groups/coalitions achieved this during the election process, they were 
there constantly to remind the decision makers of the issues they were concerned 
about, they told a well-developed story, which evolved over time and they 
represented credible and influential organisations and individuals. They were there 
after the election with solutions as well as a constant reminder of the key issues and 






This post-election period, with a new administration, is identified by Kingdon (1984) 
as an important opportunity for policy change. The discussion above suggests that 
whilst there is a window of opportunity that opens as a result of a new administration, 
it is a smaller window than the previous agenda window, where much of the work on 
policy priorities was undertaken and an initial party or institutional agenda was set 
just before the election took place. This smaller window, the decision window, opens 
briefly as new influences become relevant and new ideas, pressures and constraints 
are introduced by council officers.  
 
Overall, the constant reference to the Bristol Plan (their party agenda) and the 
repetition of the commitments and priorities by C2 and M1 has been critical in 
ensuring a focus on their own identified priorities in their party agenda. The new 
administration, during my research, up to the end of their first one hundred days, had 
continued with their determination not to be distracted by events. They remained 
clear about their priorities and made a number of quick policy changes to reinforce 
this and to demonstrate their new approach. They listened to others and worked in 
partnership to deliver change. The influencers remained visible, front and back 
stage, constantly reminding the new leadership of the issues and solutions, and 
offering to help deliver.  
 
After an initial divergence the streams were brought back together with the 
restatement of priorities and commitments and the window closed after new issues 
and existing commitments had been raised and either responded to or ignored, when 











Figure 12: The Decision Window: Bristol Mayoral Election 
Source: author’s own diagram 
 
The next chapter provides a discussion of the main findings from my research 
drawing closer links with the existing literature relating to the MSF and how this 
worked in helping to explain agenda setting during the mayoral election in Bristol. 
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8.0 DISCUSSION  
 
The aim of this chapter is to draw together the main findings from my research and 
demonstrate links to the existing literature. The first part is an exploration of the 
agenda setting process during the mayoral election. It focuses on how the opening of 
two predictable windows provided opportunities for change and how particular issues 
made it onto the mayoral agenda. It addresses how political manifestos are 
developed, how priorities are decided and how candidates prioritised their 
engagement with different actors. Attention then turns to the role and characteristics 
of the influencers, the policy entrepreneurs, identified during the election process. 
The discussion focuses on what tactics, strategies and attributes contribute to the 
success of a policy entrepreneur and how these are illustrated by my research.  
 
 
8.1  The Agenda Setting Process 
My research explored agenda setting during a local election. It began by using a 
revised version of Kingdon’s MSF as a starting point for discussion on agenda 
setting before, during and after the election, to identify how agendas were set, who 
influenced what and how. The story that emerged detailed how mayoral candidates 
decided their priorities, who they spoke to and listened to. It identified the 
influencers, their tactics, and at the end of it all, after initial priorities were set out and 
the election was over, it highlights what made it onto the policy agenda of the new 
mayor and the council. The story is about local agenda setting where policy 
prioritisation and change were prompted by the mayoral election providing two 
predictable windows of opportunity, big and small, for change to happen. 
 
It is not a simple story, it is built around a range of different influences that are formal 
and informal, covert and overt, direct and indirect. It is difficult to piece these 
together in a timeline or coherent and logical manner, as the process at times 
appeared to be anything but linear. At other times it seemed to follow a clear 
sequence of events, with clear objectives and outcomes. It was also a messy 
process involving different people and organisations at different times and one that in 
the end appeared to come down to personalities and individual preferences and 
beliefs, as much as it did evidence, identified need and the viability of solutions.  
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This story is unusual in that it is based on two predictable windows, prompted by the 
mayoral election, with local policy entrepreneurs waiting for the election in order to 
ignite their campaign. The run up to the election changed the dynamic, away from 
stability, to provide what Howlett (1998) calls a ‘routine political window’ where 
election dates are set in advance as part of the administrative calendar (in this case 
every 4 years). 
 
My research identified two windows, an agenda window and a decision window, as 
suggested by Herweg et al (2015). The agenda window opens in the politics stream 
as a result of the election being called and continues until the election takes place. 
After the election a further smaller window, the decision window, opens as the new 
administration is formed and different influences come into play. The process I 
outline below, and illustrate in Figure 13, demonstrates what happened during the 
Bristol mayoral election, where there was a predictable window and clear time 
constraints, where policy entrepreneurs have had time to anticipate and prepare for 
their engagement in the process. 
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Figure 13: Agenda Setting in the Bristol Mayoral Election 2016 
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The Agenda Window 
My research identified the process as beginning during an open window in the 
politics stream created by the election timetable itself as the election campaigning 
began in earnest. The problem and policy streams were seen to work in parallel and 
to some degree in sequence, in a process of issue identification, problem definition 
and ideas development. These seemed to go hand in hand, as problems were 
defined and solutions identified together by the same actors. 
 
The initial stages involved the identification and promotion of issues through different 
but connected processes which brought them to the attention of the candidates. One 
was through external influence: the use of evidence and information provided by 
individuals and groups reinforced through public and media attention and quite 
clever framing of the problems. The other was through party processes: roundtables, 
discussions and meetings arranged by the candidates and party members (or in the 
case of C1, supporters rather than members). 
 
Once the issues had been identified the process moved on to policy formation and 
policy selection where a large number of policy solutions were subsequently 
narrowed down to a short list of possible policy proposals, moving from the public 
systemic agenda to the institutional or party agenda and then finally to the mayoral 
decision agenda. This process occurred during the agenda window and led to the 
first identification of priorities in the form of the manifesto, or party agenda, produced 
by each of the main candidates before the election. This process can be lengthy 
under normal circumstances, with an initial softening up taking place over many 
months and even years (Herweg et al, 2018) but, as my research demonstrates, the 
time constraints imposed by an election mean this process occurs at a much quicker 
rate and is far more concentrated. 
 
Some of the candidates also set up their own focus groups and meetings to gather 
evidence, to discuss issues and challenges and identify problems. C2 established 
three stakeholder roundtable discussions and a Housing Policy Group (HPG1) set up 
for party members to engage in the debate. C2 also met with individuals from 
national think tanks, MPs and other experts to gather information on key housing 
issues and potential solutions. He and I had regular conversations about what he 
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was learning from this process, what the extent of the problem was, and how this 
could be used in Bristol to provide solutions to the housing challenges facing the city.  
 
Whilst this process involved both party members and non-party members it soon 
became clear that at times it was party interests that dominated the final formation 
and selection of priorities, as this took place in party meetings and within the small 
Advisory Group made up of party members. The institutional context of party politics 
was important, with set rules about engagement with members and councillors 
influencing how decisions were made (Jennings et al, 2011). To some extent C2 had 
tried to amend this process to include a wider group of stakeholders, which itself 
caused some consternation within the local party and was held back to some extent 
by formal and informal party rules. His frustration at this was evident throughout; 
indeed he more than any of the others involved in the campaign seemed more willing 
to seek external views and to work with a trusted few to develop ideas and solutions, 
rather than work through normal, agreed party processes. Despite this, the role of 
the local party was still evident: with the final document was drawn up by M1 (on the 
basis of information collected throughout the process) and the final decision on what 
was included was taken by a small group overseeing the campaign (working with 
C2). For C1, a non-party candidate, the process was much less organised and 
involved supporters and a smaller campaign group, but was also focused more on 
existing achievements and the existing agenda of the council.  
 
This stage of the process was a particularly important part of the election process in 
Bristol and demonstrates the significance of activity in the agenda window. My 
research demonstrates that, in the Bristol case at least, the pre-election campaign 
stage is of primary importance when defining problems, and developing and 
selecting solutions. The opportunity for input to the manifestos and action plans of 
the different candidates took place at this stage, during the agenda window, where 
priorities were set in writing in the party agenda before the election. 
 
Whilst each candidate went through a different process, and involved different 
people, they did all produced something prior to the election itself outlining their 
priorities. This varied in terms of detail and approach, but nonetheless all the main 
candidates had a written party agenda published between February and April 2015. 
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As suggested by Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) this ‘party system agenda’ 
is a balance of party concerns and ideology, and public and media attention and, in 
this case, I would add to this the evidence and information provided by experts and 
influencers, as illustrated by my research.  
 
The key housing policy commitments contained in these party agendas were 
outlined in Chapter 6, Table 9, whilst the overall housing issues raised were 
identified in Table 8 in that chapter. What is interesting are the issues that were 
raised but did not make it onto the agenda compared to the issues that did. Table 10 
provides a brief outline of the housing issues raised that made it onto the shortlist of 
priorities in the party agendas of the main candidates.  
 
Table 10: Housing Issues and the Party Agenda 
Issues included in party agendas Issues not included/fully addressed in 
party agendas  
• Lack of social and affordable housing 
• Increasing homelessness and pressure 
on support services 
• Lack of new housing construction 
• Private rented sector – cost, security, 
quality 
• Make better use of council owned land 
and property 
• Work with local communities to develop 
local housing schemes 
• Support self-build and self-finish housing 
options  
• Plan for housing growth positively 
• Set up council owned/arm’s length 
company to deliver social and affordable 
housing 
• Increase the number of night shelters 
and provide additional temporary 
accommodation 
• Introduce city wide landlord licensing 
scheme 
• Promote and roll out Ethical Lettings 
Charter 
• Address the backlog of housing benefit 
claims 
• Problems of gentrification 
• Number of empty homes in Bristol 
• Lack of engagement with tenants 
• Poor mix of housing and low density on 
outer estates 
• Insufficient land made available for self-
build and community housing schemes 
• Showcase modular build affordable 
housing 
• Improve range of move on options from 
supported housing 
• Introduce local lettings policies 
• Better enforcement of existing powers in 
relation to PRS 
 
Source: author’s own analysis 
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The table is a mixture of problems and solutions as these were often raised at the 
same time during the same discussions. This demonstrates that many of the issues 
raised did actually make it onto the agenda of one or more of the candidates. The 
issues that did not were related to national issues and requiring national legislation, 
were referred to but not fully addressed, or were not specifically mentioned in initial 
documentation.  
 
During this process of deciding party agendas all three streams as identified by the 
MSF were active, as the streams were brought together to attach problems to 
solutions in a way that was politically acceptable. The activity of the policy 
entrepreneurs at this point was potentially important, as both main campaigns sought 
to provide solutions to the perceived problems and to keep housing issues firmly on 
the agenda of the candidates.  
 
The solutions promoted were focused largely on issues within the council’s control, 
so were broadly feasible and within the resource constraints of the council. One of 
the main solutions proposed to the affordability and homelessness problems in 
Bristol was focused on improving the use of council land and property to increase the 
supply of new and affordable homes. There was relatively common agreement 
amongst the candidates that setting up a council owned company to oversee the 
provision of new homes was an essential part of the solution. It seemed to be a 
ready-made solution, where a process of ‘softening-up’ had already taken place as 
different proposals for a council owned housing company had been made by 
different groups over the previous year. This corresponds to the suggestion by 
Herweg et al (2015:23) that policy proposals can be developed over a number of 
years before achieving traction. The solutions that made it into the Manifesto 
commitments of the main candidates varied, but there was some degree of 
consensus about the use of council land and property, the creation a council owned 
housing company, and the adoption of similar targets for new and affordable homes 
as set out by the MfH campaign. 
 
It became clear even at this stage that solutions were focused on what the council 
was perceived to be able to influence and that had some resonance with the 
candidates, supporting the suggestion by Kingdon (1984:131) and Herweg et al, 
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(2015:24) that solutions need to be feasible and viable, as well as politically 
acceptable. For example, whilst there was some discussion at some of the party 
group meetings about the impact of welfare changes, there was little that the council 
could do to influence these issues, so potential actions relating to these matters were 
largely left out of policy commitments or reduced to what the council itself could do to 
improve things locally. Another example that came from some of the political 
discussions and that was raised at the housing hustings was the proposal that rent 
controls should be introduced. Whilst this received some political support it was also 
accepted that currently this was not possible under national legislation and was 
therefore not included as a policy proposal in the manifestos. There also seemed to 
be an element of competition about the policy proposals included in the manifestos, 
as suggested by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009): with the main parties responded 
to each other’s platforms and commitments, in particular in relation to the inclusion of 
firm commitments to setting up a council owned housing company and setting 
housing targets.  
 
The focus on building more homes, whilst offered as a solution to the housing crisis 
and the problem of homelessness, on its own was unlikely to tackle the issues raised 
other than potentially in the long term. However, solving rough sleeping, 
homelessness and the housing crisis in the short term are complex and difficult, so 
simple, quick and easy manifesto commitments are unlikely to address this 
complexity. This point frustrated a number of the candidates, as they felt the detail of 
the discussions was lost in the need for brevity in manifesto commitments and 
documents. The inclusion of policies and targets on building more homes seemed to 
be a response to public and influencer concern and evidence, as well as party 
ideology. It was also included by C2 as a response to the perceived lack of action by 
the previous mayor. This echoes a point made by Rogoff and Sibert (1988): party 
platforms seek to reverse reforms and provide alternative solutions to those of the 
previous administration and emphasise issues where they have identified a 
perceived weakness in their opponents. 
 
This initial agenda window provided an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to raise 
issues, promote their own projects and solutions, and for the media to focus attention 
on particular issues, all in an attempt to influence the political agenda of the 
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candidates. As the process moved closer to the election, these issues and problems 
were further refined into manifesto pledges and promises, and formalised into the 
written policy of each candidate and party through a policy selection process. The 
issues that made it onto this agenda were a combination of ideological and political 
commitments and issues that had been the subject of public and media attention, as 
well as those that seemed viable and achievable. At various points in this process, 
policy entrepreneurs and other stakeholders were able to influence the agenda by 
promoting their own issues and ideas, providing evidence, framing an issue to attract 
attention and linking to other issues that were the focus of attention.  
 
The Decision Window 
Once the election was over, and the new administration formed, there appeared to 
be a further opportunity for influence and change to the previously formed party 
agenda as a new window of opportunity opened. This led to a divergence of the 
streams as they were pushed apart as new processes began and new ideas, 
opportunities and challenges presented themselves. This resulted from a new set of 
influences, as identified by Froio et al (2017), some of which related to election 
promises, whilst others were formed as a result of new pressures, policy legacies 
and the existing agenda of the senior officers of the council. Party concerns and 
manifesto commitments were still relevant, but were brought together with new 
problems, existing commitments, the executive agenda and what remained on the 
public systemic agenda. These elements competed for attention and were 
particularly relevant as a new administration was formed. The competition between 
issues was a key factor here, as the new mayor and his cabinet formed new 
agendas and committed to policy change. This finding sits well with the work of 
Jennings et al (2011) who suggest that when a new administration is formed there 
are shifting priorities as scarce institutional and cognitive resources mean limited 
issues can be earmarked for attention, so different influences come into play. 
 
At this point it also became clear that a new set of policy entrepreneurs were 
entering the arena, that is the council officers who pushed their own agenda, 
bringing new information and evidence to the forefront alongside new priorities and 
existing commitments. It was at this stage that the senior officers of the council tried 
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to put forward their own agenda, with the Chief Executive having clearly identified a 
100-day plan for the new mayor to consider. This included existing commitments 
made during the previous mayor’s administration, pressing issues as identified by 
the executive and a number of projects that had not gained support from the 
previous mayor but officers were keen to pursue. It appeared that the new mayor 
might find himself locked into commitments made by the previous administration. 
Officers were pushing their own agenda, much of which was based on existing 
commitments and plans, with policy legacies potentially having a constraining rather 
than enabling effect (see Ellerman, 2014, and Wright, 2012, for a discussion of the 
potential significance of policy legacies in determining policy).  
 
New information and new constraints were also introduced at this stage of the 
process pushing new problems onto the agenda leading to the need for balance 
between election mandates and these new agenda items (Jennings et al, 2011:9). 
The extent of the council’s budget deficit became clearer as more work was done to 
establish what savings had been made and what commitments were unlikely to be 
delivered on. This left the new mayor with a much greater budget problem than 
originally anticipated from the limited information available to him prior to the 
election. In addition, officers were able to provide more detail on schemes and 
initiatives that had already been tried, the extent of the barriers to delivery and some 
of the problems they were experiencing with such initiatives.  
 
The officer agenda was a mixture of previous commitments and officer priorities. For 
example, whilst the previous mayor’s priorities included homelessness and new build 
housing, the officer agenda was more technical and focused on bureaucratic issues, 
such as council policy on voids, changes to the housing band system and the 
introduction of discretionary licensing of landlords. In addition, they were concerned 
to ensure that partnership structures like the Homes Board set up by the previous 
mayor continued to operate. There was also some resistance to some of the policies 
in the new mayor’s manifesto, such as the idea of setting up an arm’s length housing 
company. Officers questioned what this was for and whether the politicians were 
clear about what it would achieve. The refrain from the officers seemed to be that 
there had been some good discussions previously with Scrutiny and the Homes 
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Commission and that there was no shortage of ideas about what needed to be done 
and that much of this was a good starting point for action.  
 
What the senior officers appeared to be missing was any reference to the political 
agenda of the new mayor and the commitments made during the election campaign. 
It became evident that the politicians were being bombarded by all this new 
information with the existing administration keen to see their agenda maintained, 
whether or not it met with the priorities of the new mayor. This was the cause of 
initial friction between the officers and the politicians until the new mayor was able to 
confirm these commitments and establish them as priorities, through a process of 
constant repetition and reinforcement.  
 
There was quite a battle initially, with officers providing extensive information of 
existing commitments and things that needed to be continued, and politicians 
pushing back with new priorities and political commitments. Whilst there was some 
overlap between the two, there were also significant differences. The approach 
adopted by the new mayor and the cabinet member for homes was to remind officers 
of their manifesto commitments and to continually repeat these as their priorities, 
until eventually officers understood that the politicians were actually going to adhere 
to those commitments and use them as the basis for initial policy change. It was at 
this point that the cabinet member for homes also took some quick decisions on key 
priority areas to demonstrate publicly that there would be a change of approach. He 
immediately stopped the sale of some existing council houses and withdrew the 
catalogue of public land for sale until these had been reviewed and were reworked in 
line with the new administration’s policy on making better use of council owned land 
and property. 
 
Throughout this battle the other policy entrepreneurs were still active challenging the 
officer agenda and the information they were providing, and continuing to push their 
own solutions alongside a reinforcement of what they perceived as the main 
problems and barriers to achieving success. Indeed, this issue was a main part of 
the policy entrepreneurs’ approach, identifying what the perceived barriers were to 
delivering more new homes, barriers that tended to begin with council policy and 
action (or inaction). Whilst there was little direct contact between the council officers 
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and policy entrepreneurs, the policy entrepreneurs were overtly challenging the 
officer agenda and providing alternative policy options, which may have previously 
been ruled out by the executive or previous mayor. 
 
This battleground tended to play out both ‘front’ and ‘back’ stage (Friedman, 1995) 
but with the emphasis on behind the scenes, less public discussion and challenge 
initially, with more public discussion at a later stage. It was a three-way process to 
begin with, with policy entrepreneurs talking to C2 and M1, the politicians then 
talking to officers, and officers pushing back at politicians, with politicians then 
seeking more information and evidence from policy entrepreneurs. There was a 
constant cycle of exchanges but rarely with all three groups around the table at the 
same time. More public debate and front stage discussion took place later in the 
process as the new administration established new forums for discussion. 
 
At the policy development stage there appeared to be a reconfirmation of pre-
election priorities, as well as the development of new policies and the improvement 
of some of the pre-election commitments. As new information and evidence became 
available, as well as additional expertise, policies were refined and reinforced and 
then formed into the mayoral decision agenda of the new administration. According 
to Froio et al (2017), the extent to which this policy agenda differs from the original 
party agenda depends on the balance of attention between electoral promises, 
promises of their opponents, the agenda of the executive and short-term changes in 
public opinion. In my research I looked at the first 100 days after the election, to see 
how election commitments translated into policy and to what extent other influences, 
such as policy legacies, became important.  
 
To some extent the above influences did force C2 and his cabinet to reconsider 
some of their priorities and the extent to which they could deliver on them in the short 
term. In terms of housing issues, it meant M1 had to identify short-term priorities 
from the longer list of issues and develop an initial list of policy changes to be 
prioritised in the first year of the new administration. It did not, however, mean they 
deviated from their election commitments set out in their party agenda, as they were 
keen to maintain these. It just meant some issues were prioritised over others in the 
short term. M1 was very clear about this and was keen to reinforce the message that 
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the priorities set out in their party agenda would form the main part of their policy 
agenda. The priorities that were set for the first year were a mix of those that could 
be achieved in the short term to demonstrate change and action and those that were 
need as the first step in a longer-term process and helped in the short, medium and 
long term to achieve the targets set out in the manifesto. 
 
For example, immediate action was taken by M1 to remove nearly 80 hectares of 
land from the market and to halt the auction of a number of council houses deemed 
too expensive to repair. This was part of a clear manifesto commitment and the 
subject of much debate during the election campaign with C2 proposing to use the 
land more creatively in the future to build new homes. In addition, as a result of an 
initial briefing on the Housing Revenue Account (HRA), M1 focused on the number 
of empty council properties (550) and the number of people in temporary 
accommodation (300+). He asked the officers to look at how they could speed up the 
relets process to turn around more empty homes quicker, as the cost savings on 
speeding up the process and reducing numbers in temporary accommodation would 
more than cover the costs of adding staff to improve the process. His approach was 
developed as a result of his first main briefing and an assessment of the cost to the 
council of the lost rent and council tax income from these properties (£2.7m/year) 
plus the cost of temporary accommodation (£800,000/year)37. 
 
Once the period of reflection, improvement and challenge had taken place, the 
streams seemed to come together again to the point where the new policy agenda 
was finalised. The final point of this process was undertaken formally and informally, 
publicly and privately, as C2 and his colleagues confirmed their priorities and agreed 
the way forward privately in party meetings and in discussions with different 
stakeholders. This was also then confirmed through formal council processes in the 
public arena at council meetings. It was only after ideas had moved through this 
process that the final mayoral decision agenda for the new administration was set. 
The timescale for this was varied, with initial announcements made on policy 
commitments immediately after the election, and some initial decisions taken on 
policy change within weeks of the cabinet members being announced. Other policy 
 
37 Information gained during an interview with M1 (3-6-16) 
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statements and changes were made during the first 100 days of the new 
administration. Figure 14 provides an example of how one particular policy, that of a 
council owned housing company (Goram Homes), made its way through the agenda 




My research demonstrates the importance of the two routine windows of opportunity 
created by the election process, and how this provided the opportunity for policy 
change. It illustrates how priorities are developed quickly, in a period of tight time 
constraints prior to the election, and then reconfirmed after further discussion and 
involvement after the election.  
 
The election was an invitation to change, providing the opportunity for policy 
entrepreneurs to attract attention to many different problems and solutions as 
candidates sought answers, information, guidance and ideas. There was a 
willingness to engage and discuss issues, an enthusiasm for change and for finding 
new solutions to existing problems. Throughout this process there were further 
opportunities for different stakeholders and lobby groups to influence the policy 
issues that were being considered and ultimately chosen as part of the agenda for 
change. The election brought people together to promote issues and prompted 
different levels of interest all at the same time. People were looking for ways to frame 
problems and promote solutions, and creative and innovative ways of drawing 
attention to issues. After the election the dynamic changed once more, as new 
influencers came onto the scene and there was more limited time to address new 
issues.  
 
A wide range of issues were discussed throughout this process, with vague or high-
level solutions often promoted rather than more detailed suggestions, as manifestos 
and election promises were developed. Those involved in the process frequently 
shared their frustration with the lack of detail and the need to reduce everything to 
what could appear in a manifesto or political action plan. More detailed plans were 
developed after the election as further discussions took place with different groups 
and individuals, both within and outside the party process. 
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Figure 14: The Agenda Setting Process - Goram Homes Example 
 
The story started during a council scrutiny event on housing held in October 2015, before 
the election, where the idea of a council owned company was first discussed as an option 
to help improve the supply of affordable housing within the city. In broad terms one of the 
main recommendations was to consider new delivery arrangements and make better use 
of council land and property. More specifically interest was expressed in having a housing 
company to act as a delivery vehicle, drawing on experience from Birmingham. It then 
took until March 2016 before the report was considered by the mayor, at which point no 
firm commitments were made. Any further consideration was put on hold as a result of the 
upcoming election, but the idea was there, floating around, waiting for the right 
opportunity. 
 
Once the election campaign began, the lack of affordable housing in Bristol was 
highlighted as a major problem, with the main campaign groups and influencers focusing 
on this issue, and candidates recognising it as a priority. As the discussion continued, 
candidates became under pressure to set targets for new build affordable housing delivery 
as influencers in the MfH campaign in particular pushed a numbers target. With the target 
setting came pressure to outline how this would be delivered and how current blockages 
in the council would be overcome. The problem had been identified and solutions were 
beginning to be proposed and assessed. 
 
Both politicians and influencers used the election as an opportunity to bring the idea of a 
council owned company back onto the public systemic agenda, promoting it as part of the 
solution to the lack of affordable housing in the city. This new form of delivery vehicle was 
seen as an opportunity for partnership working to make better use of council assets. This 
particular solution was being matched to one of the main problems identified and began to 
draw the streams together, with specific policy suggestions that met with political approval, 
which were within the remit of the council and were viable as other councils had used a 
similar approach. 
 
By the time election commitments were made in party agendas two candidates specifically 
mentioned setting up a housing company, whilst others were supportive but less direct in 
their election statements. At the housing hustings meeting, just before the election, all five 
of the main candidates clearly stated that they thought setting up a housing company to 
deliver affordable housing on council owned land was something they would support. The 
streams had come together and the idea had made it onto the party agenda of the 
candidates and would stay there until after the election. 
 
Once the election was over, the idea of setting up a housing company gained momentum, 
the mayor and cabinet member took early action, despite some resistance from officers. 
The officers questioned the idea of the arm’s length company, and suggested that 
perhaps it was more of a solution looking for a problem than necessarily being clear what 
it was there to solve. At this point the streams diverged, as potential new ideas were 
brought into play, and existing ideas questioned. But the politicians, backed up by external 
influencers, persisted with the idea and requested options to be developed with a view to 
having a clear proposal for the company by the new year. This brought the streams back 
together, with a clear solution identified and confirmed onto the mayoral decision agenda. 
Whilst it did take longer than originally anticipated the council owned housing company 
(Goram Homes) was finally launched in October 2018, providing the council with greater 
control over development on its own land to increase the delivery of new affordable 




8.2 What makes a successful Policy Entrepreneur? 
This section draws together findings from my research on the role and 
characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, how they operated during the election 
process and the strategies and tactics they used to exert influence. It highlights the 
mechanisms by which advocates of policy change sought to have an influence over 
the candidates.  
 
It is important to remember that policy entrepreneurs operating at a local level are 
constrained by institutional factors. The environment within which local government 
operates is limited and constrained by other levels of government, particularly the 
national level, where ability to address challenges is often hindered by national 
policy. This is certainly the case in relation to many local housing issues, where local 
policy is restricted by national policy or the lack of a particular national policy. As 
Catney and Henneberry (2016:1336) suggest, “Public entrepreneurs operate 
reflectively and strategically within the governance structures that frame their 
actions”. Beeson and Stone (2013) also identify the point that the success of policy 
entrepreneurs is to some degree dependent on the wider political and institutional 
context being amenable to the ideas suggested. In this context, the success of policy 
entrepreneurs is framed in the first instance by their own recognition of these 
institutional and political constraints, whereby the solutions identified need to be 
feasible at a local level within the power and responsibility of local government. 
Having recognised the context within which the policy entrepreneurs are operating, 
then agency becomes important, and the individual tactics and strategies of the 
policy entrepreneurs and their own abilities, knowledge and expertise come to the 
forefront.  
 
The environment alone cannot explain the success of policy entrepreneurs (Cohen, 
2016), they also need to have certain characteristics to be successful. Thus, policy 
entrepreneurs, according to a number of authors (Minton and Norman, 2009; 
Craven, 2017; Cairney, 2018; and Aviram et al, 2019), require certain characteristics 
and attributes to be successful. These include the ability to lead by example, 
ambition to change things and influence others, ability to create coalitions and the 
tenacity to keep going to achieve success. The lack of resources in terms of power 
and money to do things on their own, often requires policy entrepreneurs to join with 
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others. They also need to be well versed in the political world in which they operate, 
be able to build trust, be experts at defining problems so people can relate to them, 
be good at persuasion and at building teams and coalitions (Aviram et al, 2019; 
Minton and Norman, 2009). Cairney (2018:200) also identifies strategies that 
effective policy entrepreneurs combine to adapt to constraints and achieve policy 
change: telling a good story to grab attention; providing feasible solutions in 
anticipation of attention turning to particular problems; and adapting their strategy to 
the nature of each window. Many of these attributes, characteristics and strategies 
were visible to varying degrees during the mayoral election, with different policy 
entrepreneurs demonstrating different characteristics at different times. 
 
Both the NFA and MfH campaigns appeared to use the first two strategies outlined 
by Cairney as they began with a story about the problem and identified solutions to 
the problems that were prominent, but they seemed less capable of adapting their 
strategies. They both entered the arena with a particular set of problems and 
solutions, and whilst they had prepared these in response to the predictable window 
created by the election, they were less flexible once the process was underway. 
Having said that, the MfH campaign was more able to adapt due to the range of 
partners involved in their campaign, each bringing with them different skills, ideas 
and solutions. 
 
In the Bristol mayoral election, the two main campaign groups (as discussed in detail 
in the previous chapters) used a range of strategies and tactics throughout the 
election campaign, as illustrated by Table 11. There seemed to be some common 
ground amongst the different campaigns in terms of strategies and tactics even if the 
campaigns were quite different in their overall approach. Table 11 brings together 
some of the main strategies and tactics identified in the literature (Cairney, 2018; 
Aviram et al, 2019; John et al, 2013) where they relate to the early stages of the 
policy process and demonstrates the extent to which these were used by the two 
main campaign groups in my research. The strategies and tactics identified in the 
literature that have been left out of the table and discussion are those that tended to 
relate to the implementation and evaluation stages of the process rather than those 
most relevant to agenda setting and policy change. 
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Table 11: Strategies and Tactics Used by Policy Entrepreneurs in Bristol  
Strategies and 
Tactics Identified in 
the Literature  
 
No Fixed Abode Campaign Mayor for Homes Campaign 
 
Positive engagement: 
get to know doers and 
decision makers, be part 
of the solution 
 
Contact with candidates and key 
council officers. Provided solutions 
but not in a position to deliver on 
their own. Individual well connected 
with a history of working in the city 
on housing. 
Good connections with decision 
makers and candidates. 
Professional reputation/credibility. 
Provided solutions and willing to 
work in partnership to deliver. 
Framing a problem: 
understand how best to 
position an issue 
 
Key part of campaign used 
emotional connections and stories 
from real people to demonstrate the 
impact of the problems. 
Careful approach adopted, wary 
of creating conflict with the 
council. Focused on information 
and helping candidates to 
understand the problems. 
Indicators and 
evidence: clear, 
accurate data, simplify 
research, targets and 
measurement. Engage 
with others to present 
the extent of a problem 
Provided simple, clear statistics as 
basis of campaign and activities. 
Provided these to the public and 
media in simple, visual manner. 
Worked with local communities on 
ideas and solutions, as well as with 
decision makers. 
Used statistics and research to 
demonstrate the problem. 
Suggested a target for candidates 
to sign up to. Brought together a 
coalition of organisations. 
Providing solutions: 
understand the cause of 
a problem and provide a 
range of solutions, be 
part of the solution 
Campaign built up from identifying a 
problem to providing a solution to 
that problem. 
Campaign focused on providing 
solutions based on partnership 
working to deliver change. 
Networking: join with 
others, coalitions of 
interest, policy 
communities, network of 
interests inside and 
outside of government 
Started off in discussion about 
joining with others but then decided 
their campaign would be better on its 
own. Kept in close touch with others 
and worked across local 
communities. Used contacts within 
the local authority and business. 
The campaign was a coalition of 
organisations with similar 
interests in ensuring housing was 
on the candidate’s agenda and 
targets were adopted. Used 
contacts with politicians and 
officers within the council, as well 
as across housing networks. 
Triggering events: use 
crises and events to 
focus attention 
The election process itself was a 
triggering event that the campaign 
used to initiate action. Increasing 
numbers of homeless people 
provided a visible issue to focus on 
throughout the campaign. 
The election process itself was a 
triggering event that led to the 
start of the campaign. 
Media attention: tap 
into the public mood, 
maximize size of 
audience, use media to 
promote policy and 
attract attention to an 
issue 
Attracting media and public attention 
was the primary purpose of the 
campaign. Sought to maximize the 
size of audience with a range of 
publicity stunts and activities. 
Not a key part of the campaign as 
it was more focused on direct 
contact with the candidates using 
existing connections. 
Salami Tactics: divide 
policy into stages, less 
risky steps 
 
One of the main strategies of the 
campaign, workable stages to their 
approach, simplified the problem and 
the solutions to make it more 
accessible and acceptable. 
Provided clear steps in the 
process, with clear targets to 
enable simple approach to policy. 
 




Generate positive engagement 
Both campaigns were well connected to officers and members of the council. They 
were professionals who worked in the housing sector and had spent many years 
working in Bristol. They knew the people in power and were able to contact them 
directly.  The NFA campaign was set up by a businessman, who was well connected 
with the Bristol business and political worlds. The MfH campaign was led by the 
NHF, a group of professional housing experts with longstanding connections with 
officers and politicians and who regularly worked on projects with the council. 
Individuals within the MfH campaign group also brought additional expertise and 
connections that enabled positive engagement with the candidates during the 
election and afterwards with both officers and members.  
 
Whilst the NFA campaign was slightly more conflict based in its approach than the 
MfH campaign, both were able to provide solutions to the problems they were 
identifying and offer support and help to achieve those solutions. This according to 
Cairney (2018) is an important part of an agenda setting strategy, engaging 
positively to help achieve outcomes receives a more positive response than merely 
identifying problems. 
 
Frame the issue to attract attention 
Understanding how best to position an issue is a significant factor in successful 
agenda setting. Being able to communicate the issue in a way that grabs attention is 
most important, as politicians during an election will inevitably be bombarded with a 
large number of problems and issues, with a limited amount of time and capacity to 
consider them. Cairney (2018) suggests an approach that uses storytelling to grab 
attention so the audience you are trying to influence then demands more information 
on the issues you are raising. This certainly seemed to work quite well for the NFA 
campaign, where their whole approach was based on telling the story of 
homelessness and its causes, and identifying what the council could do to improve 
its own approach to the issue. This raised the issue publicly in a very media friendly 
way with just enough information and statistics to interest people, without 
overwhelming them with too much information. Indeed, the storytelling approach 
worked well at attracting attention and gaining media coverage, which raised the 
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profile of the campaign and the issues they were promoting. Whether or not it had 
more of an impact on the candidates than the MfH campaign is difficult to identify as 
both were addressing similar issues, but it certainly did more to raise the profile of 
the issue publicly in a way that was easily understood.  The MfH campaign was keen 
to raise issues without being conflict based, as its members had a professional 
relationship to maintain with the council after the election. It therefore focused more 
on providing clear and simple information to help the candidates understand the 
issues and the potential solutions. The two campaigns deliberately adopted a 
complementary approach. 
 
Provide clear evidence 
Cairney (2018) suggests that policy entrepreneurs should not focus on bombarding 
policy makers with too much evidence. The ability of policy makers to take on board 
information within limited time constraints is reduced, particularly during the specific 
timeline of an election process. This point is important, as providing too much 
evidence at the beginning of a campaign can make it difficult for politicians to 
process and utilise that evidence. Providing just enough to make a point, without 
overload, is a delicate balance. Both of the main campaigns seemed to understand 
this point and delivered information, evidence and statistics in a way that was both 
manageable and understandable. The NFA campaign was particularly skilled in the 
visual way in which they provided information and the clarity they delivered in terms 
of high-level statistics to prove their point. This was backed up by the MfH campaign, 
who provided the next level of detail and were more rounded in their approach to 
housing issues, identifying issues beyond homelessness and the lack of affordable 
housing, to include problems with the private rented sector. The information provided 
by both campaigns was welcomed by the main candidates and used by them as the 
election process progressed. 
 
Have a ready-made solution to each issue 
Understanding the nature of a problem and providing different solutions is critical to 
successful agenda setting. Both campaigns were very focused on providing solutions 
and on being part of those solutions. Cairney (2018) points towards the need to 
produce a solution then find the problem it relates to, as by the time people pay 
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attention to an issue it is too late to produce a solution as interest may be short lived 
and other issues could be more pressing. This was partially what the campaigns did 
but in a slightly different way. Both campaigns were built around identifying the 
problem and then demonstrating how to solve it. In many ways the solution suited 
their own particular approach and purpose and was to some extent arrived at as the 
problem was identified. It could be argued that the problem of lack of affordable 
housing has been an issue for a long time in Bristol, therefore it is well known and 
there have been many discussions over many years about the barriers to delivery 
and the potential solutions. It is also important to point out that the solutions were 
carefully framed to ensure that they were viable for local government to deliver and 
were largely based on what the council could do to improve things within their own 
power and resources. Therefore, both campaigns were clear about the constraints 
on local government from above in terms of central government policy and were 
aware of the local context of cutbacks and austerity within which they were 
operating. These issues were taken into account even before solutions were 
identified.  
 
What did become clear during the election process was that whilst the candidates 
were concerned about specific problems they were initially more attracted to broad 
ideas or commitments rather than specific solutions, particularly at the point of 
manifesto development. Although to some extent this was due to the constraints 
presented by the type of the policy outputs at the time, more work had been done 
behind the scenes to identify and select solutions, but these were generally not part 
of the manifesto commitments due to the level of detail required for these types of 
documents.  
 
The detailed solutions became more important once the election was over and 
further policy formulation and development work took place, using greater evidence 
alongside other expert and professional input as well as personal views and ideas. 
At this point the new mayor and cabinet lead were keener to talk about solutions and 
ideas and how partners could help to make things happen. 
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Make use of triggering events 
My research findings suggest that the policy entrepreneurs locally were more like 
‘Poseidon moving the waves’ than ‘surfers being swept away by them’ (see Cairney, 
2018). The NFA and MfH campaigns both seemed to be quite clever at using the 
election process to raise awareness of their issues. They knew the election was due 
and that it would be high profile and they used that as an opportunity to present 
particular solutions to the main housing issues as they perceived them. The election 
as a predictable window presented this opportunity, the skill was then in framing the 
problem to grab attention and provide the solutions at the right time to make it into 
manifesto commitments. Kingdon (1984) suggests that policy entrepreneurs develop 
solutions then find the right time to generate and encourage attention to the relevant 
problem. This resonates with my findings whereby the different campaigns had 
solutions ready developed and projects they wanted to promote, so they used the 
election process to present them alongside the problems they raised at the 
beginning of the process. During an election it is possible to plan for this eventuality, 
as the window of opportunity for presenting a particular solution is predictable, they 
knew there was going to be an election and could plan for it. The key during a policy 
window created by a local election appears to be the ability to link problems to 
election debates and seek solutions that are popular, feasible, align with party 
political objectives and are broadly acceptable to policy makers. 
 
Networking 
Joining with others and creating coalitions of interest is another tactic identified by 
different authors. Cohen (2016) refers to the number of potential allies a policy 
entrepreneur can form a coalition with, where opportunity for success is increased as 
the number of allies increases. This strategy was adopted by the MfH campaign 
which realised from the start that bringing the different groups together into one 
campaign would make their campaign stronger. The downside of this is that it is 
more time consuming and likely to lead to greater compromise. This certainly 
seemed to be the case for the MfH group, where their initial document was produced 
quite late in the campaign and was a mixture of compromise and agreement, with 
some members of the coalition less happy about what had been left out. The NFA 
campaign was initially part of the MfH coalition, but realised early on that their 
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approach would work better alongside the MfH campaign rather than as part of it. 
They were less willing to compromise on their approach and did not have the same 
professional working relationship with the council that other members of the MfH 
group did. The housing networks across the city were strong and were a good basis 
for the main campaigns to work from. The MfH coalition had been brought together 
at the first mayoral election in 2012, so was a well-connected group who had mostly 
come together before. Their connections inside and outside of the council were 
strong and well developed and they represented the housing associations working in 
Bristol as well as the wider business community. The NFA campaign was a new 
group, set up specifically for this election. The influencer who set it up was well 
connected with the business community and the council, as well as some local 
communities. 
 
Attract public and media attention 
Being able to tap into the public mood and attract attention to an issue to maximize 
the size of the audience is an important skill and tactic for policy entrepreneurs. The 
NFA campaign certainly demonstrated this ability, particularly as the founder used a 
marketing agency to develop and deliver the campaign. This showed a significant 
understanding of the process that was needed and an ability to make it happen. The 
MfH campaign however did not rely on this aspect. Their approach to attracting 
attention appeared to be mostly an afterthought and quite amateurish in concept. 
They preferred instead to use their political connections to get directly to the 
candidates to discuss the issues with them and to provide a short manifesto 
document themselves setting out what they wanted the candidates to sign up to. 
Both were effective in different ways at gaining attention, but the NFA campaign did 
attract greater public and media attention. 
 
Salami Tactics 
Being able to split the task of policy development into simple steps was very much 
the approach adopted by the NFA campaign. They set out deliberately to take the 
public, media and candidates on a journey through a story about homelessness and 
how it could be solved. They broke it down into a series of steps relating to different 
parts of the story and were quite successful in attracting attention to the issues as 
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the story developed. The MfH campaign also broke their information down into 
simple steps, as they identified clear targets and ‘asks’ of the candidates. Indeed, 
rather than pushing the candidates to commit to a house building target, they asked 
them to produce an action plan to set out how they would deliver more homes. This 
was clearly a compromise as they did not want to appear too challenging publicly, 
whereas privately, in discussions with the candidates they produced much clearer 
statements about what they thought the candidates should do if elected. 
 
Summary 
In terms of the attributes of the policy entrepreneurs themselves, Cohen (2016) 
suggests they need to be politically adept, persuasive and risk takers. The 
combination of these attributes enables the policy entrepreneur to be effective in 
forming coalitions, operating in the right networks and identifying where compromise 
is needed to achieve success. One of the key questions that Cohen raises is 
regarding the motivation that underlies the work of a policy entrepreneur: is it about 
personal goals or social welfare? The literature on this issue appears to be less than 
compelling, as some suggest ‘good things happen’ when policy entrepreneurs are 
active, whilst others focus on the personal goals of the policy entrepreneur (Cohen, 
2016:195). 
 
The findings from my research support elements of the work by Aviram, et al (2019) 
Cohen (2016) and Cairney (2018). The policy entrepreneurs during the Bristol 
mayoral election seemed to be well versed in attracting attention and maintaining it 
by using a range of strategies and tactics. In particular the NFA campaign based its 
whole approach on telling a story which gradually unfolded to reveal the answer. It 
was a story brought to life by the use of real people, outlining what it is like to be 
homeless and the challenges they face every day. It was a story defined by a 
solution, where the different chapters led towards that solution from the very 
beginning, almost like the unfolding of a murder/mystery novel. The characters were 
introduced gradually alongside the main plot and the ‘bad guys’ (the council), then 
the story progressed through an emotional journey of hardship and challenge, before 
finally the answers were revealed, and the solutions to the problem, as defined by 
the campaign, were clearly outlined.  
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In practical terms this meant starting with a small amount of evidence using bold 
figures to grab attention, using waiting list numbers and the numbers of homeless 
people in the city. At this point the injection of stories from homeless people 
themselves helped to tug on the emotions and gain increasing interest in the issue. 
This was further reinforced with the use of alternative ‘blue plaques’ on doorways 
and car park entrances to show where homeless people were sleeping. Then there 
began a demonstration of the cause of the problem, using billboards placed on 
derelict plots of land across the city, showing a window into a family home with the 
slogan “this is what could happen here”. This is when the solution began to unfold, 
with the publication of a map illustrating empty council land and property across the 
city and examples of how many new homes could be provided if these sites were 
developed properly. The answer to the housing crisis in these terms was simple; 
build more homes on council owned land. That was the clear message of the 
campaign, which then went on to succinctly identify how and where this could 
happen. 
 
The policy entrepreneurs involved in both campaigns were willing to invest time, 
money and energy into the promotion of problems and solutions. The MfH campaign 
had senior housing professionals involved in volunteering their time to draw up the 
campaign manifesto, with time commitments for two or three of those involved quite 
significant. From the discussions I had with key personnel the burden of effort really 
did fall on a small number of people, with others merely signing up to what had been 
agreed. In this sense the importance of individual agency as a promoter of policy 
outcomes is primary according to Cohen (2016), with the role of the policy 
entrepreneur seen to be at the forefront of change. 
 
Even when they are successful in getting an item onto the policy agenda, policy 
entrepreneurs knew they needed to keep up the pressure on the council to formulate 
policies that supported their own objectives. The process did not end with agenda 
setting, but this was the key stage where policy entrepreneurs could be most 
effective and need to be according to Cohen (2016:180). In my research this was 
certainly the case, although that influence continued into the policy development 
stage once the election was over. Both main campaign groups continued to play an 
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important part in providing information, ideas and solutions to the mayor and his 
team after the election. They recognised the need to continue their influence to 
ensure agenda success evolved into formal policy change.  
 
In summary, policy entrepreneurs have a range of skills and expertise that they used 
in their attempts to influence the candidates before, during and after the election. 
Some policy entrepreneurs were better placed than others in terms of access and 
credibility, others used persistence and framing to get their voice heard. Both main 
campaigns demonstrated a good understanding of how to influence and how to 
exploit the window of opportunity created by the election. In terms of success both 
campaigns could point to housing being a top priority during the election, to 
extensive publicity for the issues they were raising and to eventual policy proposals 
reflecting their priorities. The extent to which this is down to the campaigns, rather 
than the input of experts, professionals, party politics and other issues is difficult to 
assess, but there was some acknowledgement from the candidates that they had 
listened to the campaigns and the information they had provided had helped them to 
shape policies. I was also able to observe their responses to the campaigns as they 
happened and see how they reacted to what was being said during meetings. It was 
clear at various points during the election process that issues raised by the 
campaign groups were making it into the language of the candidates and onto their 
agenda. 
 
My research demonstrates that indicators (particularly evidence and local 
knowledge) were important to the candidates in their consideration of issues, 
definition of problems and selection of solutions. They relied on information provided 
to them, they sought information and actively used it throughout the campaign to 
highlight their own agenda, to justify it and promote it. This I believe is an important 
contribution to the debate about agenda setting during an election, as Kingdon 
(1984) talks about indicators, as do other authors (Aviram et al, 2019 and Cairney, 
2018) but less importance is attached to the use of evidence and expertise, than is 





9.0 Conclusions  
 
In my research I studied the mayoral election in Bristol and focused on how the 
election process gradually unfolded revealing diverse, complex and sometimes 
conflicting stories that were related to me by the different actors involved. The 
research looked at what people do and what they say, as well as what they say they 
do. It focused on practices not just discourse and theory, using a policy ethnography 
approach as far as was practical given the time pressures on the actors at the centre 
of the action. I looked at who influenced the candidates and who they listened to, as 
well as how influencers attempted to engage with the candidates to get their voice 
heard. The focus was on housing policy and how this was addressed before, during 
and after the election. I used Kingdon’s MSF as my guiding framework, to help me 
define my research questions and to inform my fieldwork.  
 
The picture I have presented is one that highlighted how priorities were set at a time 
of great pressure and engagement, and how those seeking to influence priorities 
promoted and presented issues, ideas and solutions. Whilst it was a small and 
simple, but detailed, case study of one area at a particular moment in time, it was 
also an example of a more pervasive issue about how agenda setting works and 
how establishment connections inform and influence decision making both overtly 
and covertly. It was about the strategy and tactics employed by those attempting to 
influence and those on the receiving end. The narrative is focused around events, 
structured by time, place, actors and context. Much like the work of Flyvberg on The 
Aalborg Project (1998) the story I have set out has two plots: the immediate plot of 
actors, activities and actions; and the conceptual plot, of agenda setting, policy 
prioritisation and the ability to influence. 
 
 
9.1  Summary of findings 
The aim of the study was to understand and explain how mayoral candidates 
prioritised policy issues during an election and what influenced them in making 
decisions on priorities. It also sought to consider who was trying to influence them 
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and how those individual actors or groups engaged with candidates on specific 
policy agendas throughout the election.  
 
I identified two main research questions, with sub questions, which formed the basis 
of the discussion in the previous chapter: 
 
1. How do issues get onto the policy agenda during an election campaign?  
This question addressed how political manifestos are developed and how 
priorities are decided. It looked at how candidates prioritised their engagement 
with different actors, who they listened to and why. 
 
2. Who is trying to influence the agenda and how?   
This questioned addressed who the main actors were during the election process 
and the tactics and strategies they used to attract attention to particular issues. 
 
 
I began by using and adapting Kingdon’s MSF to provide a framework for the 
research. This modified framework identified the potential for two predictable 
windows to open during an election campaign, both opening in the politics stream, to 
provide opportunities for change. It highlighted the potential role of political parties 
and the institutional setting of local governance as well as the role of policy 
communities and networks. My research has drawn out these issues in relation to 
the election process in Bristol highlighting how these windows operated, the potential 
they provided and how there was a staged process in the development of priorities 
that aligned with these windows. It looked at the role of the party in political decision 
making throughout the process and how the introduction of the mayoral system has 
had an impact on the way this operated locally. It also focused on the influencers; 
their role and strategy for engagement and their connections across sectors and 
groups, forming alliances and networks to increase their impact. 
 
What I found was a process of agenda setting on housing issues that began when 
the agenda window, the largest window, opened as a result of the election campaign 
process getting under way, as candidates were announced and campaign teams and 
processes identified. This agenda window encouraged conditions for debate and 
consultation as candidates were keen to listen to experts and interest groups about 
the housing issues that they thought were important. There was a clear timeline from 
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this stage onwards, that focused on the publication of the party agenda in the form of 
a political manifesto or campaign action plan that would be launched closer to the 
election. Once this party agenda had been launched, the window drew to a close as 
the focus was on getting the message out to voters about each candidate’s priorities 
and how they were different to their rival candidates. There was also an element of 
filling in the detail on each of the issues, where key groups and organisations were 
involved, but where mostly the process was a closed political party process, 
involving members and councillors.  
 
Once the election was over, a new window opened with the creation of a new 
administration and there was an opportunity once more to influence the new mayor, 
as new issues and constraints became apparent and priorities were adjusted to 
reflect this new position prior to the final policy agenda being consolidated and 
agreed. This smaller decision window provided only limited opportunities for 
influence and brought in new influencers in the form of council officers, who had 
been less apparent previously in relation to their impact on the priorities of the 
majority of candidates, except the incumbent mayor. This was their opportunity to 
raise new issues, existing commitments and immediate constraints that would not 
necessarily have been apparent to most of the candidates, as there was little 
opportunity for them to engage with senior council officers prior to the election. 
 
The agenda setting process demonstrated clear party influence with local party 
members and councillors involved at critical stages in the process, and in relation to 
two of the main party candidates (C2 and C3), formed the main control group that 
brought the manifesto and commitments together and advised the candidates 
throughout. There was also significant engagement by these two candidates with 
broader interest groups and key stakeholders, this ran alongside engagement within 
the party. Both forms of engagement can be seen to have influenced the housing 
priorities developed by each candidate, and to some extent they were 
complementary processes, with many of the same issues and priorities identified and 
agreed, for example, homelessness, lack of affordable housing and the use of 
council land and property was commonly raised by internal party influencers and 
external influencers alike. 
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In relation to the existing mayor the process was different, as an independent 
candidate, he had no party membership to relate to and formed his housing priorities 
on the basis of what the council was already committed to and to a greater extent his 
approach was restricted by knowledge of what was possible within the perceived 
constraints of the council budget and current staffing levels. His engagement with 
supporters and stakeholders was limited, partially because as the existing mayor he 
was continuing to do the job of the mayor and therefore had less time, and partially 
because he felt it was less relevant, as he had been engaging with stakeholders 
throughout his term of office. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, all candidates also seemed quite willing to engage with 
indicators, evidence and local knowledge, and even seemed to want information on 
key housing issues to develop and support their ideas. This process was largely 
reliant on housing experts and professionals, business leaders, academics, and 
campaign groups, who were keen to present information to back up their own 
priorities and to demonstrate why they should be priorities for the candidates.  
 
It was also clear that whilst indicators, party politics and wider engagement helped 
candidates to develop their priorities, personal interests and ideology also had a role 
to play. Each candidate had their own views and ideas on what was important, which 
came about as a result of their own experience, their own interests and their own 
connections. These were to some extent already formed into priorities before the 
election campaign began, but were refined and developed further throughout the 
process. 
 
The role of the policy entrepreneurs in the agenda setting process has been clearly 
demonstrated by my research, where the policy entrepreneurs are the campaigners 
and key stakeholders engaged in promoting different issues and solutions. I 
identified the main influencers in relation to housing issues and met with them 
regularly during the campaigns to discuss their approach, frustrations and 
challenges. The approach of the main policy entrepreneurs was based on positive 
engagement, working with decision makers to identify problems and being willing to 
be part of delivering the solution. The different groups had different skills in terms of 
how to engage and how to frame problems to attract attention. The NFA campaign 
 208 
focused on media and public attention, using stories to generate empathy and raise 
the profile of homelessness as a mechanism for highlighting the lack of available 
affordable housing. They moved seamlessly from identifying and framing the 
problem to providing workable solutions. The MfH campaign focused more on 
providing evidence and information in a usable format to identify the problem, and 
demonstrating expertise and knowledge to ensure they were taken seriously. They 
used existing connections and joined with others to form a coalition of interests 
across professional organisations and delivery organisations to strengthen their 
position.  
 
Both campaigns had an impact on the candidates and helped in the formation of 
their priorities on housing issues, as can be seen by the adoption of a housing target 
on new build and affordable homes, as well as the introduction of priorities on 
reducing homelessness. Both these issues were promoted and defined as problems 
by the campaign groups, who also helped to provided workable solutions that were 
acceptable to the candidates. Whilst it is difficult to know if these priorities would 
have appeared anyway without the input of the campaigns, it is clear from discussion 
with the candidates that they recognised the input of the campaigns and the 
information they provided. They also helped to raise public and media awareness of 
the problems and ensured the issues were debated publicly. By contrast, other 
issues, such as the use of modular housing, self-build proposals, concerns about the 
impact of the welfare system on housing affordability and concerns with the right to 
buy process, did not feature as prominently on the party agenda of the candidates 
but were raised during the election process from within the party processes as well 
as by policy entrepreneurs. In this instance their intervention was less successful, 
either because the idea did not receive much traction, or because there was a 








9.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Agenda Setting  
My research has contributed to knowledge in terms of how agendas are set during 
an election. It identifies the existence of two predictable windows, a bigger agenda 
window as the election begins, and a smaller decision window when a new 
administration is formed, where there is a clear, predictable opportunity for policy 
change to occur and for influencers to become active. I have demonstrated how the 
mayoral candidates are keen to engage with both party and non-party members, to 
gather ideas about problems and solutions and how they move the debate forward in 
terms of identifying priorities. My research highlights the different processes used 
during the election to gather information, to engage with influencers, and to confirm 
priorities, including the use of internal party processes to differing degrees. It also 
identifies the tension that exists between internal and external processes and how 
these are brought together to balance different influences. 
 
I have highlighted how the streams converge and are then forced apart again as the 
two different windows of opportunity occur, generating different opportunities for 
influence at different stages of the process. My research moves the agenda setting 
literature on in a number of different ways. It confirms and develops our 
understanding of the operation of predictable windows in the politics stream and 
demonstrates how these operate to provide opportunities for change during an 
election.  
 
My research also demonstrates how not only how the streams come together but 
also how they are forced apart as a result of activity within the streams and the 
opening of different windows during an election. Much of the emphasis in the MSF 
literature is on the process of bringing the streams together, whilst less attention has 
been given to the forces that can push the streams apart again. This study shows 
that this is an important part of the overall story and could potentially apply to any 




My research provides information on how policy entrepreneurs attempt to influence 
the agenda and the tactics and strategies they use to gain attention. It highlights the 
use of different tactics at different times to generate the greatest impact and the 
relative success of two different campaigns. I used the work of Cairney (2018) and 
Aviram et al (2019), that outlined different strategies used by policy entrepreneurs, to 
assess the strategies used during the mayoral election. I found many of the same 
approaches were relevant but to different degrees, with networking, framing and 
providing solutions a major part of the approach taken by the main influencers. 
However, I also found that the provision of evidence and information played an 
important part in the process, which may be surprising given more recent national 
debates about the role of evidence, but nevertheless this was significant in the early 
stages of the election campaign as candidates sought facts and figures, expert 
advice and information to illustrate the existence and extent of different housing 
issues, as well as to support the definition of the problem and the provision of 
solutions. In addition, it was unusual to find a local campaign group as well versed in 
engaging with the media and providing a story in a format specifically framed to elicit 
media attention and public support in the way that the NFA campaign did. Their 
approach was something we are more used to seeing at a national rather than a 
local level, and is a good example of how local campaigns could benefit from 
adopting similar strategies in the future. 
 
My research suggests that whilst policy entrepreneurs are particularly active during 
the agenda and decision windows, and used these to provide impetus to their ideas 
and issues, they were also generally active and applying pressure on decision 
makers and policy makers. They stepped up their campaign during the election 
process and had planned for it, but were also active after the election, keeping the 
pressure on in terms of their solutions, as well as ensuring the issue was not 
forgotten. This suggests policy entrepreneurs are active outside of windows of 
opportunity as well as during them. The windows provide additional impetus for them 
to apply pressure to policy makers, but many of them are constantly active in and 
around the council, pursuing opportunities to make their voice heard. 
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Assessing how effective policy entrepreneurs are is complex, as there may be many 
reasons why a policy change occurs. Even during an election when the role of policy 
entrepreneurs was quite visible and encouraged, it is difficult to judge the success or 
otherwise of their activity on its own. Whilst some of the priorities outlined in the 
manifestos of the different candidates did quite clearly reflect the issues, ideas and 
solutions raised by the two main campaign groups, it is difficult to assess the extent 
to which this inclusion was because of the activity of the policy entrepreneurs. This is 
particularly true of agenda setting in local government as there are a limited range of 
issues that can be dealt with at a local level and which local government has the 
capacity to change, therefore the housing issues promoted by the campaign groups 
in this instance were likely to feature on agendas even without their input. I was able 
to make some assessment of the success of the campaigns through my 
conversations with the candidates, as well as observation of their response to the 
different policy entrepreneurs and the suggestions they were making at meetings. 
 
Methodology  
I adopted a policy ethnography approach to my research, which enabled me to look 
at what people do as well as what they say they do, and to some extent meant I was 
able to get behind the scenes of the action to observe activity as it happened. The 
research I undertook adopted a dual stance, both from the outside looking in and the 
inside looking out. I watched and listened to events, activities, announcements and 
statements as they happened, as a bystander looking at a process from the outside, 
looking into the world of the politicians. I also attended, participated in and observed 
at private meetings and discussions, spoke formally and informally to the mayoral 
candidates, with inside access looking out from their world, seeking to see it and 
understand it as they do. This approach helped me to gain a better understanding of 
events, based on informal, in the moment, responses and observation as well as 
more rationalised responses provided through more formal interviews at set times 
during the election process.  
 
I walked a fine line between involvement and observation, and influence and 
impartiality. That is the nature of this type of research, where I was observing and 
engaging in a political world where I was known and where I had previously been a 
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participant. The process of research was by no means perfect, but it did enable me 
to get beneath the surface, just a little, to see beyond what people said, to what they 
actually did and how they responded.  
 
Having connections within the political world in Bristol and with others in the housing 
sector helped me to gain good access to the candidates and the policy 
entrepreneurs at a time of high pressure, tight time constraints and political 
sensitivity. I was observing discussions and receiving information about campaign 
activity, and involved in discussions about priorities with different candidates as they 
were developing their ideas, when political sensitivity about confidentiality could have 
been a concern. I was fortunate that this did not cause concern amongst the 
candidates and other participants and was perhaps helped because many of them 
already knew me and trusted me as a colleague and friend. 
 
There is an opportunity to use this type of approach in policy studies more widely, 
utilising the work of Rhodes (2013 & 2016) and Boswell et al (2018), combining 
observation, interviewing and the use of documentary evidence to both explain and 
construct an understanding of how and why things happen. Getting behind the 
scenes and entering the world, albeit briefly, of the candidates provided an 
opportunity to see things as the candidates saw them, to be part of the activity rather 
than hearing about it afterwards. Using different methods to explore events as they 
occurred rather than retrospectively provided a different perspective on events and 
activities. It helped me to see immediate reactions and gain instant feedback from 
the candidates and those around them. This would certainly seem to be valuable in 
terms of agenda setting, but could easily relate similarly to research on others stages 
and elements of the policy process.  
 
The method adopted allowed for a level of insight to the agenda setting process as it 
evolved, including capturing how key actors interpret and reinterpret events and 
actions over time. This would have been difficult to achieve using a more 
conventional method based upon interviews gathering retrospective accounts. This 
comes through most strongly in the discussion of the perceptions C2 and M1 had 
about the involvement of party members and councillors compared to the 
involvement of experts in roundtable discussions and their impact on the final party 
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agenda, as highlighted in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8. At the time, during the election 
campaign, I got different accounts of how they thought this had worked. C2 
expressed his irritation and frustration with the process to me in an informal chat I 
had with him soon after one of the party meetings, which he felt was less relevant 
and not particularly useful, whilst M1 talked about how important that meeting had 
been in bringing things together and gaining agreement from the party group. Later, 
in more formal interviews, after the election, their accounts of the process were 
similar, with both saying the party agenda had been brought together through party 
processes as well as the roundtables involving outside experts and individuals. Both 
elements had played an important part in the process. 
 
One of the main problems I encountered was the need to constantly check with 
participants about my involvement and ensure they understood that both formal and 
informal conversations would be used in my research. I set all this out at the 
beginning very clearly when first asking for their engagement (see Participant 
Information Sheets and Consent Forms in Appendices 2 & 3), but found I needed to 
remind the candidates at different times throughout the research period and check 
that they understood that particular meeting I was attending was part of my research. 
I also had to keep asking and reminding them to invite me to meetings and events. 
Obviously, this is perfectly understandable, particularly as the campaigns got going 
and time became even more pressure and there were more and more events 
happening. I learnt therefore to make phone calls, send text messages and emails to 
the candidates and their campaign teams to ask about forthcoming meetings/events. 
Even then I found I still missed a few events and was left off invite list despite the 
candidate asking for me to be added. 
 
Timing was also a problem. I was researching a relatively short period of time, with 
intense activity building up particularly in the last three months before the actual 
election. I was trying to set up interviews, attend meetings, event and activities, 
mostly during the few months leading up to the election in May. There were the 
inevitable clashes, where I had agreed to attend one meeting or had set up an 
interview, then I was contacted about another meeting at the same time, often last 
minute. I underestimated the amount of time I would have available and how difficult 
it would be to fit everything in during such a condensed period. On reflection I could 
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have managed my time better and prioritised activities better. There were some 
interviews that I could have undertaken earlier in the campaign or even after the 
election, rather than in the busiest period, which would have freed me up to attend 
more activities and meetings that were scheduled by others. I could have prioritised 
some of my attendance at these meetings better too, with less focus on hustings and 
more on campaign meetings. At various points during the process I felt overwhelmed 
by the number of interviews, meetings and events I had planned to undertake and 
attend in one week, which together with all the preparation that is required 
beforehand and the assimilation after each activity meant on occasion I felt less well 
prepared than I would have liked. Careful planning of schedules for fieldwork activity, 
with enough clear space to write up notes, prepare for the next activity and think 




9.3  Limitations of the study 
This study focused on one election in one city at a particular moment in time. It is 
difficult to generalise from this as I can only demonstrate what happened in this 
particular case. I played multiple roles in the research process, which has its 
positives and negatives, as it enabled me to engage at a closer level with some of 
those involved and to gain and maintain their trust, providing me with greater access 
throughout the election process. It did however lead to a potential imbalance of 
information, as I worked more closely with one candidate than any of the others, and 
had no, or limited, access to two of the main party candidates. It would however 
have been physically difficult to be involved in any more activity as the time available 
was limited and as discussed above building free time into a research schedule is 
essential to enable some reflection and assimilation of information between 
interviews, meetings and other activities. The level of access achieved would have 
been difficult to achieve in another geographical area as my personal links and 
connections would not have been as good, therefore I am only able to make 
observations on what happened in Bristol during this mayoral election; other areas 
may well operate differently during different types of election. However, I believe 
there are some interesting issues raised by my research that could be tested through 
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similar studies in other areas. For example, the identification and operation of the 
two windows during the election, the difference of approach between party-political 
candidates and an independent candidate, the difference a mayoral system makes 
to the process, and the role of the main campaign groups in highlighting issues and 
developing solutions. My research enabled me to delve more deeply into some of 
these issues, which may not have been possible if I had tried to undertake the 
research across another city area at the same time. 
 
Because of the nature of the process I was studying I did not manage to achieve 
quite the level of access and engagement with the candidates that I had originally 
planned. This was almost inevitable as I was trying to work alongside actors at a 
particularly busy and sensitive time, so gaining access to them was challenging and 
in some cases impossible. As discussed above, it was difficult throughout the 
research to maintain consistent access, as I was required to keep checking with the 
candidates that my involvement and attendance at meetings and discussions was 
acceptable to them. It was also a challenge to ensure I received information about 
meetings and events that might be useful as my main contact and connection was 
mostly through the candidates themselves and they were obviously preoccupied with 
more important things than remembering to let me know what was happening and 
when. Having said that, I did get access to some very valuable discussions and 
meetings, as well as informal chats, that provided information and insight that I would 
not have been able to achieve through other means of research. I am therefore 
extremely grateful to the candidates and those around them who helped me to 
access and understand the process as it happened and to live briefly in their world at 
different times during the campaign. 
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Appendix 1 – Theories of the Policy Process 
 
The table overleaf provides a brief consideration of the main theories of the 
policy process, reviewed by Weible and Sabatier (2018. This identifies the 
extent to which they provide an understanding of agenda setting and provides 
some clarity on which frameworks and theories have the most to say about how 
and why issues move up and down the policy agenda and how these can be 
used to help us understand the issues and questions most pertinent to a study 
of agenda setting. This discussion was used to inform the choice of the MSF as 

























Theories of the Policy Process 
Theory 
 
Key Points Actors/Institutions Characteristics 
Methods 
The Stages Model 
 
No single model, more of a heuristic 
tool. Simplified, linear approach with 
sequential phases. Idealised view of 
the process. 
Agenda setting is identified as the 
first phase of the process. 
Discussion of actors and 




used at different 
levels of analysis. 
Multiple Streams 
Framework (MSF) 
Five structural elements: 3 streams, 
policy windows and policy 
entrepreneur. Primary focus on 
agenda setting and policy 
formation. Policy choice and 
ambiguity. 
Focus on actors, policy 
entrepreneurs and policy 
makers. Institutions not 
emphasied but does 
reference the role of informal 
rules and formal venues. 
Case study 
approach, mostly 







Political systems are both stable 
and dynamic. Most policies stay the 
same for long periods, some 
change very quickly and 
dramatically – major policy change 
and incrementalism. Focus on 
factors that lead to change and 
those that constrain change. 
Reference to triggering events that 
shift the political agenda. 
Models of the individual and 
importance of bounded 
rationality in relation to 
attention. Reference to 
powerful and influential 
groups. Includes rules 
associated with institutional 
venues and friction. 
Quantitative 
approach. Moved 





Broad framework looking at 
networks, coalitions of actors, 
learning and policy change. Looks 
at factors influencing coalition 
formation and policy change. 
Policy actors who form 
coalitions – policy makers and 
policy brokers. Types of policy 
venue and rules in broader 
context are considered. 






A systematic way of studying 
institutional arrangements and the 
ways an institution can operate and 
change over time. Little directly to 
say about agenda setting. 
Focus on actors within an 
institutional environment. 
Sees actors as individuals 
who make choices and 
institutions as rules and 
norms that shape behavior. 
Outcomes generated by local 






Explores the process through which 
governments adopt new policies. 
Internal determinants and diffusion 
are central concepts. 
There is a key role for policy 
makers, experts, change 
agents and opinion leaders in 
ensuring diffusion. The focus 
is on the policy choices of 
actors at the ‘collective level’ 
whilst institutions and 
networks are part of the wider 
context of change. 
Quantitative. 





Creation of new policies is 
influenced by existence of other 
policies. New policies shape new 
politics which in turn affects policy 
making. 
The focus is on actors, 
networks and ideas. Individual 
choice is shaped by policies 
and institutions. Emerged 






Focus on policy problems and 
policy solutions. Policy maker uses 
policy narratives to construct 
focusing events and define policy 
reality. Introduces the concept of 
problem surfing and the opportunity 
for solutions to be attached to 
problems. 
Actors making choices are the 
core focus. Looks at the use 
of narratives by actors and 
groups to influence decisions. 
Individuals play a particularly 
key role at the micro level of 
analysis. 
Mixed methods. 
Different levels of 
analysis. 
Sources: Cairney (2012), Heikkila & Cairney (2018), Weible & Sabatier (2017) 
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Appendix 2 – Participant Information Sheet 
Bristol Mayoral Election 2016 – PhD Research Project 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
About the research 
My name is Tessa Coombes and I am a PhD 
student in the School for Policy Studies at the 
University of Bristol. My research is about 
how housing policy is treated during the 
Bristol Mayoral election in 2016. I am 
particularly interested in understanding the 
pressures and influences on mayoral 
candidates during the election and how they 
respond to influence and lobbying. I am 
interested to know how priorities are decided 
and if they change during the campaign. 
 
My aim is to try and understand these issues 
from the perspective of a range of 
stakeholders and to explore the pressures 
and constraints on local politicians. I am keen 
to better understand how and why decisions 
are made at a local level in Bristol. Ultimately, 
I hope to be able to contribute to debates 
about local policy prioritisation, how different 
levels and types of influence impact on 
decisions and to provide a better 
understanding of local politics. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been asked to take part in this 
research as someone who has been selected 
as a candidate in the Bristol mayoral election 
in May 2016.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
I would like to ‘shadow’ some of the mayoral 
candidates for up to 3 days during the 
election campaign. I will use this time to 
observe and make notes about how 
candidates develop priorities, who they speak 
to and how they respond to different 
influences.  
 
I would also like to formally interview some of 
the mayoral candidates, both in the early 
stages of the campaign and again towards 
the end. Where possible all interviews will be 
recorded and will take between 1-1.5 hours 
each. No one other than me will listen to the 






Participation in the research will be 
negotiated on an individual basis and clarified 
through a detailed consent form (see 
attached). Participants are free to withdraw 
from the research at any time, although this 
will be difficult if consent is withdrawn less 
than three months prior to submission of the 
thesis 
 
What will happen to the information? 
The date collected will be used to write up my 
PhD thesis. Data will be anonymised unless 
quotes are agreed by the participant. Any 
quotes will be sent to the candidate for 
approval prior to inclusion. I may also use 
anonymised data in academic articles and at 
conferences. Some of the issues raised and 
themes identified may form the basis of some 
online blogs. These will be fully anonymised 
so individuals cannot be identified. 
 
The University requires data to be stored on 
a secure server for 10 years after the end of 
the research. All data will be anonymised 
before being stored in this way. Any 
information participants share with me, or that 
is collected during my observations, will only 
be seen by my supervisors and me. All data 
and information will be treated with the 
strictest confidence. 
 
Limits to confidentiality 
Issues of confidentiality will only be called 
into question where there is the potential for 
significant risk of harm to participants or 
others, or where illegal activity is identified. In 
these circumstances I would raise the issue 
with the participant concerned and seek 
advice from my supervisor. 
 
Contact details 
Researcher: Tessa Coombes 
Email – tc13233@bristol.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Prof Alex Marsh 
Email – alex.marsh@bristol.ac.uk 
Tel – 0117 954 5584
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Appendix 3 – Consent Form 
 
Bristol Mayoral Election 2016 – Research Project 
Informed Consent Form 
 
 
1. I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet. 
 
2. I have had an opportunity to ask questions about the project.  
 
3. I am happy to take part in the research.    
 
4. I am happy for formal interviews to be recorded digitally, for the sole use of the 
named researcher.  
 
5. I agree to allow attributed quotes to be used in the reporting of this study as long as 





6. I agree to allow only anonymised quotes to be used in the reporting of this study.
  
7. I understand I am free to withdraw from the research at any time, without giving a 
reason (this will be difficult if consent is withdrawn less than three months prior to 
submission of the thesis)  
           
I understand that the research is confidential and the limits to this are described in the 




Print Name: _______________________________ 
 





Supervisor: Prof Alex Marsh 
E: alex.marsh@bristol.ac.uk 
T: 0117 954 5584 















I agree to participate in this research involving the following: 
 
 
☐ Two formal interviews, lasting no more than 1.5 hours 
 
☐ A shadowing process for up to 3 days (equivalent) during the election campaign, 




By agreeing to take part in this research, I agree to the researchers attendance at the 
following events/activities: 
 
☐ Attendance at campaign meetings 
 
☐ Attendance at meetings with housing stakeholders/lobby groups 
 
☐ Attendance at hustings meetings 
 
☐ Attendance at campaign activities 
 













Contact details:      Researcher: 
Supervisor: Prof Alex Marsh     Tessa Coombes 
E: alex.marsh@bristol.ac.uk     E: tc13233@bristol.ac.uk  
T: 0117 954 5584 
 
School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, 8 Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TZ
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Appendix 4 – Interview Themes/Questions  
 
Mayoral Candidates 
Introduction to the research, check participant has seen the participant 
information sheet, sign consent forms. 
 
Begin with simple question about why they are standing as a candidate, what 
their main priorities are and what they see as the key issues for the campaign. 
This may well lead to openings for many of the issues and themes to cover. Try 
to keep the interview conversational, open and provide plenty of time for them 
to speak about what they think is important. 
 
Introduction 
Why did you decide to stand as a candidate? 
What are your main priorities? (Where does housing feature?) 
What do you think will be the key issues during the campaign? (are these likely 
to differ from priorities?) 
 
Follow up with prompts on the following themes/issues: 
 
Housing Policy: 
§ Views on housing policy locally, what’s missing, what’s important and 
why? 
§ What are the key groups with a role in housing policy, have they been 
in contact, have you spoken to them? 
§ Are there any housing issues that aren’t being looked at, why not? 
§ How do housing issues compete for attention with other priorities, is it 
a top 5 issue? 
 
Structures: 
§ Do you think having a mayor has made any difference to how 
decisions on housing are taken? 
§ Has the current mayor prioritised housing? 
§ What impact has national policy had on how decisions are made 
locally? 
§ Are there any key policy changes at national or sub national level that 
have an impact on what you can do in Bristol? 
 
Individuals and Influence: 
§ In terms of housing policy, who has been in touch with you, sent you 
information or talked to you about housing in Bristol? 
§ What are the issues they are raising and how have they approached 
you?  
§ Have discussions, contact been positive or negative? 
§ Do you agree with them? Are there contradictions in approaches and 
issues? 
§ When you agree your priorities/pledges/policies, who do you seek to 
speak to about them, where do your ideas come from? 
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Follow up issues and prompts: 
• What evidence has been presented to you to identify the problem? 
• Can you think of any key events, activities, that have highlighted the 
problem? 
• Where do the ideas and solutions come from? 
• What perceived problems are they trying to address? 
• How far do issues of finance and viability of solutions govern your 
response? 
• When you agree your priorities/ pledges/policies, who do you seek to 
speak to about them, where do your ideas come from? 
• Who was involved in developing your manifesto? 
• What do you think is the biggest issue when determining priorities?  
• How would you do things differently? 
• Are there any key policy changes at national or sub national level that 
have an impact on what you can do in Bristol? 
• Are there any housing issues that aren’t being looked at, that haven’t 
been raised? Why do you think that is? 
• How do housing issues compete for attention with other priorities? 
• When presented with an issue how do you respond? What governs your 
response? 
• Who do you listen to most when developing policy ideas and solutions? 
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Housing Stakeholder Groups 
 
Introduction to the research, check participant has seen the participant 
information sheet, sign consent forms. 
 
Begin with simple question about what their role is as an organisation and what 
their priorities are for Bristol - help to put them at ease and ensure my 
understanding of this is right: 
 
Initial questions: 
§ Can you tell me what role you play in your organisation? 
§ What are the main aims/priorities of your organisation in relation to 
housing provision generally and in Bristol?  
§ What are the biggest issues facing Bristol in relation to housing, follow up 
with what role they play in that and how they promote the issues. 
§ What are the main changes you have seen in relation to national housing 
policy since 2010, are there specific policies that you have found to be 
particularly helpful or that have acted as a barrier to delivery on your 
priorities?  
§ Can you provide a couple of examples of how they have worked locally? 
§ How far does national policy shape what happens in Bristol – examples? 
 




§ How did they approach them, was it easy to get a responses/meeting? 
§ Did they approach all the candidates, if not who and why? 
§ What type of issues did they raise? 
§ What was the response from the candidates? 
§ Were they happy with the meeting? 
§ What do they think will happen as a result, or would like to happen? 
 
NO 
§ Do they intend to contact the candidates?  
§ Who do they wish to contact, about what issues and why? 
§ What sort of response do they expect? 




Appendix 5 – Interview Schedule and Coding 
 
 
Interviews and Coding38 
The Candidates Date Recorded 
C1 Mar 16/July 16 Yes 
C2 Jan 16/May 16/ Sept 16 Yes 
C3 Jan 16/May16 Yes 
C4 Jan 16 No – declined 
C5 Declined  n/a 
The Influencers Date Recorded 
INF1 Dec 15/Mar 16/May 16 Yes 
INF2 Jan 16/July 16 Yes 
INF3 Feb 16/May 16 Yes 
INF4 Apr 16 Yes 
INF5 Nov 15 No - declined 
INF6 Jan 16 No - declined 
INF7 Feb 16 Yes 
INF9 Mar 16 No - informal 
INF10 Mar 16 Yes 
INF11 Feb 16 Yes 
INF12 Apr 16 No -  informal 
INF13 Jun 16 Yes 
INF14 May 16 Yes 
INF15 Jun 16 Yes 
INF16 Mar 16 Yes 
INF17 Apr 16 No – informal 
INF18 Feb 16 Yes 
Party Members/Councillors Date Recorded 
CL1 Feb 16 No – declined 
CL2 Jan 16 Yes 
CL5 Feb 16 No – informal 
M1 June 16/ Sept 16 Yes 
M6 Feb 16 No - informal 
Council Officers Date Recorded 
BC1 April 16/July 16 Yes 
BC2 June 16 Yes 
Media Date Recorded 
NEWS1 May 16 No - tel 
NEWS2 April 16 No - tel 





38 Note - codes relate to overall coding structure, including attendees at meetings etc. for the purposes of 
quotes/comments throughout the text. 
